Dispatches from Brookline: Home Schooling and Social Distancing IV

On Monday, March 23, 2020, Massachusetts Governor Charlie Baker called for the closure of all non-essential businesses and asked residents to stay in their home as much as possible: to “shelter in place.” The order went in to effect at noon on Tuesday, March 24, and it will stay in effect until noon at April 7.

In three previous posts (I, II, III), I described how my wife Nell, our two daughters—one in 4th grade and one in 6th grade—and I were already coping with social distancing and the closure of the public schools in Brookline, Massachusetts until at least April 7, 2020. Besides staying inside as much as possible, we converted our dining room into a functioning classroom complete with workbooks, flip charts and a very popular white board.

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After a successful, albeit exhausting, first week of home schooling, we laid low over the weekend.

The highlight of Saturday stemmed from an idea our older daughter had: she desperately wanted a burrito, which she would happily eat at every meal. Choosing not to walk down the street to our preferred takeout joint, we explored delivery options instead…and discovered that our favorite Mexican restaurant—a drive of at least 20 minutes away in Cambridge—would deliver to us. It felt like such a ridiculous treat, and the food was so good, I did not mind they had given soft, not crunchy, tacos. While I ate my food and worked on my “lectures,” Nell and the girl swatched Onward, which emotionally wrecked my wife.

Later that night, I walked our golden retriever up to our local dog park—and I mean “up;” Brookline is renowned for its many streets that slope upward at nearly a 45-degree angle. To be honest, I needed the outing and the exercise more than she did. We stayed about 15 minutes, as she ecstatically chased an increasingly-filthy fuzzy ball hurled by a Chuck-It. Returning home, I put her to bed, bathed and settled down to watch the excellent I Wake Up Screaming via Turner Classic Movies OnDemand.

The choice of film–other than its sudden aviability–was in keeping with my discussion of film noir with the girls the previous day, during which I used “oneiric” to describe the dream-like quality of many films noir. This spurred a conversation about we all are having intense, more-anxiety-than-nightmare dreams during our “lockdown.”

Also in keeping with Friday’s “lecture,” our younger daughter and I watched Stranger on the Third Floor on Sunday evening. She very much enjoyed it, patiently allowing me to pause the movie at times to explain the difference between “high-key” and “low-key” lighting.

As to why we watched this particular film, here is an excerpt from Chapter 6 of the book I am writing—and need to finish soon:

Another myth to be exploded was film noir’s origin story. In the traditional telling, first outlined in Schrader’s essay, waves of mostly-German émigré filmmakers arrive in Hollywood throughout the 1930s, bringing with them the cinematic techniques of Expressionism and, later, French poetic realism. Vincent Brook, as we saw in the Introduction to Part 1, argues these filmmakers were often deeply and specifically influenced by their Jewish heritage, a primary reason they abandoned Europe, however temporarily, in the first place. Meanwhile, starting in 1931, Universal Studios—aided by German cinematographer Karl Freund, who had arrived in Hollywood two years earlier—makes a series of dark shadowy horror films (about which more in Chapter 8).  That same year, rival studios like Warner-First National, later Warner Brothers, start to produce high-quality gangster films, inspired by the lawlessness of Prohibition, ironically set to be repealed just two years later. Needing work for this influx of cinematic talent, studio heads take a long second look at works of hard-boiled crime fiction, ultimately relegating their new talent to the B-movie backlots to turn those works into films. Applying everything they know about filmmaking, and drawing upon the visual style of the popular horror films and the rapid-fire plots of the gangster films, they make films that would later be labeled film noir. The quality of these films is only enhanced throughout the 1940s by a slow loosening of the restrictive Hays Code of “voluntary” censorship, Italian neo-realism and technological advances. And the first of these films is almost certainly a 64-minute-long B-movie directed by an Eastern European émigré named Boris Ingster—and featuring an Eastern European actor named Peter Lorre—called Stranger on the Third Floor. Released on August 16, 1940, it has 33.0 POINTS, tying it for 71st overall—and, if forced to choose, it is what I designate the first film noir as commonly understood today.

For an explanation of POINTS, please see here.

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On Monday, March 23, 2020, I came downstairs to find this in the “classroom.”

March 23

The night before, Nell had drawn this homage to author Mo Willems—whom we once met in Maine—on the ever-popular white board.

Happy Monday Gerald and Piggy

Our younger daughter had again had a very rough morning—literally getting no work done even as our older daughter continued to thrive; indeed, on Tuesday, the latter would finish her work by at 11:30 am then ask “Is that it?!?” Still, the former daughter recovered sufficiently to sit attentively through the first hour of “Pop school,” during which we discussed the history and composition of American political parties.

March 23

For…reasons…our daughters have assigned nicknames to some of our early national leaders. Alexander Hamilton is “Hottie” Hamilton, while his rival Thomas Jefferson is “Smoking Hot” Jefferson. Our seventh president is now, unfortunately, “A**hole Jackson.” Our older daughter thought the name “Martin Van Buren” sounded “nice,” but she did not assign him a nickname.

We used two handouts to explore two ways to understand contemporary political parties:

  1. Elected officials and voters who share a common philosophy of government and policy preferences
  2. Coalitions of groups based on such factors as demographics, socioeconomic status, religiosity and cultural outlook.

The first sheet condensed an analysis I performed in August 2017 of issues on which a majority of Democrats—and often Independents—differed from a majority of Republicans. Our older daughter, fully in the throes of puberty and naively exploring her own sexuality, was particularly interested in partisan stances on LGBTQ+ rights.

Issue Differences Democrat v Republican

Whatever makes you happy, kid.

The second sheet, however, provoked the most interest. Less so from our fading younger daughter, but definitely from the older daughter, who delighted in reading aloud for Daddy to note on the white board which groups had voted, on average over the previous four presidential elections, at least 55% for the Democratic nominee or the Republican nominee; data taken from CNN exit polls conducted in 2004, 2008, 2012 and 2016.

How Groups Voted for President 2004-16.docx

You can see how that ended, complete with the tissues I use in lieu of a proper eraser:

Group voting for president

Following a break of an hour or so, we reconvened to begin to learn about probability. Which meant we each flipped a penny 30 times; by a neat fluke, in total, we had 45 heads and 45 tails—there was an a priori 8.3% chance this would happen. Then we rolled a die 30 times—the totals diverged sharply from 1/6 for each number; the number two noticeably received very little love. Our younger daughter asked to record my rolls on the white board, and, regretfully, I grew testy with her when she did not write numbers evenly on the row. I apologized immediately; clearly sheltering in place takes its toll on everyone at some point.

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Knowing the Commonwealth would be shuttering its doors the following day even more than it already had, I was tasked with making a run to our local Star Market. I chose to drive to one ten minutes away on Commonwealth Avenue, a stone’s throw from the main campus of Boston University; not surprisingly, we call it “the BU Star.” It normally closes at midnight, and with the campus all-but-deserted I thought this would be a relatively sane place to search for the 27 items listed in a text message from Nell on my iPhone, mostly varieties of fresh fruit and vegetable.

I never got the chance to determine it sanity, however. When I drove by its lower rear entrance, I could see the vast parking lot to my left was practically empty. Nonetheless, I parked and walked across the street to the locked sliding glass doors. A series of notices taped to those doors informed me this Star now closes at 8 pm every night.

Rather than turn around and drive home, though, I realized I was enjoying being out of the apartment and decided to drive over the nearby Charles River into Cambridge, through Harvard Square—eerily quiet—and north on Massachusetts Avenue to Porter Square. Like the BU Star, the Star Market used to be open 24 hours a day; it was my primary grocery store when I lived one block away in Somerville between September 1989 and February 2001. Driving to this Star always feels a bit like traveling back in time, with many landmarks remaining from two, three decades ago.

This Star now closes at 8 pm as well, meanwhile, which did not really surprise me. The silver lining is that a CVS sits in the same Porter Square parking lot; it is mandated by law never to close so that it can dispense emergency medications at any time of the day. When Nell nearly “broke her face” falling into a gate latch four years ago this May, this is where I acquired her pain medications after she was released from the hospital at around 1 am.

The older, deeply-freckled, red-haired manager of the CVS wore a blue face mask and darker-blue gloves. There was a strip of duct tape on the carpeting every six feet reminding patrons to observe social distancing. I collected what foodstuffs from the list I could find—including fresh-looking cut strawberries in clear plastic containers—and went to a register to pay. The manager scanned and helped bag my groceries—using the reusable bags I always keep in my car–as we chatted amiably.

As I thanked him for being there, he pointed out a woman I had noticed earlier—heavy-set, a bit unkempt and of indeterminate age—hunched over a wheelchair loaded with items she was pushing slowly around the store.

“I have to worry about thieves,” he said.

“Really? Her?” I responded, or words to that effect.

“Last week she managed to get all the razors…This never happens when George is in charge.”

He may not have been that upset, though, as he cheerfully handed me four dollars bills and some change—“You could have bought one more thing!”—before gently warning me not to forget my iPhone.

My route back to Brookline took me past the 7-Eleven on Market Street in the Boston neighborhood of Brighton, which was also still open. They had respectable-looking bananas, limes, lemons and small red and green apples, so I purchased a handful of each along with a few other items. Returning home five or so minutes later, I thoroughly washed my hands before putting away the four total bags of groceries.

A few hours later, as I was preparing a steaming-hot bath, Nell—who had gone to sleep hours earlier but now was restlessly tossing and turning—informed me she had put her wakefulness to good use by placing an Amazon Fresh order on her iPhone. She added that rather than give the recommended $10 tip, she chose to give $25 instead.

“Was that right?” she asked me as I soaked sleepily.

Of course it was,” I assured her.

When Nell placed the order, meanwhile, she thought it would arrive Tuesday night at 6 pm, only to realize later that morning it would not arrive until Thursday.

C’est la vie.

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The next afternoon, Tuesday, March 24, 2020, I came downstairs to find this in the “classroom.” Apparently there was no “word of the day.”

March 24

“FATHER COLLEGIO” did not start until 2:52 pm, as I was moving slowly this day. Once we assembled, though, after a BRIEF review of political parties, I began to tell the story of the 2000 presidential election by way of introducing American presidential elections generally and the Electoral College specifically. And our younger daughter was riveted.

March 24

The night before, Nell and I had discussed whether she should start taking her Ritalin on weekday mornings again. The last time she had taken any was two Thursdays earlier, her last day at her elementary school before it temporarily closed due to COVID-19, in part because we thought it was why she had been having a hard time falling asleep at night recently.

But despite refusing to take any of “her medicine” that morning, she was fully attentive and engaged as I described watching CNN continually reverse itself on who had won Florida that November night in 2000. Her attention did not wane as I walked through the history and defenses of the Electoral College, breaking more than 200 years of elections into a handful of epochs. We concluded with a discussion of how few states actually appeared to be in play as the 2016 presidential election approached—mooting the argument repealing the Electoral College would limit campaigning only to the most populous areas. At this point, our older daughter turned to her and said, “You probably don’t even remember that election. You were only [pause for arithmetic] six.”

I reminded them how both had cried the following morning upon learning that Hillary Clinton had not, in fact, been elected the first female president.

Breaking at 3:45 exactly, we reconvened one hour later to do two things as our “applied math” lesson:

Discuss how exactly Clinton lost the Electoral College in 2016 while winning the national popular vote

How Hillary Clinton Lost in 2016.docx

This is where our older daughter perked up again. While both daughters read from the one-page sheet, it was the older daughter who said “Wow!” every time I described how the Republican percentage of the non-urban vote in the pivotal states of Michigan, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin had skyrocketed between 2012 and 2016. And when we were finished, this is what the white board looked like.

Discussing 2016 election

Incidentally, you may find the answer to the question posed in the upper right-hand corner of the white board here.

I also used my wall maps of the 1988 and 1992 presidential elections to help to illustrate why the notion of a Democratic “blue wall” was absurd—voting patterns can clearly change dramatically from one election to the next. Those wall maps, by the way, are covering up an original painting by my maternal first cousin once removed; yes, that really is what my great-aunt and uncle named her. 

Color in a blank map to show current state partisanship

A few years ago, I developed 3W-RDM to assess how much more or less Democratic a state is—at least at the presidential level—than the nation as a whole.

States Ordered from Most to Least Democratic

Using the attached list of states and the District of Columbia, we each colored in our blank map as follows:

  • Dark blue = ≥10 percentage points (“points”) more Democratic
  • Light blue = 3-10 points more Democratic
  • Purple = between 3 points more Republican and 3 points more Democratic
  • Light red/pink = 3-10 points more Republican
  • Dark red = ≥10 percentage points (“points”) more Republican

Given how much both our daughters love to draw—they doodle and do other art projects as they sit and listen to me talk—this was easily their favorite afternoon activity so far. Even as our younger daughter was trying to keep up with which states were which—she got there soon enough—our older daughter was touting her “perfectionism” in carefully coloring in each state. She even gently chided me for my blunt-instrument approach to filling in “all those islands off of Alaska,” which she delicately colored one by one.

Hand drawn Democratic strength map

This is what my final map looked like. I may not be as good at drawing as my cousin, or even my wife and daughters, but I still think I produced a solid work of art, despite the single sweep of dark red across the Aleutian Islands.

Until next time…please stay safe and healthy…

December 2019 update: Democratic presidential nomination and general election polling

With the sixth Democratic presidential nomination debate set for December 19, 2019 in Los Angeles, California, here is an updated assessment of the relative position of the now-15 declared candidates. Since the previous update, four candidates exited the race: Miramar, Florida Mayor Wayne Messam on November 20, former United States House of Representatives Member (“Representative”) Joe Sestak of Pennsylvania on December 1, Montana Governor Steve Bullock on December 2, and, rather surprisingly given that she had qualified for the sixth debate, United States Senator (“Senator”) from California Kamala Harris on December 3. The 13 candidates who have abandoned their quest to be the 2020 Democratic presidential nominee each exited with grace, class and dignity; I commend them for it.

To learn how I calculate the value I assign to each candidate, NSW-WAPA (national-and-state-weighted weighted-adjusted polling average), please see here;[1] for recent modifications, please see here.

And, of course, here is the December 2019 lighthouse photograph in my Down East 2019 Maine Lighthouses wall calendar.

Dec 2019 lighthouse.JPG

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Table 1 below aggregates data from all national and state-level polls publicly released since January 1, 2019(as of 1:00 am EST on December 19, 2019), including:

  • 284 national polls (including 50 weekly Morning Consult tracking polls and 30 weekly YouGov tracking polls)
  • 38 Iowa caucuses polls
  • 39 New Hampshire primary polls
  • 12 Nevada caucuses polls
  • 33 South Carolina primary polls
  • 73 Super Tuesday polls[2]
  • 78 polls from 20 other states.[3]

There are now 558 total polls, up from 488 last month.

Table 1: National-and-state-weighted WAPA for declared 2020 Democratic presidential nomination candidates

Candidate National IA NH NV SC Post-SC NSW-WAPA
Biden 28.1 19.9 20.8 27.3 36.3 27.2 25.7
Warren 16.0 18.3 17.6 18.8 12.6 18.2 17.0
Sanders 16.5 15.5 17.5 19.0 11.7 16.2 16.0
Buttigieg 6.2 15.1 11.1 6.1 4.5 6.4 9.1
Steyer 0.5 2.1 1.5 3.1 3.1 0.3 2.1
Yang 2.0 2.0 2.6 2.7 1.4 1.4 2.1
Klobuchar 1.5 4.0 2.0 1.3 0.9 1.3 2.1
Booker 2.1 2.1 1.7 1.5 2.8 1.5 2.0
Gabbard 1.0 1.4 2.9 1.1 0.9 0.9 1.6
Castro 0.9 0.5 0.2 1.0 0.2 1.1 0.55
Williamson 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.30
Delaney 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.00 0.3 0.2 0.28
Bennet 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.28
Bloomberg 0.7 0.2 0.2 n/a 0.3 0.3 0.21
Patrick 0.05 0.00 0.05 n/a 0.1 0.1 0.04
DK/Other 23.6 18.0 20.8 17.4 24.2 24.4 20.6

The race continues to follow the same pattern. Former Vice President Joe Biden remains the nominal frontrunner (25.7, down from 26.2), primarily because of his 23.7-percentage-point (“point”) lead in South Carolina, essentially unchanged from 24.0 last month. However, he is less strong in Iowa and New Hampshire, where the two candidates battling for second place—Massachusetts United States Senator (“Senator”) Elizabeth Warren (17.0, down from 17.3) and Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders (16.0, up from 15.8)—are much closer to first place. And this more-inclusive version of NSW-WAPA overstates the gap between Biden and Warren; only examining polls conducted entirely after June 26, 2019, when the first round of Democratic presidential debates ended, Biden drops to 24.6 and Warren rises to 18.2; Sanders is at 15.8. Rounding out the Big Four, overall and in the four earliest states, is South Bend, Indiana Mayor Pete Buttigieg (9.1—up from 8.1, and 7.1 the month before). These four candidates account for more than two-thirds (68.0%) of declared Democratic voter preferences.

Looking only at Iowa and New Hampshire, meanwhile, shows an even tighter race, especially when only post-first-debate polls are considered. Using these more recent polls, Iowa is effectively a four-way tie, with Warren at 19.7, Biden at 18.9, Buttigieg at 16.0 and Sanders at 15.0. There is a similar scrum in New Hampshire, with Biden at 19.5, Warren at 19.4, Sanders at 17.0 and Buttigieg at 11.4.

In the next tier are five candidates with NSW-WAPA between 1.6 and 2.1 who are running out of chances to rise into the top four: billionaire activist Tom Steyer, entrepreneur Andrew Yang, Minnesota Senator Amy Klobuchar and New Jersey Senator Cory Booker—essentially tied for 5th place—followed by Hawaii Representative Tulsi Gabbard. Other than Booker, these candidates rose in the last month, particularly in the early contests. However, only Steyer, Yang and Klobuchar will be joining the Big Four on Thursday’s debate stage, despite protests by Booker and former Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Julián Castro, who remains mired around 0.6. The top nine candidates total more than three-quarters (77.7%) of declared Democratic voter preferences.

While Castro and the remaining six candidates divide just 1.7 between them, nobody else seems close to ending their campaign soon. Indeed, Castro missed the December 9 deadline to run in 2020 against Texas Senator John Cornyn. Meanwhile, the upsurge in NSW-WAPA for “Don’t Know/Other” reflects lingering support for Harris.

Returning to the debates, seven pollsters—six nationally[4] and one in South Carolina[5]–conducted polls of the 2020 Democratic presidential nomination both before (but after the October 2019 debate) and after the November 2019 debate. Simple average differences in polling percentage (South Carolina poll results weighted four times national results) show measurable gains for Buttigieg and Steyer (+1.7 points each), Gabbard (+0.9) and Booker (+0.6), as well as measurable declines for Biden (-2.9) and, especially, Warren (-4.1). Warren’s decline was even sharper after weighting averages by pollster quality (-5.9) and number of days between polls (-7.9): her decline was steepest in higher-quality polls conducted farther apart in time. This decline is reflected in the decline in Warren’s NSW-WAPA from 19.1 last month to 18.2 now using only polls conducted after the first Democratic candidate debate. By contrast, “Don’t Know/Other,” Castro, Sanders, Booker and Klobuchar saw higher increases in support, albeit still small, with higher-quality polls conducted farther apart in time.

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On December 13, 2019, FiveThirtyEight unveiled its own 2020 Democratic presidential nomination polling aggregations. We use different aggregation methods, so while values we estimate for each candidate are broadly similar, there are clear differences, most notably in the relative standings of Buttigieg and Warren in Iowa and New Hampshire. I encourage you to compare our methods and results, especially since I base much of my own methods on their example.

Here are four key areas where our aggregation methods differ.

First and foremost, I combine state and national polling averages into a single overall value: NSW-WAPA; FiveThirtyEight does not. Similarly, when a state has not been polled for a while, FiveThirtyEight adjusts each candidate’s standing in that state by the change in their national standing, or “secular trend.” I do not do this. The first four states are polled often enough to make such adjustment unnecessary there, and I use time-and-quality weighted averages of a) the 10 Super Tuesday states and b) all subsequent states, mitigating the need for secular trend adjustment. Moreover, while I think such adjustment is necessary for general election polling, particularly the closer the election is, I am skeptical state-level primary polling moves in tandem with national polling, if only because there is no “national presidential nomination primary” to assess.

That secular trend is apparent in how much worse Warren is faring in Iowa and New Hampshire in FiveThirtyEight’s models compared to mine, likely due to her polling decline since the last debate, as well as the corresponding stronger position of Buttigieg in those states.

Second, the way I weight elapsed time since a poll was conducted compared to the way FiveThirtyEight does means NSW-WAPA is slower to detect sustained movement in a candidate’s standing. Still, it caught the major movements: the decline in support for Biden and former Texas Representative Beto O’Rourke since the start of the debates, the rise of Harris after the first debate and her subsequent decline, and the slow steady ascent of first Warren (with a recent decline) then Buttigieg.

Third, FiveThirtyEight adjusts for the tendency of some pollsters to release more favorable results for some candidates, on average, relative to others. I do not, simply because I had not performed or seen the calculations. Also, adjusting for this mathematical “bias” in my general election polling aggregates rarely alters final aggregates very much. However, if I can obtain the bias estimates FiveThirtyEight uses, I may consider using them.

Finally, FiveThirtyEight assigns a higher weight to polls with a larger sample size; I do not weight by sample size at all. For one thing, this would give inordinate influence to Morning Consult tracking polls, whose average sample size in 2019 has been 14,562—while their pollster rating is B/C (which I code 2.5/4.3 = .581). There is in fact a slight inverse relationship between average sample size and pollster quality: r=-0.20 for 24 polling agencies who have conducted two or more national Democratic nomination contest polls in 2019.[6] Moreover—and here my epidemiological training comes into play—increasing sample size makes an estimate more precise (i.e., smaller margin of error) but does not reduce any systematic bias; the latter is reduced through the sort of adjustment discussed in the previous paragraph. Simply put, I see no valid methodological reason for giving more weight to polls with higher sample sizes.

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There has been a slight pro-Trump trend in recent polls of hypothetical matchups between potential 2020 Democratic presidential nominees and President Trump I may address in a later post. For now, though, here are the averages: Biden would beat Trump nationally by 7.6 points, Warren by 3.1 points and Sanders by 4.9 points, while Buttigieg would lose by 0.3 points and Booker by 0.7 points[7]; Bloomberg, based on eight polls—seven released in the last two months, would win by 1.2 points. The other eight candidates for whom I have matchup data would lose by between 2.9 (Klobuchar) and 9.3 (spiritual advisor Marianne Williamson) points, although these numbers are misleading, as they are primarily based upon data from pollster Harris X, who tend not to push undecided voters to choose, making for unusual polling margins.

Weighted by a rough estimate of the likelihood of winning the nomination (NSW-WAPA/.794), the 2020 Democratic nominee would beat Trump by 3.4 points, broadly in line with the median Democratic presidential margin (+3.0) in the previous six presidential elections, which include three elections with an incumbent seeking reelection and three elections with no incumbent. Excluding Biden and Sanders, however, decreases the margin to -0.2 points, with the caveat from the preceding paragraph.

Comparing available state-level results,[8] which decide presidential elections via the Electoral College, to my partisan-lean measure 3W-RDM implies Democrats would win the national popular vote by between 3.7 (excluding Biden and Sanders) and 5.8 points. Most encouraging to Democrats should be polls from North Carolina (R+6.0), Georgia (R+9.6), Arizona (R+9.7) and Texas (R+15.3), which show Democrats either even (Georgia) or within five points of Trump; on average, they imply a national Democratic lead of 8-9 points, confirming strong opportunities for Democrats in the southeast and southwest.

By contrast, polls from Democratic-leaning Nevada (D+2.0) show Democrats anywhere from 0.7 points ahead to 2.1 points behind, implying Democrats would lose nationwide by 1.3-4.1 points. And while Democrats are 2.1-5.5 points ahead in the swing state of Michigan, which Trump won by 0.16 points in 2016, their position is…wobbly…in Florida (R+3.4), Pennsylvania (R+0.4) and Wisconsin (D+0.7), all of which Trump won narrowly in 2016.

On balance, however, Democrats remain extremely competitive in a wide range of swing and Republican-leaning states against an incumbent president, with the most likely nominees—Biden, Warren, Sanders, Buttigieg—beating him by a combined 4.8 points.

Until next time…

[1] Essentially, polls are weighted within nation/state by days to  nominating contest and pollster quality to form an area-specific average, then a weighted average is taken across Iowa (weight=5), New Hampshire (5), Nevada (4), South Carolina (4), time-weighted average of subsequent contests (2) and nationwide (1). Within subsequent contests, I weight the 10 March 3, 2020 “Super Tuesday” states (Alabama, California, Colorado, Massachusetts, Minnesota, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia) twice subsequent contests. As of this writing, I have at least one poll from (in chronological order) Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Ohio, Washington, Arizona, Florida, Illinois, Georgia, Wyoming, Wisconsin, Delaware, Maryland, New York, Pennsylvania, Indiana, Oregon, Montana and New Jersey.

[2] Primarily California (31), Texas (19) and North Carolina (8)

[3] Primarily Wisconsin (13), Florida (12), Pennsylvania (9) and Michigan (8)—not coincidentally, the four states President Donald J. Trump won in 2016 by the narrowest margins.

[4] Morning Consult Tracking, Monmouth University, Fox News, YouGov, IBD/TIPP, CNN/SSRS, Quinnipiac University

[5] YouGov

[6] The correlation increases to -0.43 if you exclude Morning Consult.

[7] Although this matchup has not been assessed since late September.

[8] From 27 states: Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, Michigan, North Carolina, Texas, Iowa, Arizona, South Carolina, Minnesota, Nevada, Massachusetts, Florida, New York, Kentucky, Maine, Ohio, North Dakota, California, Alaska, Washington, Colorado, Missouri, Utah, Virginia, Montana, Connecticut, Georgia.

Just under one year until the 2020 presidential election…how does it look for Democrats?

On November 3, 2020, one year from this past Sunday, the United States will hold its next presidential election; technically, the election will conclude that day, given early voting and vote-by-mail opportunities in many states. Once a month since April 2019, I have updated analyses of polling data on hypothetical match-ups between potential candidates for the 2020 Democratic presidential nomination and President Donald J. Trump; for this post, I assume he will be impeached by the United States House of Representatives but not removed by the Senate. I make this assumption not because of any particular insight into the outcome of the Senate trial, but simply because polling data for other potential 2020 Republican presidential nominees, such as Vice President Mike Pence or former Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley, is sparse.

With the presidential election now one year away, here is a deeper dive into these polling data.

I Voted sticker

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First, however, here are the final polling averages for the two gubernatorial elections to be held on Tuesday, November 5, 2019.  In Kentucky, incumbent Republican Governor Matt Bevin trails Democrat Andy Beshear by 6.1 percentage points (“points”), though this is based upon only five polls, and only two conducted in October, with an average pollster rating of B-/B and an average Democratic “bias” of roughly 0.8 points; pollster quality is a letter grade assigned by FiveThirtyEight.com, and bias is a pollster’s average tendency to err towards Democrats or Republicans[1]. Plus, this state leans 28.7 points more Republican than the nation, according to my 3W-RDM, meaning the “fundamentals” (-28.7 3W-RDM + 5.7 Democratic edge in the generic ballot question – 8.5 Republican incumbency edge) suggest Bevin should win by nearly 32 points. Beshear should still be considered a slight favorite, but it would not be remotely surprising if Bevin won; with an astonishing gap of 38 points between polling and fundamentals, anything from a Bevin landslide to a narrow Beshear victory is possible.

In Mississippi’s open gubernatorial race, meanwhile, Republican Tate Reeves leads Democrat Jim Hood by 2.7 points, based upon 11 polls with an average C pollster rating and Democratic bias of 1.2 points. The fundamentals suggest Reeves wins by about 13 points, which more closely matches the polls. Reeves will likely win by a margin in the mid-single digits.

The bottom line, however, is that Democrats should not be competitive in either of these races, yet are within single digits in both.

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We have national-level polling data for hypothetical match-ups between 16 of the 17 currently-declared candidates for the 2020 Democratic presidential nomination and President Donald J. Trump; only former United States House of Representatives member (“Representative”) Joe Sestak has not yet been tested. Table 1 summarizes these match-ups; it includes all polls released publicly since January 1, 2019.

Table 1: Weighted-average national-level polling data for hypothetical match-ups between 2020 Democratic presidential nominees and President Donald J. Trump

Democrat NSW-WAPA # Polls Pollsters

 

Wtd-Ave Margin
# Rating Bias
Biden 26.8 76 22 B 0.0 D+8.4
Warren 17.4 70 20 B/B+ 0.0 D+3.8
Sanders 16.0 67 19 B/B+ 0.0 D+5.4
Buttigieg 7.6 37 13 B/B+ R+0.1 D+0.2
Harris 6.9 56 18 B R+0.2 D+1.8
Booker 2.1 18 9 B-/C+ R+0.6 R+0.6
Yang 1.8 8 HarrisX C+ R+1.5 R+7.1
Klobuchar 1.7 10 3 B R+0.3 R+5.5
Gabbard 1.3 7 HarrisX C+ R+1.5 R+8.7
Steyer 1.2 3 HarrisX C+ R+1.5 R+5.0
Castro 0.6 9 2 C+ R+1.5 R+6.2
Delaney 0.4 7 HarrisX C+ R+1.5 R+7.4
Williamson 0.3 7 HarrisX C+ R+1.5 R+9.1
Bennet 0.3 3 HarrisX C+ R+1.5 R+7.3
Bullock 0.2 3 HarrisX C+ R+1.5 R+6.5
Messam 0.0 5 HarrisX C+ R+1.5 R+12.5
Weighted Average Democratic margin over Trump D+4.0

NSW-WAPA” is a 2020 Democratic nomination polling average that aggregates national- and state-level polling averages adjusted for pollster quality and time-to-election; early states are weighted more than later states, and all state polls more than national polls. Each candidate’s estimated margin versus Trump uses polling margins from which pollster “bias” has been subtracted before weighting by pollster quality and time-to-election[2]. Final estimated margins for each Democratic candidate are weighted by the value NSW-WAPA/.845[3] to produce an “overall” Democratic average margin over Trump; the denominator is the total of 17 individual NSW-WAPA values[4].

Each of the six leading candidates for the 2020 Democratic nomination—former Vice President Joe Biden; United States Senator (“Senator”) from Massachusetts Elizabeth Warren; Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders; South Bend, Indiana Mayor Pete Buttigieg; California Senator Kamala Harris; New Jersey Senator Cory Booker—have at least 18 polls testing a hypothetical election between them and Trump. And for the first five candidates, the average pollster rating is a respectable B or B/B+ for at least 13 distinct polling organizations; the average for Booker is only C+/B- due to a preponderance of polls from Republican-leaning HarrisX (rating=C+, bias=+1.5); I have written previously about problems with HarrisX polls.

Overall, based upon a rough likelihood of each candidate winning the nomination, Trump would lose to the 2020 Democratic presidential nominee nationally by 4.0 points; Removing Biden’s polls lowers the margin to 2.0 points, while removing Biden’s and Sander’s polls lowers the margin to 0.6 points. Nonetheless, each of the six leading candidates either beats Trump nationally (Biden, Warren, Sanders, Buttigieg, Harris) or loses by less than one point (Booker). Unfortunately, the final estimated margins for the remaining 10 candidates in the table, including entrepreneur Andrew Yang, Minnesota Senator Amy Klobuchar, Hawaii Representative Tulsi Gabbard, businessman Tom Steyer and former Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Julián Castro, should be taken with a few pounds of salt due to the preponderance of HarrisX polls of these match-ups; for every candidate except Klobuchar and Castro they are the only publicly-available polls.

There are reasons besides these admittedly-very-early polls to argue the Democratic presidential nominee will win the national popular vote in 2020 by around 3-4 points—where Warren polls right now. In fact, Warren’s 3.8-point margin is very close to the 3.3-point-average Democratic margin in the last six presidential elections, which include three incumbents seeking reelection (Bill Clinton in 1996, George W. Bush in 2004, Barack Obama in 2012) and three open seats (2000, 2008, 2016); Obama beat Republican Mitt Romney in 2012 by 3.9 points. As usual, presidential election data from Dave Leip’s indispensable Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections.

Also, relative support for a Democratic candidate versus Trump is directly related to how well that candidate currently fares in the presidential nomination process, itself a proxy for name recognition; the correlation between the final estimated margin and NSW-WAPA is 0.90, suggesting the better known a Democrat becomes, the better (s)he polls versus Trump; Democrats are that eager to defeat the president.

Finally, some very back-of-the-envelope math suggests the 2020 Democratic presidential nominee is likely to improve over 2016 nominee Hillary Clinton’s 2.1-point margin over Trump. For one thing, while Trump remains nearly as unpopular as he was on election day 2016 (38% favorable then, 41% job performance approval now[5]), he will likely not face a nearly-equally-unpopular Democratic nominee in 2020. Voters who chose Trump as, hypothetically, the lesser of two evils now know what he is like as a president; the Democratic nominee now represents the blank slate, for better or for worse. More to the point, however, it is difficult to envision more than a small handful of the 65,853,625 voters who chose Clinton in 2016 switching to Trump, whereas switching in the other direction strikes me as far more plausible. But even if the vote switches roughly cancel out, there are 8,261,498 third party 2016 votes to consider, an unusually-high 6.0% of the total national popular vote. Let us assume half of those voters switch to one of the two major party candidates in 2020, and that they split roughly 2-1 for the Democrat, based on the idea voters who wanted to vote against Trump in 2016 but could not stomach voting for Clinton voted for Libertarian Gary Johnson, Green Jill Stein or Independent Evan McMullin. Using the six-election average increase in the total national popular vote over the previous election of 4.9%, that works out to about 72 million Democratic votes (50.0%), 67.5 million Republican votes (46.9%) and 4.3 million third party votes (3.1%)—and a Democratic margin of 3.1 points.

**********

Of course, it is the Electoral College, not the national popular vote, that determines the winner of presidential elections. Using 3W-RDM, if the Democratic nominee won by 4,0 points, (s)he would be expected to win 308 electoral votes (EV), although the race in Florida would be very close, more than the 270 EV necessary to win the presidency. Given an average error of 5.3 points, however, the Democratic EV total could be anywhere from 222 to 347. If the Democratic nominee only won by 0.6 points, though, (s)he would either lose with 259 EV or win with 279 EV, pending a likely recount in Pennsylvania[6]; the range of Democratic EV in this scenario is 191 to 314.

However, it is not necessary to rely solely on “fundamentals” calculations (i.e., national average plus 3W-RDM), as we have at least one hypothetical match-up poll from 26 states, including every relatively competitive state except Georgia. Table 2 summarizes these data, with polling averages in boldface; Democratic “wins” are italicized. Each row containing polling data has two values: the final weighted-adjusted average and, in parentheses, the extrapolated national popular vote margin based upon 3W-RDM. For example, Biden is currently ahead by 10.3 points in Michigan (which Trump won in 2016 by 0.2 points), but because Michigan averages 2.2 points more Democratic than the nation, that implies Biden is winning the national popular vote by 10.3-2.2=8.1 points, very close to his 8.4-point national polling average.

Table 2: Weighted-average state-level polling data for hypothetical match-ups between leading 2020 Democratic presidential candidates and President Donald J. Trump

State EV 3W-RDM Biden Warren Sanders Buttigieg Harris
DC 3 82.0 D+90.4 D+85.8 D+87.4 D+82.2 D+83.5
Hawaii 4 34.3 D+42.7 D+38.1 D+39.7 D+34.5 D+36.1
Vermont 3 27.7 D+36.1 D+31.5 D+33.1 D+27.9 D+29.5
California 55 23.2 D+28.4

(D+5.2)

D+21.9

(D+1.3)

D+26.7

(D+3.4)

D+20.0

(R+3.2)

D+22.4

(R+0.8)

Maryland 10 22.6 D+31.0 D+26.4 D+28.0 D+22.8 D+24.4
Massachusetts 11 22.1 D+37.9

(D+15.8)

D+25.9

(D+3.8)

D+27.9

(D+5.8)

D+22.3 D+23.9
New York 29 21.6 D+30.0 D+25.4 D+27.0 D+21.8 D+23.4
Rhode Island 4 18.0 D+26.4 D+21.8 D+23,4 D+18.2 D+19.8
Illinois 20 14.7 D+23.1 D+18.5 D+20.1 D+14.9 D+16.5
Connecticut 7 12.8 D+19.0

(D+6.2)

D+14.0

(D+1.2)

D+16.0

(D+3.2)

D+12.0

(R+0.8)

D+13.0

(R+0.2)

Delaware 3 12.5 D+20.9 D+16.3 D+17.9 D+12.7 D+14.3
Washington 12 12.1 D+21.8

(D+9.7)

D+20.5

(D+8.3)

D+21.4

(D+9.3)

D+12.9

(D+0.8)

D+13.9

(D+1.8)

New Jersey 14 12.0 D+20.4 D+15.8 D+17.4 D+12.2 D+13.8
Oregon 7 8.7 D+17.1 D+11.5 D+14.1 D+8.9 D+10.5
New Mexico 5 6.5 D+14.9 D+10.3 D+11.9 D+6.7 D+8.3
Maine 4 5.9 D+8.7

(D+2.8)

D+7.7

(D+1.8)

D+8.3

(D+2.4)

D+6.6

(D+0.7)

D+5.0

(R+0.9)

Michigan 16 2.2 D+9.0

(D+6.8)

D+4.5

(D+2.3)

D+7.5

(D+5.3)

D+2.8

(D+0.6)

D+4.1

(D+1.9)

Colorado 9 2.2 D+9.2

(D+7.0)

D+6.9

(D+4.7)

D+9.9

(D+7.7)

D+9.9

(D+7.7)

D+2.9

(D+0.7)

Nevada 6 2.0 D+1.4

(R+0.6)

R+2.8

(R+5.0)

D+0.1

(R+1.9)

R+4.4

(R+6.4)

R+0.8

(R+2.8)

Minnesota 10 1.5 D+12.7
(D+11.2)
D+11.7
(D+10.2)
D+9.7

(D+8.6)

D+1.6 D+3.3
Virginia 13 1.5 D+10.5

(D+9.0)

D+7.0

(D+5.5)

D+4.2

(D+2.7)

D+1.7 D+11.0

(D+9.5)

Wisconsin 10 0.7 D+5.9

(D+5.2)

D+1.1

(D+0.4)

D+4.5

(D+3.8)

R+1.3

(R+2.0)

D+0.1

(R+0.6)

New Hampshire 4 0.1 D+10.2

(D+10.1)

D+0.6

(D+0.5)

D+6.7

(D+6.6)

D+2.3

(D+2.2)

D+6.4

(D+6.3)

Pennsylvania 20 -0.4 D+4.5

(D+4.9)

D+0.04

(D+0.3)

D+2.8

(D+3.2)

R+3.8

(R+3.4)

D+0.3

(D+0.7)

Florida 29 -3.4 D+2.3

(D+5.7)

R+0.2

(D+3.2)

R+0.2

(D+3.2)

R+1.0

(D+2.4)

R+2.9

(D+0.5)

Iowa 6 -4.7 R+0.4

(D+4.3)

R+3.9

(D+0.8)

R+0.9

(D+3.8)

R+3.5

(D+1.2)

R+6.8

(R+2.1)

Ohio 18 -5.8 D+4.9

(D+10.7)

D+1.4

(D+7.2)

D+1.8

(D+7.6)

R+1.8

(D+4.0)

R+1.8

(D+4.0)

North Carolina 15 -6.0 D+1.8

(D+7.8)

R+1.5

(D+5.5)

R+0.2

(D+5.8)

R+3.0

(D+3.0)

R+3.7

(D+2.3)

Georgia 16 -9.6 R+1.0 R+6.1 R+4.3 R+9.5 R+7.8
Arizona 11 -9.7 D+1.8

(D+11.5)

R+0.8

(D+9.1)

R+6.0

(D+3.7)

R+3.6

(D+6.1)

R+6.7

(D+3.0)

Texas 38 -15.3 D+0.4

(D+15.7)

R+3.3

(D+12.0)

R+0.7

(D+14.7)

R+5.3

(D+10.0)

R+5.2

(D+10.1)

South Carolina 9 -15.7 R+11.3

(D+4.4)

R+12.1

(D+3.6)

R+15.7

(D+0.0)

R+15.5 R+17.4

(R+1.7)

Missouri 10 -15.9 R+11.3

(D+4.6)

R+15.1

(D+0.8)

R+16.7

(R+0.8)

R+15.4 R+17.1

(R+1.2)

Indiana 11 -16.3 R+7.9 R+12.5 R+10.9 R+15.8 R+14.5
Mississippi 6 -18.5 R+10.1 R+14.7 R+13.1 R+18.0 R+16.7
Montana 3 -18.6 R+7.0

(D+11.6)

R+9.0

(D+9.6)

R+8.0

(D+10.6)

R+18.4 R+10.0

(D+8.6)

Alaska 3 -19.2 R+4.1

(D+15.1)

R+15.1

(D+4.1)

R+6.1

(D+13.1)

R+13.1

(D+6.1)

R+17.1

(D+2.1)

Louisiana 8 -22.2 R+13.8 R+18.4 R+16.8 R+22.0 R+20.4
Kansas 6 -23.4 R+15.0 R+19.6 R+18.0 R+23.2 R+21.6
Nebraska 5 -25.8 R+17.4 R+22.0 R+20.4 R+25.6 R+24.0
South Dakota 3 -25.8 R+17.4 R+22.0 R+20.4 R+25.6 R+24.0
Tennessee 11 -25.8 R+17.4 R+22.0 R+20.4 R+25.6 R+24.0
Arkansas 6 -28.2 R+19.8 R+24.4 R+22.8 R+28.0 R+26.4
Alabama 9 -28.4 R+20.0 R+24.7 R+23.0 R+28.2 R+26.6
Kentucky 8 -28.7 R+15.5

(D+13.2)

R+32.6

(R+3.9)

R+22.6

(D+6.1)

R+32.6

(R+3.9)

R+26.9
North Dakota 3 -29.4 R+21.0

(D+8.4)

R+25.6 R+24.0 R+29.3 R+27.5
Utah 6 -33.1 R+1.3

(D+31.8)

R+3.3

(D+29.8)

D+5.7

(D+38.8)

R+20.3

(D+12.8)

R+15.3

(D+17.8)

Idaho 4 -34.2 R+25.8 R+30.4 R+28.8 R+34.0 R+32.4
West Virginia 5 -35.5 R+27.1 R+31.7 R+30.1 R+35.3 R+33.5
Oklahoma 7 -38.1 R+29.7 R+34.3 R+32.7 R+37.9 R+36.3
Wyoming 3 -45.7 R+37.3 R+41.7 R+40.3 R+45.5 R+43.9
TOTAL EV 390 271/291 297 243 273

There is a lot to unpack in this table, so here are some highlights:

  1. Biden would resoundingly beat Trump, but other top Democrats could easily defeat Trump as well.

Based upon polling averages and fundamentals calculations, Biden would most likely win 390 EV, even more than Bill Clinton’s 379 EV in 1996 and Obama’s 365 EV in 2008. However, if we allow states where the table margin has an absolute value less than 3.0 points to be “won” be either major party candiates, he could finish with as few as 292 EV—still 22 more than needed—or as high as 412 EV, a number on par with George H. W. Bush’s 426 EV in 1988; the senior Bush was the last president to top 400 EV.

However, I would not put too much stock in the single set of match-up polls from Utah (R+33.1), which imply Democrats winning the national popular vote by anywhere from 13 to 39 points, despite the pollster, Y2 Analytics having a B rating and a slight Democratic skew of 0.3 points; the polls, which also have Booker winning Utah by 12 points, were conducted on just 144 registered voters between July 31, and August 6, 2019. It is nearly impossible to envision ANY Democrat winning Utah’s six EV.

Meanwhile, Warren, Sanders and Harris would be slightly favored based on these polling averages and fundamentals calculations, with Warren literally winning Pennsylvania by something like 3,000 votes. Warren’s range is 239-352 EV, Sanders’s range is 242-379 EV, and Harris’ range is 243-326 EV. Buttigieg, finally, would be a slight underdog, with a range of 200-300.

Taking a much wider view, however, incumbent presidents should not be trailing at all at this point, and especially not to five or possibly six Democrats. In many ways, this race feels like late 1979, when a wide range of Republicans were eager to challenge an unpopular Jimmy Carter—whose own election had been something of a fluke in 1976, based on revulsion with the Watergate scandal. With all that, however, Carter won a narrow victory over a weakened incumbent Gerald Ford, at a time when Republicans had won four of the six previous presidential elections. At this point, the polls were close—though Republican Ronald Reagan, often seen as “too extreme” to beat an incumbent, ultimately won a 9.7-point landslide and the Electoral College 489-49.

  1. Democrats are doing better on Republican turf than Republicans are on Democratic turf.

Extrapolating from individual-state polling averages, the “typical” Democratic presidential nominee would win the national popular vote by either 5.6 (median) or 6.6 points (mean), both substantially higher than the average 4.0-point margin of actual national polls. Given extreme outliers like Utah, the median is likely the more valid measure. Remove Biden’s data, and the extrapolated national margins are 3.8 (median) and 4.9 (mean); remove Biden’s and Sander’s data yields margins of 2.5 and 4.0 points.

Why do state polls paint a rosier picture for Democrats? Consider Ohio, North Carolina, Arizona Texas, Montana, Alaska, Kentucky and, yes, Utah. Trump won each of these states in 2016 by at least 3.5 points, and they have a mean 3W-RDM of R+17.0. And yet, in these states the extrapolated national popular vote margin for each Democratic candidate mostly exceeds her/his calculated average national margin. In fact, the correlation between 3W-RDM and “excess extrapolated Democratic national popular vote margin” is -0.46, implying that the more Republican the state, the more Democratic state polling “overperforms” national polling. This should be extremely encouraging for Democrats.

The flip side, however, is a number of states where Democrats are underperforming, most notably in Nevada, whose six EV look dicey right now, despite it being a D+2.0 state. For all that, every other core Democratic state looks good for Democrats

Democratic support also looks wobbly in the vital swing states of Pennsylvania (R+0.4) and Wisconsin (D+0.7). Still, in Pennsylvania, Warren is no worse than tied, while Buttigieg is “only” 3.8 points behind, and in Wisconsin, Harris is no worse than tied, while Buttigieg is only 1.3 points behind. Plus, Michigan (D+2.2)—the third state, along with Pennsylvania and Wisconsin, that delivered the Electoral College to Trump in 2016 by less than 77,000 total votes—and New Hampshire (D+0.1) look solid for Democrats right now, with Florida (R+3.4) very much in play.

**********

The values discussed here, of course, should be taken with multiple grains of salt. It is impossible to know, for example, how the rapidly-unfolding impeachment process or changes in the economy will affect voters’ decision-making. An unforeseen crisis, domestic or foreign, could fundamentally change perceptions of Trump’s job performance—for better or for worse—as could something like a bipartisan massive infrastructure bill. Undecided and truly “independent” votes could break heavily for either party’s nominee—or they could split right down the middle.

Nonetheless, I would much rather be the Democratic presidential nominee than Trump right now.

Until next time…

[1] All calculations made prior to FiveThirtyEight publishing updated pollster ratings on November 5, 2019.

[2] Final nomination and presidential election values, nationally or at state-level, are the average of two  weighted-adjusted averages: irrespective of pollster and adjusted for pollster.

[3] Sum of NSW-WAPA across 17 candidates

[4] Overall Democratic margin does not substantially change if NSW-WAPA is calculated only using polls released since the first Democratic presidential candidate debates held on June 26-27 2019.

[5] I realize these metrics assess slightly different concepts, but job performance is a) a slightly better predictor of vote choice and b) cannot be measured prior to being in office.

[6] And possibly New Hampshire

A wicked early look at the 2020 U.S. presidential election

With the 2018 midterm elections behind us, and the field of Democrats seeking to challenge Republican President Donald Trump in 2020 taking shape, let us turn to the 2020 presidential elections, scheduled to take place (technically, to conclude) on November 3, 2020.

Previously, I addressed the wicked early relative standings of the 44 Democrats listed in at least one public pollreleased since January 1, 2019 by:

  1. Calculating each candidate’s polling average (WAPA[1]; weighted by time to election and pollster rating), both nationally and within any state with available 2019 polling.
  2. Calculating a single average (NSW-WAPA[2]) for each candidate by weighting their WAPA in early primary/caucus states (Iowa, New Hampshire, Nevada, South Carolina) more than in later states, in turn weighted more than national polls.

I similarly approach the 2020 presidential election: mixing “fundamentals” with public polls released since January 1, 2019 asking voters to choose between a named Democratic candidate and Trump.”[3] “Fundamentals” are simply expected margins between the Democratic and Republican presidential nominees in a state (the Electoral College [EC] elects the president of the United States) based upon my 3W-RDM measure (weighted average arithmetic difference between state and national Democratic margins in the last three presidential elections[4]). This measure is not perfect: it has “missed” (in either direction) by an average of 5.4 percentage points (“points”) over the last six presidential elections, with 67 misses (22%) higher than 5.4%.

Nonetheless, “fundamentals” (3W-RDM plus hypothesized 2020 Democratic national popular vote margin) provide a useful baseline against which to assess wicked early polling data. This allows me to avoid such “macro-level” indicators as the state of the economy or Trump’s approval ratings advocated by political scientists in (solid) volumes like this:

Forecasting Rosenstone.JPG

**********

Let me begin with the metaphorical (literal?[5]) elephant in the room: incumbent presidents who seek reelection win about two-thirds of the time, according to Yale political science professor David R. Mayhew[6].

All else being equal, then, Democrats have an uphill battle to defeat Trump in 2020. However, all is not equal, as both “fundamentals” and polling suggest. To calculate the “fundamentals” for each state (and District of Columbia [DC]), one needs

  1. That state’s 3W-RDM and
  2. The Democratic margin in the national popular vote.

While #2 is difficult to estimate more than 18 months in advance, there may be historic guidance.

Just bear with me while I review 60 years of presidential election results. As usual, election data come Dave Liep’s indispensable Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections.

Over the last 10 presidential elections (1980-2016), the Democratic presidential nominee has lost the national popular vote by an average of 1.0 point. However, because Democrats have fared better in presidential elections since 1992, perhaps more weight should be given to more recent elections. One way to do this is to weigh the 1980 margin “1,” the 1984 margin “2” and so forth through a weight of “10” for 2016; this yields a Democratic edge of 1.7 points. This is broadly similar to taking the mean of the 10- , 5- and 3-election averages (D+1.9). Even better for Democrats is a weighted average of the the last five presidential elections (D+2.9), not surprising given that Democrats have won the national popular vote in four of those elections (while only winning the EC twice).

Based on recent electoral history, then, a Democratic national popular vote margin of between 1.5 and 3.0 points is certainly plausible; the 2.1 points by which Democrat Hillary Clinton beat Trump in 2016—an election with no incumbent seeking reelection, which Mayhew found were 50-50—falls squarely in this range.

But incumbency does need to be taken into account. In the last 10 presidential elections in which an incumbent president election sought reelection (including 1964 and 1976, when elevated Vice Presidents Lyndon Johnson and Gerald Ford, respectively, first sought election in their own right), that incumbent won by an average of 7.7 points. Once you exclude the landslide reelections of Dwight Eisenhower (1956, 15.4 points), Johnson (22.6 points) and Richard Nixon (1972, 23.2 points), however, the average drops to just 2.2 points. And that latter figure drops to a loss of 0.5 points if you exclude Ronald Reagan’s 1984 reelection landslide (18.2 points).

An even better way to assess the effect of incumbency, though, is to compare initial and reelection margins. Starting with Eisenhower in 1956, there have been eight such election pairs:

Table 1. Presidential margins, initial and reelection, 1952-2012

President Initial Election Reelection Change
Year % Margin Year % Margin R – I
Dwight Eisenhower 1952 10.9% 1956 15.4% 4.6%
Richard Nixon 1968 0.7% 1972 23.2% 22.5%
Jimmy Carter 1976 2.1% 1980 -9.7% -11.8%
Ronald Reagan 1980 9.7% 1984 18.2% 8.5%
George H. W. Bush 1988 7.7% 1992 -5.6% -13.3%
Bill Clinton 1992 5.6% 1996 8.5% 2.9%
George W. Bush 2000 -0.5% 2004 2.5% 3.0%
Barack Obama 2008 7.3% 2012 3.9% -3.4%
Average, all   5.4%   7.0% 1.6%
Average, GOP only   5.7%   10.7% 5.0%

Since 1956 (Table 1), elected presidents won reelection by an average 1.6 points more than they won initially; this would put Trump at just 0.5 points down in 2020. However, when you examine only the five Republican presidents who sought reelection over this time span (Eisenhower, Nixon, Reagan, Bush 41, Bush 43), the margin increase jumps to 5.0 points; this would put Trump 2.9 points ahead in 2020. That said, the last three elected presidents to seek reelection actually saw an average drop of 0.8 points in their margins; the decline is similar (-0.6 points) for the last three Republican presidents to seek reelection (Reagan, Bush 41, Bush 43).

In other words, a longer analytic time frame implies Trump would win the 2020 national popular vote by 1.0 to 7.7 points, while a shorter analytic time frame implies a Democratic win of 1.7 to 2.9 points—a range of R+7.7 to D+2.9.

Well, that was not very helpful, was it?

**********

Actually, this range provides a baseline against which to assess 2020 presidential election polls asking respondents to choose between a named Democrat and Trump.

Table 2: “Fundamentals”-based 2020 state-level Democratic margins 

State/DC 3W-RDM EV D-7.7 D-2.9 D-1.0 D+0.0 D+1.7 D+2.9
131 +12.0-+82.0 175 +≥4.3 +≥9.1 +≥11.0 +≥12.0 +≥13.7 +≥14.9
OR +8.7 7 +1.0 +5.8 +7.7 +8.7 +10.4 +11.6
NM +6.5 5 -1.2 +3.6 +5.5 +6.5 +8.2 +9.4
ME +5.9 4 -1.8 +2.0 +4.9 +5.9 +7.6 +8.8
MI +2.2 16 -5.5 -0.7 +1.2 +2.2 +3.9 +5.1
CO +2.2 9 -5.5 -0.7 +1.2 +2.2 +3.9 +5.1
NV +2.0 6 -5.7 -0.9 +1.0 +2.0 +3.7 +4.9
MN +1.5 10 -6.2 -1.4 +0.5 +1.5 +3.2 +4.4
VA +1.5 13 -6.2 -1.4 +0.5 +1.5 +3.2 +4.4
WI +0.7 10 -7.0 -2.2 -0.3 +0.7 +2.4 +3.6
NH +0.1 4 -7.6 -2.8 -1.1 +0.1 +1.8 +3.0
PA -0.4 20 -8.1 -3.3 -1.4 -0.4 +1.3 +2.5
FL -3.4 29 -11.1 -6.3 -4.4 -3.4 -1.7 -0.5
IA -4.7 6 -12.4 -7.6 -5.7 -4.7 -3.0 -1.8
OH -5.8 18 -13.5 -8.7 -6.8 -5.8 -4.1 -2.9
NC -6.0 15 -13.7 -8.9 -7.0 -6.0 -4.3 -3.1
GA -9.6 16 -17.3 -12.5 -10.6 -9.6 -7.9 -6.7
AZ -9.7 11 -17.4 -12.6 -10.7 -9.7 -8.0 -6.8
212 -15.3-

-45.7

164 -≥23.0 -≥18.2 -≥16.3 -≥15.3 -≥13.6 -≥14.8
TOTAL DEM EV   182 191 245 259 279 279

1 DC, HI, VT, CA, MD, MA, NY, RI, IL, CT, DE, WA, NJ

2 TX, SC, MO, IN, MS, MT, AK, LA, KS, NE, SD, TN, AR, AL, KY, ND, UT, ID, WV, OK, WY

Table 2 shows how EV would hypothetically be distributed across states under scenarios ranging from Trump winning the national popular vote by 7.7 points to the Democratic nominee winning it by 2.2 points. Boldfaced results are expected Democratic wins, with italicized results reflecting uncertainty based on the average 3W-RD miss of +/-5.4 points.

What jumps out are the eight states comprising 78 EV with 3W-RDM between D+2.2 and D-0.4 (MI, CO, NV, MN, VA, WI, NH, PA). This range includes the states that effectively cost Clinton the presidency in 2016: MI, WI, PA. All but Pennsylvania lean slightly toward the Democrats, but even a relatively narrow 2.3-point Trump win in the national popular vote (well within the historic range) could easily put all 78 EV in the Republican column, giving Trump a solid 347-191 EC win. However, because there is a 3.0-point jump from Pennsylvania (truly “The Keystone State”) to Florida in 3W-RDM, a similar 2.2-point national popular vote win for the 2020 Democratic presidential nominee would be expected to yield only a narrow 279-259 EC win. In fact, the 2020 Democratic presidential nominee winning Florida (and the EC 308-230) would seem to require winning the national popular vote by at least 3.5 points. That same nominee winning 347 EV would similarly require winning the national popular vote by at least 6.0 points, adding Ohio, Iowa and North Carolina to her/his column.

In other words, there is clear asymmetry in the distribution of EV that works to the Republicans’ advantage: they can win solid EC victories with smaller national popular vote margins.

Of course, this analysis is purely hypothetical, even before re-emphasizing every state-level Democratic margin in Table 2 is the center of a 10.8-point range of possible outcomes (with roughly 80% certainty). Thus, a Trump win by 2.9 points nationally could result in anything from 259 to 356 EV for Trump, while that same margin for the Democratic nominee could yield anything from 191 to 347 EV.

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This broad uncertainty about the outcome in 2020, with perhaps a slight historical edge to Trump (though nothing like being a 2-1 favorite, per Mayhew), is why we now turn to 2020 presidential polling.

Since January 1, 2019, pollsters have tested national match-ups between Trump and 16 announced (or soon-to-announce) candidates for the 2020 Democratic presidential nomination:

  • Former Vice President Joe Biden (15 times)
  • California Senator Kamala Harris (14)
  • Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders (14)
  • Massachusetts Senator Elizabeth Warren (13)
  • Former Texas U.S. Representative Beto O’Rourke (10)
  • New Jersey Senator Cory Booker (7)
  • South Bend, Indiana Mayor Pete Buttigieg (4)
  • New York Senator Kirsten Gillibrand (4)
  • Minnesota Senator Amy Klobuchar (3)
  • Former Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Julián Castro (2)
  • Maryland U.S. Representative John Delaney (2)
  • Hawaii U.S. Representative Tulsi Gabbard (2)
  • Former Colorado Governor John Hickenlooper (2)
  • Washington Governor Jay Inslee (2)
  • Author Marianne Williamson (2) and
  • Entrepreneur Andrew Yang (2)

Five other national polls matched Trump against former New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg, Ohio Senator Sherrod Brown, New York U.S. Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) and Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY), none of whom are running for president in 2020; Representative Ocasio-Cortez, who was born in 1989, would actually be too young to serve as president on January 20, 2021.

Not surprisingly, the number of polls conducted with each candidate closely matches her/his current standing for the Democratic nomination, based on NSW-WAPA; Table 3 below shows these values as of April 20, 2019. To calculate how each candidate currently fares against Trump in the 2020 national popular vote, I used the procedure detailed here. Essentially, I weighted “unbiased” polling margins[7] by date-to-election and pollster rating two ways: 1) treating all polls (even from the same pollster) as statistically independent and 2) treating polls from the same pollster as a single “average.” WAPA is the average value from the two methods.

Table 3: Current WAPA margins for hypothetical 2020 matchups between Donald Trump and selected Democratic presidential nominees

Democratic nominee Nomination polls1 Margin vs. Trump
Joe Biden 27.9% 7.9%
Bernie Sanders 19.9% 3.7%
Kamala Harris 9.8% 1.3%
Elizabeth Warren 8.3% 0.5%
Beto O’Rourke 6.8% 1.6%
Cory Booker 4.3% 1.0%
Pete Buttigieg 4.3% -5.1%
Amy Klobuchar 2.6% -5.2%
Kirsten Gillibrand 1.0% -0.2%
Andrew Yang 0.9% -7.5%
Tulsi Gabbard 0.8% -9.6%
Julián Castro 0.8% -7.5%
John Hickenlooper 0.3% -9.7%
John Delaney 0.3% -9.1%
Jay Inslee 0.2% -11.6%
Marianne Williamson 0.0% -10.1%
Other2 11.9% 4.2%
Margin weighted by nomination polls 3.1%
Margin weighted by nomination polls (w/o Biden) 1.3%

 1 Not listed are Ohio U.S. Representative Tim Ryan (0.1%), California U.S. Representative      Eric Swalwell (0.1%) and Miramar, Florida Mayor Wayne Messam (0.01%)

 2 The weighted average of the five non-candidate matchups

As of April 2019, Biden—with near-universal name recognition—fares best against Trump in 2020, beating him by nearly eight points, which translates to around 347 EV (and perhaps more if he wins Georgia’s and Arizona’s 27 combined EV as well). More surprising, though, is Sanders’ solid performance against Trump—beating him by 3.7 points in the national popular vote (and likely winning Florida for 308 EV).

Moreover, both Biden’s and Sanders’ prospective margins are well outside the historic range computed above. The next tier of candidates—Harris, Warren, O’Rourke, Booker and Buttigieg—essentially tie with Trump, averaging a -0.1% loss in the national popular vote; Gillibrand also would essentially tie Trump (-0.2%). Of this group, Harris, O’Rourke and Booker fare best, beating Trump in the national popular vote by between 1.0-1.6 points and eking out an EC win, more likely than not. The other candidate with at least three public head-to-head matchups, Klobuchar, for now fares as poorly as fellow Midwesterner Buttigieg, losing the national popular by just over five points.

I would not read too much into polls showing Yang, Gabbard, Castro, Hickenlooper, Delaney, Inslee and Williamson losing the 2020 national popular vote to Trump by between 7.5 and 11.6 points. Both sets of polls were conducted by HarrisX, a firm rated “C+” by FiveThirtyEight.com and for whom no “skew” has yet been calculated. They may be affiliated with Harris Interactive, another C+-rated pollster with a significant pro-Republican (mathematical) bias of 1.5 points.

Nonetheless, it is noteworthy (and likely reflecting the strong Democratic desire to defeat Trump in 2020) that the better a candidate is doing in the nomination polls (i.e., NSW-WAPA), the better that candidate currently fares against Trump; the correlation between the two values is 0.84.

But most interesting of all is that a possible proxy for “generic Democrat” (weighted-adjusted average of the five candidates not running for president) would theoretically beat Trump in 2020 by just over four points (putting Florida, Iowa, Ohio and North Carolina in play).

To get a sense of how a typical Democrat nominee would fare against Trump in 2020, I calculated a weighted average of the 17 margins listed in Table 3 using each candidate’s NSW-WAPA (a rough proxy for “likelihood of winning the nomination”). By this measure, the typical 2020 Democratic presidential nominee would beat Trump nationally by 3.1 points, just outside the upper end of the range based upon recent electoral history. However, if you remove Biden’s projected 7.9-point win, the margin drops to 1.3 points…roughly how Harris, Warren, O’Rourke and Booker would theoretically fare against Trump. They would still be slightly favored to win, though arguably 164 EV from 14 states (NM to NC in Table 2) would be in play.

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But what about the states?

Since January 1, 2019, head-to-head 2020 matchups between a named Democrat and Trump have been conducted in 12 states (AZ, IA, MA, MI, MN, NV, NH, NC, PA, SC, TX, WI; mean 3W-RDM = D-1.9). Table 4 shows how specific Democrats (as well as “typical Democratic nominee”) currently fare against Trump (minimum 2 matchup polls in state), sorted from most- to least-Democratic by 3W-RDM.

State Bid San Har War O’Ro Boo Oth Overall Implied NPV
MA1 1 1 1 D+32.6 D+10.5
MI2 5.8 4.5 3.5 3.0 1 1 D+3.6 D+1.4
NV3 1 1 1 1 1 D-1.0 D-3.0
MN4 1 D+15.5 D+14.0
WI5 10.7 5.3 1 1 2.6 D+6.1 D+5.4
NH6 1 10.6 1 5.2 1 D+8.1 D+8.2
PA7 9.3 6.4 1 1 -0.6 D+5.9 D+6.3
IA8 4.8 1.1 -6.8 -3.4 1 1 1 D-1.4 D+3.3
NC9 -3.0 -10.3 -9.8 1 1 -7.3 D-5.6 D+0.4
AZ10 1 1 1 1 D-6.2 D+3.5
TX11 -1.9 1 -7.9 1 -1.9 1 D-3.3 D+12.0
SC12 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 D-7.7 D+8.0

1 Emerson College, 4/4-4/7/2019, 761 registered voters

2 O’Rourke: Firehouse Strategies/Optimus, 3/19-3/21/2019, 540 likely voters; Klobuchar: Emerson College, 3/7-3/10/2019, 743 registered voters

3 Emerson College, 3/28-3/30/2019, 719 registered voters; Oth=Buttigieg

 4 DFM Research, 2/26-3/3/2019, 719 registered voters; Oth=Klobuchar

 5 Emerson College, 3/15-3/17/2019, 775 registered voters; Oth=Klobuchar

  6 Emerson College, 2/21-2/22/2019, 910 registered voters

  7 Emerson College, 3/28-3/30/2019, 719 registered voters

 8 Emerson College, 1/30-2/2/2019, 831 registered voters; Other=Gillibrand; mean of  Brown, Pelosi

  9 PPP, 1/4-1/7/2019, 750 registered voters

  10 OH Predictive Insights, 2/12-2/13/2019, 600 likely voters

  11 Quinnipiac University, 2/20-2/25/2019, 1,222 registered voters; Other=Castro

  12 Emerson College, 2/28-3/2/2019, 755 registered voters; Other=Klobuchar

Most public 2019 state-level polls have been conducted by Emerson College (B+, D+0.1), who occasionally test “trial heats” when they conduct Democratic (and, less frequently, Republican) nomination polls in a state. While Emerson is a high-quality pollster, it would help to see other high-quality pollsters test these matchups. Also bear in mind that these are primarily polls of “registered voters,” not voters deemed likely to vote; the latter polls often tilt slightly Republican. And, of course, the 2020 U.S. presidential election is still more than 18 months away.

Nonetheless, Table 4 reveals some interesting things. One, it is clear pollsters believe that Biden, Sanders, Harris and Warren (≥14 head-to-head matchups)—in that order—are the likeliest 2020 Democratic presidential nominees, followed by O’Rourke (10 matchups); this perfectly matches the top five using NSW-WAPA. Pollsters asked about Booker, Gillibrand and Klobuchar earlier in the year, but have ceased doing so, reflecting their stagnation in the race.

As they do nationally, both Biden and Sanders perform very well in the states—especially in the key swing states of Michigan, Wisconsin, New Hampshire (one poll has Biden up 10 points), Pennsylvania and, most importantly, Iowa. Removing Biden from the analysis, in fact, lowers hypothetical margins a mean 2.2 points across these states, albeit without changing the state “winner.” Harris, Warren and O’Rourke do not perform as well, but neither do they fare poorly.

Overall, Democrats (using the same weighting method as national polls) are collectively ahead by solid margins in Michigan (3.6), Wisconsin (6.1) and Pennsylvania (5.9)—the states that cost Clinton an EC victory in 2016; strong 2018 Democratic performances in these three states may not have been a fluke. They are winning New Hampshire (D+0.1) by 8.1 points. And they are holding their own in Iowa, a state trending sharply Republican—from D+2.0 after 2012 to D-4.7 after 2016; being behind only 1.4 points could be a terrific sign for Democrats in 2020.

The most striking positives for Democrats in Table 1, however, are being down “only” 3.3 points in Texas and 7.7 points in South Carolina (albeit in a single set of late February polls). First, these averages imply an 8-12-point lead in the national popular vote, which has not happened since Clinton won reelection in 1996 by 8.5 points. Moreover, this could confirm the southeast and southwest are trending Democratic…although the averages from Arizona (D-6.2) and North Carolina (D-5.6) suggest otherwise.

Being collectively 5.6 points down in North Carolina, in fact, is not ideal for Democrats, as it implies essentially a tied race nationally. The worst news for Democrats in Table 4, though, is a set of polls conducted by Emerson College in Nevada in late March. Nevada has been trending steadily more Democratic[8], so to be collectively down roughly one point there is worrisome, because it implies a national environment where Trump wins by 3.0 points. Across the other 11 states, on average, the Democratic nominee would beat Trump by 6.6 points!

Still, the overall message from Table 4 is that a hypothetical Democratic nominee

  • is faring well precisely where (s)he needs to (MI, WI, NH, PA—even IA) and
  • leads the 2020 national popular vote by 5.8 points–roughly the margin by which Democrats now lead in the “generic ballot” (e., some variant of “If the election for U.S. House were held today, would you vote for the Democratic or Republican candidate?”)[9].

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I cannot emphasize enough the following caveats to this analysis:

  1. The 2020 presidential election is more than 18 months away.
  2. National polls only reveal so much.
  3. State-level polling is limited and mostly conducted by a single (respectable) pollster.
  4. Most polls are of registered voters, not likely voters, introducing some pro-Democratic (mathematical) bias
  5. Hypothetical matchups reflect name recognition as much as considered choice.
  6. I have not controlled for a possible Independent run by Schultz.

That said, signs are good for Democrats right now. The best-known Democratic candidates (and current adjusted polling leaders)—Biden and Sanders—are beating Trump both nationally and in the key states. The next tier of candidates—Harris, Warren and O’Rourke—while less well-known, are also faring relatively well, beating Trump by just over one point on average. As they get better known, that margin could increase (just as the Biden and Sanders margins could shrink).

And while a wider historical frame shows Trump as much as a 2-1 favorite (winning the national popular vote by as much as 7.7 points), recent history favors the Democrats to win the national popular vote by between 1.5 and 2.9 points—though even then their nominee would not be guaranteed an Electoral College victory.

Moreover, current polling suggests Democrats are ahead of even those positive numbers. Using national polls only, a typical Democratic nominee is ahead by 3.3 points in the national popular vote, while state-level polls imply a lead nearly double that: 5.8 points! Removing Biden from the analysis drops these values to 1.8 and 3.6 points, respectively, precisely in line with recent electoral history.

All in all, then, I would rather be the eventual Democratic presidential nominee than Trump in 2020.

In April 2019, anyway.

Until next time…

[1] Weighted-adjusted polling average

[2] National-and-state-weighted WAPA

[3] For now, I ignore a March 8-10, 2019 poll by Change Research which substituted Vice President Mike Pence for Trump. I also ignore (for now) five national polls (and Emerson College polls from Iowa, Michigan, New Hampshire, South Carolina and Wisconsin) that also include former Starbucks CEO Howard Schultz, who may run for president as an Independent.

[4] Democratic percentage of total vote minus Republican percentage of total vote. Weights for most recent 3W-RDM are 2008=1, 2012=2, 2016=3

[5] This drives our eldest daughter—a Democrat like her parents—crazy because she LOVES elephants.

[6] Mayhew, David R. 2008. “Incumbency Advantage in U.S. Presidential Elections: The Historical Record.” Political Science Quarterly 123:2.

[7] Using the FiveThirtyEight.com “Mean-Reverted Bias” listed in their Pollster Ratings.

[8] Starting with the three presidential elections from 1984-1992, Nevada’s 3W-RDM are D-8.5, D-6.9, D-5.0, D-2.5, D+2.0, D+3.2, D+2.0

[9] The margin has varied between D+2 and D+9—and mostly between D+5 and D+7—over the last few weeks, according to polls listed on FiveThirtyEight.com.

An (Electoral) College education

Imagine it is late on the evening of Tuesday, November 2, 2004.

Actually, it is closer to 5 am EST on the morning of Wednesday, November 3, 2004.

Since 7 pm EST the previous night, CNN has been presenting the results of the 2004 presidential election between incumbent President George W. Bush, a Republican, and his Democratic challenger, United States Senator (“Senator”) John Kerry of Massachusetts.

At this point, Bush leads in the national popular vote by about 3.6 million votes (51% to 48%); by “national popular vote,” I mean every vote cast for president (and vice-presidential running mate) in the 50 states and the District of Columbia (DC). However, under Article I, Section I of the United States Constitution (“Constitution”)—with clarification in Amendment XII—this is not the vote that determines who is elected president of the United States.

Instead, a group of electors chosen by each individual state and DC (Amendment XIII, ratified March 29, 1961) “in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct” (Article I, Section I) meet and cast separate for president and for vice president. The number of electors in each state is equal to the number of members that state currently has in the United States House of Representatives (“House”) plus two (the number of Senators every state has); DC is assigned three electors. With 435 House members, 100 Senators and 3 DC electors, there are 538 electoral votes (EV) up for grabs. In order to win the presidency, a party’s nominee must win a majority of the EV (currently 270); if no candidate wins 270 EV, the election goes to the House, with each House delegation (i.e., every House member from the same state) having a single vote to cast for the top three EV recipients (the Senate similarly would choose the vice president from the top two EV finishers on a simple majority vote of all Senators).

Thus, when I cast my vote in suburban Philadelphia for Senator Kerry and his vice-presidential running mate, Senator John Edwards of North Carolina, I was actually casting my vote for a slate of 21 electors I had never heard of, all of whom had pledged to cast THEIR votes for the Kerry-Edwards ticket if it won the most votes in Pennsylvania (which it did, 50.9 to 48.4%)[1].

Returning to our 2004 election scenario: as of 5 am on the morning after the election, Bush has 254 EV and Kerry has 252 EV, meaning neither has yet achieved a majority. Only the winners of Ohio (20 EV), Iowa (7) and New Mexico (5) remain to be projected. Since Iowa and New Mexico have only 12 EV combined, whoever wins Ohio will win the election.

By this point, though, there were at most a few hundred thousand votes remaining to be counted in these three states, meaning it was mathematically impossible for Kerry to win the national popular vote—and yet it was still not clear who would win the presidency.

Suddenly, at around 5:15 am, anchor Wolf Blitzer interrupts commentator Jeff Greenfield in what for him is an agitated state.

The Associated Press, who have been feeding us raw vote totals since 7 pm yesterday, has just announced that it has found an error in the tabulation of votes in Cleveland. Rather than trailing by about 143,000 votes, Kerry is actually leading the president by about 107,000 votes. And with that, CNN can now project that when all of the votes are counted Massachusetts Senator John Kerry will win the state of Ohio—and its 20 electoral votes—making him the next president of the United States.”

Winning Ohio would have given Kerry 272 EV, two more than necessary (assuming no more than two “faithless electors”[2]) to win the presidency. For the record, Kerry actually lost OH by 118,601 votes, IA by 10,069 votes and NM by 5,088 votes (vote totals from Dave Leip’s indispensable Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections). But let us assume under this scenario that Kerry wins OH by 81,399 votes (an even 200,000 vote flip), while still losing IA and NM narrowly.

In this alternate reality, Kerry would have won the United States presidency—while still losing the national popular vote by 2.8 million votes! In fact, had Kerry also won NM and IA narrowly, he would have won 284 EV (to Bush’s 254)—while still losing the national popular vote by something like 2.75 million votes!

Broadly speaking, this is what actually happened in the 2016 presidential election. Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton won the national popular vote by 2.87 million votes, largely on the strength of a 3.67 million vote win in California. However, Republican nominee Donald J. Trump won narrow victories in Michigan (10,704 votes), Wisconsin (22,748) and Pennsylvania (44,292), and their combined 46 EV gave him 306 EV and the presidency. Put another way, the 2016 presidential election was not decided by a national popular vote margin of nearly 3 million votes, but a combined margin in three states of 77,774 votes.

This was actually the fourth time since 1856—the first presidential election to feature Democratic and Republican party nominees—that the candidate who won the Electoral College lost the national popular vote; the Republican nominee won all four elections.

In fact, it had just happened in 2000. That year, Republican nominee George W. Bush beat Democratic nominee Al Gore in the Electoral College 271 to 266 (with one faithless elector), while losing the national popular vote by 547,398 votes. Under the “Kerry wins in 2004” scenario, this would mean that in back-to-back presidential elections, the winner of the Electoral College lost the national popular vote—with Democrats and Republicans switching places with regard to which party benefited from the divergence.

Presumably, this one-two punch would have led to bipartisan efforts to abolish the Electoral College, either by amending the Constitution (which requires winning at least 2/3 of the members of the both the House and Senate, followed by winning a majority in 3/4 of state legislatures) or by something like an agreement among states whose combined EV total is at least 270 to award their EV to whomever wins the national popular vote.

Actually, this exact idea—the National Popular Vote bill—was launched in 2006. As of this writing, the legislatures of 12 states and DC (whose EV total 181) have passed the bill (and had it signed by the governor), and it is expected to be signed into law in Delaware and New Mexico shortly, bringing the total to 189.

But…how did we get to this point in the first place?

Why do we even have an Electoral College?

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Just bear with me while I discuss what are now known as The Federalist Papers. Following the signing of the Constitution in September 1787, Alexander Hamilton realized how difficult it would be to convince each of 13 independent (and markedly different) colonies to ratify it, thus forming a “united” states; of particular concern was Governor George Clinton of “the growing State of New York.” [3] Hamilton thus began to write and publish a series of essays (under the pseudonym Publius) strongly defending decisions made by the Constitution’s framers; he was soon joined by James Madison and John Jay. In all, the three men—separately and together—wrote 85 essays. Federalist 68 (Hamilton) is specifically devoted to presidential electors, while Federalist 39 (Madison) grounds the idea of presidential electors in both the “republican” and “federal” nature of the proposed new government.

Federalist Papers.JPG

By “republican,” Madison means leaders are a) chosen directly or indirectly by the people and b) serve a limited time and/or under good behavior. In fact, Madison notes that most chief magistrates are already chosen through indirect means. As for “federalism”: rather than colonies merging into a single entity, there would be “a Confederacy of sovereign states.”[4] This was the great compromise: “the great and aggregate interests being referred to the national, the local and particular to the State legislatures.”[5]

Moreover, in Federalist 10, Madison explains how a republican government can limit the deleterious effects of “factions,” which he describes as “a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.”[6] While this certainly sounds like our current tribalistic partisan polarization—elevating loyalty to a political party over loyalty to the nation—Madison was really talking about factions emerging, then quickly disbanding, around a single issue or demagogic leader. He did not anticipate the emergence of two evenly-matched, organized, national political parties with broadly coherent policy agendas to which voters identify over multiple elections. Instead, Madison argued hopefully that an “extensive republic”[7] (sufficient representatives from a variety of localities) would diffuse the effects of any single faction.

Hamilton simply applied the logic of both “federal” and “republican” governance to the election of a president in Federalist 68, which I recommend reading in its entirety. He avoids saying the broader voting public cannot be entrusted to elect its presidents directly (until Amendment XVII was ratified in April 1913, United States Senators were selected by state legislatures), instead observing it was…

“…desirable that the immediate election should be made by men most capable of analyzing the qualities adapted to the station and acting under circumstances favorable to deliberation, and to a judicious combination of all the reasons and inducements which were proper to govern their choice. A small number of persons, selected by their fellow-citizens from the general mass, will be most likely to possess the information and discernment requisite to so complicated an investigation.”[8]

Moreover, having electors deliberate within their native state will create a “detached and divided situation [that] will expose them much less to heats and ferments, which might be communicated from them to the people.”

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That was the theory, at any rate: electors, chosen at the state level, would be free to choose whomever they thought would make the best president unfettered by factional loyalties; for a fractious collection of once-independent colonies, the logic is sound. And it worked in the first two presidential elections (1789 and 1792, during which electors had two votes, ostensibly one for president and one for vice president): George Washington finished first (making him president) with 69 and 132 EV, respectively, and John Adams finished second (making him vice president) with 77 and 34 EV, respectively. Even then, however, a nascent form of political parties was emerging, with Federalists like Washington and Adams, opposing anti-Federalists, like Governor Clinton.

By 1796, the anti-Federalists had become the Democratic-Republicans, and something akin to presidential tickets were emerging. Adams ran for president as a Federalist, with former South Carolina Governor Thomas Pinckney as his “running mate,” while Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr ran as the Democratic-Republican “ticket.” However, each man ran separately—which is how Adams received the most EV (71), making him president, while Jefferson finished a close second (68 EV), making him vice president. This was the first Electoral College: the election of a president and vice president from different “factions.”

When Adams ran for reelection four years later, the Jefferson-Burr ticket again opposed him. Unfortunately, Jefferson and Burr each received 73 EV because every Democratic-Republican elector split their votes between their party’s designated choices for president and vice president; the House ultimately selected Jefferson as president and Burr as vice president. This second glitch led to Amendment XII (ratified June 1804), establishing separate Electoral votes for president and vice president.

Much to the chagrin of Madison (who died in 1836), though, the modern strong two-party system was emerging, particularly under the leadership of Martin Van Buren, Vice President under Andrew Jackson (1829-37) then President (1837-1841). And the leaders of the two parties realized the best way to maximize the EV they received in a state was to legislate a “winner-take-all” system: whomever won the most votes in a state won all of that state’s EV—the system we have today. Virginia was the first state to adopt such a law,[9] in 1800; by 1832, only Maryland still split its EV. And as of 1880, every state had passed a “winner-take-all” law.

I cannot emphasize how important this history is to understanding the modern Electoral College. Remember, for Hamilton and Madison, the fundamental purpose of electors was to deliberate on the vital question of who they wanted to be the nation’s chief executive independent of factional alliance. The winner-take-all legislation—pushed by the very factions Madison sought to restrain—was not only antithetical to this purpose, it made a complete mockery of it.

**********

The first time the national popular and Electoral College votes diverged was in 1876.[10] Democratic nominee Samuel J. Tilden won the national popular vote over Republican Rutherford B. Hayes by 252,696 votes (3.0 percentage points [“points”]), but fell one EV shy of the required 185; Hayes had 164 EV. Nineteen EV were in dispute because both men declared victory in Florida, Louisiana and South Carolina. Ultimately, Hayes was awarded all 19 disputed EV, as well as one problematic EV in Oregon,[11] making him the dubious winner.

After two excruciatingly close elections[12] which could easily have resulted in a divergence, it actually happened in 1888. Republican Benjamin Harrison lost the national popular vote to incumbent Democrat Grover Cleveland by 94,530 votes, but prevailed in the Electoral College, 233-168. However, despite four divergences/close calls in a row, any momentum toward ending the Electoral College system stalled once Cleveland decisively beat Harrison in an 1892 rematch, 277 to 145 EV, despite a national popular vote margin of “only” 3.0 points[13].

And then came 13 presidential elections (through 1944) in which the average national popular vote margin was 14.1 points and the average Electoral College margin was 266.5 EV. The only relatively close elections during this period were 1896 (Republican William McKinley beat Democrat William Jennings Bryan by 4.3 points, 95 EV) and 1916 (incumbent Democrat Woodrow Wilson held off Republican Charles Hughes by 3.2 points, 23 EV). In fact, had Hughes flipped just 1,887 votes in California, HE would have won despite losing the national popular vote by more than 570,000 votes.

Starting in 1948, though, “near misses” became more common. That year, incumbent Democrat Harry Truman was challenged by Republican Thomas E. Dewey, Progressive Henry Wallace and States Rights Strom Thurmond.  As I wrote hereDewey had fallen just 77 EV short of the 266 he needed to win. Had he won about 18,000 more votes in California (47.6-47.1%), 34,000 in Illinois (50.1-49.2%) and 8,000 (49.5-49.2%) in Ohio, he […] would have won the 1948 presidential election…” Under this scenario, Dewey would still have lost the national popular vote by a remarkable 4.5 points (2.1 million votes).

Republican Dwight Eisenhower then defeated Democrat Adlai Stevenson by 10.8 points (353 EV) in 1952 and 15.4 points (384 EV) in 1956. But in 1960, Democrat John F. Kennedy defeated Republican Richard Nixon 303-219 EV, despite winning that national popular vote by only 0.17 points (112,827 votes). It is easy to imagine a scenario in which Nixon wins at least 113,000 additional votes across states he won, such as California, Florida, Ohio and Virginia, giving him a narrow national popular vote victory but a loss in the Electoral College—the first time a Democrat would have benefitted from such a divergence.

Four years later, incumbent Democrat Lyndon Johnson trounced Republican Barry Goldwater (22.5 points, 434 EV). But in 1968, Nixon beat Democrat Hubert Humphrey (and Wallace) by a solid 110 EV, despite winning the national popular vote by “only” 511,944 votes (0.7 points). While that is a substantial margin to overcome, had Humphrey won half the votes American Independent George Wallace won in Michigan (331,968), New York (358,864) and Pennsylvania (378.582), he would have won a bare national popular vote victory of 22,763 votes (but not the White House).

Nixon then handily defeated Democrat George McGovern in 1972 (23.2 points, 503 EV). Four years later, Democrat James E. Carter beat Republican Gerald R. Ford 297-240 EV while winning the national popular vote by 2.1 points (1,683,247 votes).  However, Ford only lost Ohio’s 25 EV by 11,116 votes and Mississippi’s 7 EV by 14,463 votes; a simple shift of just 12,760 votes in these two states would have given Ford 272 EV (and the White House) despite losing the national popular vote by well over 1.6 million votes.

After four near-misses in eight presidential elections, however, the next five (1980-96) were not especially close, with average winning margins of 10.0 points and 337.8 EV[14]. Still, that brings us to the five most recent presidential elections, three of which ended in divergence (2000, 2016) or came very close (2004). Even in 2012, had Republican Willard “Mitt” Romney flipped 214,761 votes across Florida, New Hampshire, Ohio and Virginia, he would have won 270 EV—and the White House—despite losing the national popular vote by more than 4.5 million votes (3.9 points).

To summarize, in the 38 presidential elections following the end of the Civil War, there have been…

  • 4 elections (1876, 1888, 2000, 2016) in which the candidate who won the Electoral College lost the national popular vote
  • 2 elections (1880, 1884) where a small shift in votes across a few states could have produced divergence in either direction
  • 2 elections (1916, 2004) where flipping fewer than 60,000 votes in only one state would have produced divergence
  • 1 election (1976) where flipping 12,790 votes in just two states would have produced divergence
  • 2 elections in which flipping a total of ~60,000 votes in three states (1948) or ~215,000 votes in four states (2012) would have produced an extremely narrow Electoral College victory AND a national popular vote loss averaging 3.4 million votes
  • 2 elections in which a candidate would have had to win an additional 130,000 votes across four states (1960) or win back half the votes of a third-party candidate in three states (530,000+ votes) to produce divergence.

Thus, one in three presidential elections over 150 years (1868-2016) either featured divergence or could have done so with varying degrees of plausibility. The Republican presidential nominee won all four “divergence” elections and would have won between four and six (depending on 1880, 1884) of the other nine “plausible divergence scenario” elections, for a total of 8-10 Republican victories (vs. 3-5 Democratic victories). And eight of those 13 elections came in two different five-election “blocks” of (mostly) close presidential elections: 1876-1892 and 2000-2016.

Those two blocks highlight a basic truth about the Electoral College: so long as the national popular vote margin is wide enough (≥5.0 points), there will be no divergence, making the Electoral College a quaint anachronism. But the closer the national popular vote margin (particularly <3.0 points), the higher the likelihood of divergence. And just because it does not always happen in this latter circumstance is purely a matter of chance.

It is worth keeping in mind that Hamilton and Madison had absolutely no conception of a national popular vote, because they did not intend for the general voting public to vote directly for a president (or vice president), any more than they could envision the modern two-party system reducing the choices to a few viable candidates. That very system, though, has reduced the electors to mere human rubber stamps, archaically ratifying what we already knew on Election Day (or a few days later). Their independence—and their role in the delicate compromise between “sovereign” states and the national government—was gone by 1836, if not earlier.

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Which leads to one final question: are there any good reasons to continue using the Electoral College to elect the president and vice president of the United States?

Arguments for keeping the Electoral College fall into two broad categories:

  1. Upholding tradition
  2. It prevents smaller states/rural areas from being ignored by presidential candidates seeking to maximize national vote totals.

The first category has two primary components:

  • It is very difficult to amend the Constitution
  • We continue to be a federalist republic, so giving states an independent role in selecting the president is necessary.

Taking each component in turn:

Amending the Constitution is indeed extremely difficult; it has only happened on 18 separate occasions (counting the 10-amendment Bill of Rights as one occasion) in 230 years. However, all that means is that amending the Constitution requires time, bipartisan effort and focus.

And there are 27 amendments (Amendment XXI even repealed Amendment XVIII)—including those arising from a steady increase over time in direct democracy such as expanded suffrage (blacks, women, 18-20-year-olds) and altered electoral processes (direct election of Senators). Similarly, since the 1968 McGovern-Fraser Commission, the process by which presidential nominees are selected has become far more democratic (if not completely so) through the establishment of state-level primaries and caucuses which use voter preferences to select Democratic and Republican nomination convention delegates.

That individual states select convention delegates using their own rules, broadly analogous to the Electoral College (even if Democrats allot delegates proportionally, not winner-take-all), demonstrates an ongoing robust federalism. Moreover, even if the Electoral College were repealed (or legislatively overruled), there would still be a solid division of labor between the national government and state (and local) governments.

The single most frivolous argument in this category, though, was made recently by Michael Steel, former spokesman for Republican former House Speaker John Boehner[15]: using the national popular vote to elect a president would be like using attendance to determine the outcome of a baseball game.

Ummm, what now?

First, how would one divide attendance to determine a winner? Second, the winner of a baseball game actually IS the team that scored the most runs—not the team that scored the most runs in the most innings, a better analogy between a baseball game and the Electoral College.

In the same conversation, however, Steel all-but-admitted Republicans want to keep the Electoral College because it has allowed them to win the White House three times in the last five elections despite only winning the national popular vote once. And that brings us to the second set of arguments: that presidential candidates would spend all their time in the biggest population centers rather than trying to win votes across the entire nation.

Forget that presidents (and vice presidents) were never meant to campaign anywhere; they were supposed to wait for the decision of independent state-level electors. Or the fact that Hamilton and Madison said nothing about protecting small states or rural areas; if anything, they were trying to convince the largest state—New York—to ratify the Constitution.

No, the fundamental flaw in this argument is that, since the advent of winner-take-all laws 200+ years ago, candidates for president and vice president have limited their campaigning to a few “swing states.”

Let me demonstrate using 3W_RDM, which measures how much or less Democratic a state’s presidential voting is relative to the nation. Table 1 lists the 12 states most in play in 2020, using the median Democratic margin in the national popular vote in the last five elections (2.1 points)[16] and an average 3W-RDM “miss” of 5.4[17].

Table 1: States most likely in play in the 2020 presidential election

State EV 3W-RDM Projected Margin in 2020
Michigan 16 D+2.2 D+4.3 (R+1.1 to D+9.7)
Colorado 9 D+2.2 D+4.3 (R+1.1 to D+9.7)
Nevada 6 D+2.0 D+4.1 (R+1.3 to D+9.5)
Minnesota 10 D+1.5 D+3.6 (R+1.8 to D+9.0)
Virginia 13 D+1.5 D+3.6 (R+1.8 to D+9.0)
Wisconsin 10 D+0.7 D+2.8 (R+2.6 to D+8.2)
New Hampshire 4 D+0.1 D+2.2 (R+3.2 to D+7.6)
Pennsylvania 20 R+0.4 D+1.7 (R+3.7 to D+7.1)
Florida 29 R+3.4 R+1.3 (R+6.7 to D+4.1)
Iowa 6 R+4.7 R+2.6 (R+8.0 to D+2.8)
Ohio 18 R+5.8 R+3.7 (R+9.1 to D+1.7)
North Carolina 15 R+6.0 R+3.6 (R+9.3 to D+1.5)
TOTAL 156 R+0.8

One can quibble with the mix of states[18]—perhaps the 27 EV in Georgia (R+9.6) and Arizona (R+9.7) are more in play for Democrats than the 24 EV in Iowa and Ohio. But the point is that in 2020 presidential candidates will focus on, at most, 14 states—a far cry from the “nationwide campaign” hyped by Electoral College advocates.

Their argument about small states fares little better. Using EV as a proxy for population, 22 states (including DC) can be considered “small” (<7 EV; median=8), of which seven are “likely Democratic,” 12 are “likely Republican,” and only three (Nevada, New Hampshire, Iowa) are potentially in play in 2020[19]; In other words, under the current Electoral College system that supposedly protects smaller states—at most three of the 22 smallest states will see ANY campaigning.

Then there is the argument only major metropolitan areas—usually limited to California (55 EV) and New York (29 EV), though not Texas (38 EV)—would see any presidential campaigning at all, completely ignoring rural areas.

First, this is precisely how campaigns are generally currently conducted within many states: Democrats rely on massive turnout in urban areas, Republicans rely on massive turnout in rural areas, with each hoping suburban areas break their way. Why is this acceptable? Why not apply Electoral College logic by assigning every county (or other sub-state area) a number of votes based upon its representation in its legislature, so that to be elected governor, for example, you would need to win a majority of these sub-state level votes?

Other than its patent absurdity, I suspect the answer is that statewide elections invalidate the “rural areas would get the shaft” argument. Theoretically, that same formula could apply at the national level:  Republicans would campaign in rural areas in every state, Democrats would campaign in urban areas in every state, and both would battle over suburban votes in every state[20]. Even more radically, Republicans could compete aggressively for urban voters, with Democrats countering by competing aggressively for rural voters. This would thoroughly upend the current geographic and policy alignments of the two parties in unforeseeable but interesting ways.

Here is the simple reality: Hamilton and Madison argued for the Electoral College in The Federalist Papers because they a) feared voters could easily be manipulated by factional loyalties and b) were luring 13 sovereign colonies into a single “united states.” But the emergence of strong political parties (national factions), the continued existence of robust federalism, the ongoing expansion of direct democracy and winner-take-all laws that run counter to the deliberative intentions of electors moot their arguments. The Electoral College simply has not served its original stated purpose since at least 1796, and it is time to repeal it to allow the only two elected officials who represent the entire nation to be elected by national popular vote.

Until next time…

[1] I was living in the suburb of King of Prussia at the time. Every morning, as I drove to the commuter rail station in Radnor, I would count the lawn signs for Bush-[Vice President Dick) Cheney and Kerry-Edwards. On average, the count was something like 24 for Kerry-Edwards, 12 for Bush-Cheney—and a smattering for Shreiner Tree Care!

[2] In the 2016 presidential election, there were a record seven such electors—five Democrats and two Republicans.

[3] According to the “Message to Mankind” written just inside the front cover of my paperback copy of Rossiter, Clinton, editor. 1961. The Federalist Papers. New York, NY: NAL PENGUIN INC.

[4] Ibid., pg. 243. Italics in the original text.

[5] Ibid., pg. 83.

[6] Ibid., pg. 79.

[7] Ibid., pg. 82.

[8] Ibid., pg. 412

[9] Technically, three states had winner-take-all laws in 1789, but each repealed them by 1800.

[10] I exclude the presidential election of 1824 because, technically Andrew Jackson won both the national popular vote AND the most EV, but because he fell 32 EV shy of the required majority (131 EV), the House decided the election in favor of the runner-up in both areas, John Quincy Adams. Moreover, both Adams and Jackson were Democratic-Republicans (the Federalist Party had faded away).

[11] An elector was invalid because he was an elected official.

[12] 1880 (9,070 votes, 59 EV) and 1884 (58.579, 37 EV)

[13] There were also bigger election system fish to fry, such as the direct election of Senators (Amendment XVII, 1913) and women’s suffrage (Amendment XIX, August 1920).

[14] The presidential election of 1988 was closer than it appears at first glance. Yes, Republican George H. W. Bush beat Democrat Michael Dukakis by 7.8 points and 315 EV. But Bush won a number of states by narrower margins than that. While this is a stretch, had Dukakis flipped a total of 615,920 votes across 12 states (CA, CO, CT, IL, MD, MI, MO, MT, NM, PA, SD, VT), he would have won the Electoral College 270-268 (assuming no faithless electors) despite losing the national popular vote by more than 5.8 million votes. Similarly, four years later, Democrat Bill Clinton defeated President Bush by 5.6 points and 202 EV. Had Bush flipped just over 300,000 votes in 10 states (CO, GA, KY, LA, NJ, OH, TN, WI and any two of MT, NV, NH), he would have won 271 or 272 EV, despite losing the national popular vote by nearly 5.2 million votes.

[15] Steel makes the argument at 39:15 here.  Actually, the entire conversation between host Chris Matthews, Steel and Reed Hundt is worth watching; Steel starts off on solid ground, then slowly deteriorates.

[16] The average of 2.3 points is slightly skewed by Obama’s 2008 margin of 7.3 points.

[17] Democrats are strong favorites in 16 states (including DC) totaling 191 EV, and Republicans are strong favorites in 23 states totaling 191 EV.

[18] Including Maine (D+5.9) and Nebraska (R+25.8), who give two EV to the statewide winner, and one EV to the winner of each Congressional district.

[19] These are also the first three primary/caucus states, undercutting arguments about their “unrepresentativeness.”

[20] This also answers a hypothetical question I like to pose: if we had had been using the national popular vote to elect presidents and vice presidents since 1789, would anyone have proposed a system as convoluted and, frankly, anti-democratic as the Electoral College as a “solution” to whatever problems may have arisen? I sincerely doubt it.

Organizing by themes I: American politics

This site benefits/suffers/both from consisting of posts about a wide range of topics, all linked under the amorphous heading “data-driven storytelling.”

In an attempt to impose some coherent structure, I am organizing related posts both chronologically and thematically.

Given that I have multiple degrees in political science, with an emphasis on American politics, it is not surprising that I have written a few dozen posts in that field…and that is where I begin.

I Voted sticker

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I started by writing about the 2016 elections, many based on my own state-partisanship metric (which I validate here).

The absurdity of the Democratic “blue wall” in the Electoral College

Hillary Clinton’s performance in five key states (IA, MI, OH, PA, WI)

Why Democrats should look to the south (east and west)

How having (or not) a college degree impacted voting

An alternative argument about gerrymandering

An early foray into what I call “Clinton derangement”

The only statistic from 2016 that really matters

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Here are a few posts about presidential polling (before FiveThirtyEight jumped on the bandwagon)…

Be careful interpreting President Trump’s approval polls

…and the 2017 special election in Georgia’s 6th Congressional District (GA-6)

Ossoff and the future of the Democratic Party

Using GA-6 polls to discuss statistical significance testing (spoiler: I am not a fan)

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And then I started looking ahead to 2018…first to control of the United States House of Representatives (“House”). Note that posts are often cross-generic…

An alternative argument about gerrymandering

The impact of voting to repeal (and not replace) Obamacare (May 2017)

I debut my simple forecast model (June 2017)

Making more points about polls and probability

A March 2018 update

A followup March 2018 update (after which I stopped writing about the 2018 House elections)

…then the United States Senate

The view from May 2017

What it meant that the Senate voted NOT to repeal Obamacare in July 2017

The view from December 2017

…and, finally, races for governor in 2017 AND 2018.

The view from June 2017

A tangentially-related post may be found here.

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After Labor Day 2018, I developed models (based on “fundamentals” and polls) to “forecast” the Senate elections…

September 4

September 13

October 23

…and those for governor (the October 23 post addressed both sets of races)

September 16

These culminated in…

My Election Day cheat sheet

And my own assessment of how I did (spoiler: not half bad)

Speaking of assessments, I took a long look at my partisan lean measure here.

And I carefully examined some polling aggregation assumptions here.

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Beginning in April 2019, I turned my attention to the 2020 elections.

First came a wicked early look at the relative standings of the dozens of women and men actually or potentially seeking the 2020 Democratic presidential nomination:

April 2019

Then came a wicked early look at the 2020 presidential election itself.

April 2019

And, of course, a wicked early look at races for Senate (2020) and governor (2019-20).

With a post-Labor-Day update.

With the first of regular updates to both the 2020 Democratic presidential nomination and the 2020 presidential election in May 2019

This post both set up the first Democratic debates and had good news for Democrats looking ahead to 2020.

This post set up the second Democratic debates and drew some conclusions about who “won” and “lost” the first debates.

This post updated the data for August 2019 and drew some conclusions about who “won” and “lost” the second debates.

Ditto for September 2019, October 2019, November 2019,  December 2019, January 2020

Once voting commenced in the 2020 Democratic presidentil nomination process, I wrote posts specific to the

As for the 2020 general election, here is the view one year in advance. And two assessment of Emerson College polls (one, two).

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Finally, there are other politics posts that defy easy categorization.

I indulged in some speculative alternative history about the presidential elections of 1948 and 2000.

I delineated issue differences between Democrats and Republicans.

I got a bit personal here and here, concluding with the fact that, despite overlapping in the same residential college at Yale for two years, I did NOT know Associate Justice Brett Kavanagh at all.

I argued for the abolition of the Electoral College.

Until next time…