November 2019 update: 2020 Democratic presidential nomination and general election polling

With the fifth Democratic presidential nomination debate set for November 20, 2019 in Atlanta, Georgia, here is an updated assessment of the relative position of the now-18 (19?) declared candidates. Since the previous update, United States House of Representatives Member (“Representative”) Tim Ryan of Ohio exited the race on October 24, followed by former Texas Representative Beto O’Rourke on November 1. The nine candidates who have abandoned their quest to be the 2020 Democratic presidential nominee each exited with grace, class and dignity; I commend them for it.

However, rather than shrink the field to 17 announced Democratic candidates, former Massachusetts Governor Deval Patrick entered the race on November 14, while others such as former New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg are strongly considering a bid—with Bloomberg even placing his name on the 2020 Democratic primary ballot in Arkansas. For this update, though, I exclude them from Table 1; the few recent polls listing Bloomberg show him registering between 0 and 3%, while no poll has included Patrick since he earned 1% in a McLaughlin & Associates national poll conducted February 6-10, 2019.

To learn how I calculate the value I assign to each candidate, NSW-WAPA (national-and-state-weighted weighted-adjusted polling average), please see here;[1] for recent modifications, please see here.

And, of course, here is the November 2019 lighthouse photograph in my Down East 2019 Maine Lighthouses wall calendar.

Nov 2019 lighthouse.JPG

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Table 1 below aggregates data from all national and state-level polls publicly released since January 1, 2019 (as of 11:39 pm on November 15, 2019), including:

  • 246 national polls (including 45 weekly Morning Consult tracking polls)
  • 34 Iowa caucuses polls
  • 34 New Hampshire primary polls
  • 11 Nevada caucuses polls
  • 28 South Carolina primary polls
  • 65 Super Tuesday polls[2]
  • 70 polls from 19 other states.[3]

There are now 488 total polls, up from 414 last month.

Table 1: National-and-state-weighted WAPA for declared 2020 Democratic presidential nomination candidates

Candidate National IA NH NV SC Post-SC NSW-WAPA
Biden 28.5 20.4 22.5 26.8 36.6 27.4 26.2
Warren 16.4 18.9 18.2 18.6 12.6 18.8 17.3
Sanders 16.3 15.0 17.4 18.8 11.7 16.3 15.8
Buttigieg 5.6 13.7 9.0 5.8 4.0 6.0 8.1
Harris 7.3 6.0 6.3 5.6 7.4 7.1 6.4
Booker 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.5 3.0 1.5 2.0
Yang 1.8 1.9 2.2 2.8 1.2 1.4 2.0
Klobuchar 1.3 3.4 1.9 1.2 0.9 1.3 1.8
Gabbard 0.9 1.5 2.4 1.2 0.7 0.9 1.4
Steyer 0.4 0.03 1.1 3.2 2.2 0.3 1.3
Castro 0.9 0.6 0.2 1.0 0.3 1.1 0.57
Delaney 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.00 0.3 0.2 0.33
Bennet 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.31
Williamson 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.29
Bullock 0.2 0.6 0.00 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.24
Sestak 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.1 0.03 0.1 0.04
Messam 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.01
DK/Other 12.9 12.7 12.5 10.5 15.8 12.0 13.4

The race continues to follow the same storylines. Former Vice President Joe Biden remains the nominal frontrunner (26.2, down from 27.2), primarily because of his 24.0-percentage-point (“point”) lead in South Carolina, itself down from 25.2 last month. However, he is less strong in Iowa, New Hampshire and (to a lesser extent) Nevada, where the two candidates battling for second place—Massachusetts United States Senator (“Senator”) Elizabeth Warren (17.3, up from 16.5) and Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders (15.8, down from 16.1)—are closer to first place. And this more-inclusive version of NSW-WAPA overstates the gap between Biden and Warren; only examining polls conducted entirely after June 26, 2019, when the first round of Democratic presidential debates ended, Biden drops to 24.9 and Warren rises to 18.9; Sanders is at 15.4.

Rounding out the top five, overall and in the four earliest states, are South Bend, Indiana Mayor Pete Buttigieg (8.1—down from 7.1) and California Senator Kamala Harris (6.4—down from 7.6); Buttigieg surged passed a fading Harris (down 2.9 in two months), particularly in Iowa and New Hampshire, where a top three finish in one or both states appears increasingly plausible. These five candidates account for three-quarters (73.9%, down from 74.6%) of declared Democratic voter preferences.

In the next tier are five candidates with NSW-WAPA between 1.3 and 2.1 who could yet rise into the top five: New Jersey Senator Cory Booker, entrepreneur Andrew Yang and Minnesota Senator Amy Klobuchar—essentially tied for 6th place—followed by Hawaii Representative Tulsi Gabbard and billionaire activist Tom Steyer. Other than Booker, these candidates rose in the last month, particularly in the early contests. Moreover, using post-first-debate polls only puts a little more distance between Yang (2.1) and Booker, Klobuchar, Gabbard and Steyer, tightly bunched between 1.6 and 1.8.

These 10 candidates—all of whom will be on the debate stage Wednesday night—total 82.5% of declared Democratic voter preferences. Of them, six—Biden, Warren, Sanders, Harris, Buttigieg, Klobuchar—have thus far met the criteria for the sixth Democratic presidential nomination debate in Los Angeles, California on December 19, though Yang and Gabbard are close; not appearing on the debate stage for the first time, meanwhile, is former Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Julián Castro, who remains mired around 0.6.

The remaining six candidates and Castro divide just 1.9 between them; as none is remotely close to making the December 2019 debate(s), I expect them to end their campaigns by the end of 2019.

Speaking of the debates, 10 different pollsters—nine nationally[4] and one in Iowa[5]–conducted polls of the 2020 Democratic presidential nomination both before (but after the September 2019 debate) and after the October 2019 debate. Simple average differences in polling percentage (Iowa poll results weighted five times national results) show measurable gains for Buttigieg (+3.5 points), Sanders (+2.3) and Klobuchar (+0.9), as well as measurable declines for Yang (-0.6), Don’t Know/Other (-0.9), Harris (-1.0) and Biden (-2.1). Adjustment for pollster quality and the number of days between polls made no appreciable difference. These shifts are reflected in the changes in NSW-WAPA detailed above for each candidate except Sanders and Yang; the latter discrepancy may be due to the preponderance of low-weighted national polls in this calculation.

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Less than two weeks ago, I took a deeper dive into hypothetical match-ups between the declared Democratic nomination candidates and Trump—assuming he is the 2020 Republican presidential nominee, as well as post-mortem on recent gubernatorial elections in Kentucky and Mississippi. Rather than repeat myself, however, I offer a few quick updates and a final look at the Louisiana gubernatorial runoff election to be held November 16 between incumbent Democratic Governor John Bel Edwards and Republican businessman Eddie Rispone.

Kentucky and Mississippi. After the November 5 elections, I discovered a final poll[6] of the Kentucky governor’s race which gave incumbent Republican Governor Matt Bevin a six-point lead over Democratic Attorney General Andy Beshear. Adding this poll dropped the “projected” margin to 4.0 points With Bevin conceding the race on November 14, Beshear actually won by 0.4 points, for a 3.6-point Republican “bias” in the results.

In Mississippi, meanwhile, Republican Lieutenant Governor Tate Reeves beat Democratic Attorney General Jim Hood by 5.5 points, while my final “projection” was Reeves by 3.0 point, for a 2.5-point Republican bias. The average bias was 3.0 points in favor of the Republicans even though I “called” both races correctly.

Louisiana. Based upon 18 polls with an average Democratic “bias” of 0.1 points and B-/C+ rating, my “projection” is that Bel Edwards will beat Rispone by 4.7 points. However, I note two caveats. One is that 3.0 pro-Republican bias in two other southern states, implying a narrower Bel Edwards victory of 1.7 points. The other caveat is that when only the nine polls conducted after the October 12 “jungle primary” are examined (averages: R+0.4; B-/C+), Bel Edwards’ lead drops to 2.2. In other words, while a narrow Bel Edwards victory—say 2.0 points—is the likeliest outcome, anything from an extremely narrow Rispone win to a mid-single-digits Bel Edwards victory is plausible.

Notably though, even if Rispone wins by one point, Democrats will still have outperformed their “fundamentals”—how a generic Democrat would fare against a generic Republican given a state’s partisan lean, national partisan environment and incumbency—by an average of 16.3 points in three strongly Republican southern states just one year before the 2020 elections.

[Update, 1:00 am, November 17: John Bel Edwards was reelected by 2.6 points. With one last Trafalgar Group poll conducted November 13-15, the final “projected” margin was Bel Edwards by 4.5 points, a miss in the Republican direction of 1.9 points. On average, in the 2019 gubernatorial races in Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, the final “projected” margin missed by 2.7 points in the direction of the Republicans, though all three elections were “called” correctly–and Democrats net one governor’s mansion. Also, the three Democratic gubernatorial nominees outperformed their “fundamentals” by an average of 17.5 points, which is extraordinary.]

Democrats vs. Trump. No sooner had I completed my most recent calculations than FiveThirtyEight.com updated its pollster letter grades and average partisan skew, analogous to the “bias” calculations I performed above. While the changes did not materially affect the Democratic nomination standings, they did have a slightly pro-Republican effect on general election polls.

Still, Biden would beat Trump nationally by 8.1 points, Warren by 3.5 points, Sanders by 5.2 points and Harris by 1.6 points, while Buttigieg would essentially tie Trump and Booker would lose by 0.7 points; Bloomberg, based on three polls, would win by 1.9 points. The other 11 candidates for whom I have match-up data would lose by between 5.2 and 12.7 points, although these numbers are misleading, as they are primarily based upon data from pollster Harris X, who tend not to push undecided voters to choose, making for unusual polling margins.

Weighted by a rough estimate of the likelihood of being the nominee (NSW-WAPA/.843), the 2020 Democratic nominee would beat Trump by 3.6 points. This is broadly in line with the median Democratic presidential margin (+3.0) in the previous six presidential elections, which include three elections with an incumbent seeking reelection and three elections with no incumbent. However, once you exclude Biden and Sanders, the margin decreases to 0.3 points, with the caveat fom the preceding paragraph.

Examining available state-level results,[7] which actually decide presidential elections via the Electoral College, then comparing to my partisan-lean measure 3W-RDM implies Democrats would win the national popular vote by between 3.6 (excluding Biden and Sanders) and 5.8 points, substantially higher than national polls suggest. Most encouraging to Democrats should be polls from North Carolina (R+6.0), Georgia (R+9.6), Arizona (R+9.7) and Texas (R+15.3), which show Democrats either barely ahead (Georgia) or within three points of Trump; on average, they imply a national Democratic lead of 8-9 points, confirming strong opportunities for Democrats in the southeast and southwest.

By contrast, however, a handful of polls from Democratic-leaning Nevada (D+2.0) who Democrats barely winning the state while implying Democrats would lose nationwide by between 1.4 and 3.8 points. And while Democrats are 4.0-7.5 points ahead in the swing state of Michigan, which Trump won by 0.16 points in 2016, their position is…wobbly…in Florida (R+3.4), Pennsylvania (R+0.4) and Wisconsin (D+0.7), all of which Trump won narrowly in 2016.

Still, at this very early point in the 2020 electoral cycle, the fact that Democrats are far more competitive in Republican-leaning states, albeit slightly behind, than Republicans are in Democratic-leaning states should encourage Democrats.

Until next time…

[1] Essentially, polls are weighted within nation/state by days to nominating contest and pollster quality to form a area-specific average, then a weighted average is taken across Iowa (weight=5), New Hampshire (5), Nevada (4), South Carolina (4), time-weighted average of subsequent contests (2) and nationwide (1). Within subsequent contests, I weight the 10 March 3, 2020 “Super Tuesday” states (Alabama, California, Colorado, Massachusetts, Minnesota, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia) twice subsequent contests. As of this writing, I have at least one poll from (in chronological order) Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Ohio, Washington, Arizona, Florida, Illinois, Georgia, Wisconsin, Maryland, New York, Pennsylvania, Indiana, Oregon and New Jersey.

[2] Primarily California (25). Texas (17) and North Carolina (8)

[3] Primarily Florida (12), Wisconsin (11), Pennsylvania (9) and Michigan (8)—not coincidentally, the four states President Donald J. Trump won in 2016 by the narrowest margins.

[4] Morning Consult Tracking, Harris X Tracking (Likely Voters), Fox News, YouGov, Emerson College, Quinnipiac University, Ipsos, Monmouth University, NBC News/Wall Street Journal

[5] Civiqs

[6] Trafalgar Group, October 29-November 1, 2019

[7] From 27 states: Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, Michigan, North Carolina, Texas, Iowa, Arizona, South Carolina, Minnesota, Nevada, Massachusetts, Florida, New York, Kentucky, Maine, Ohio, North Dakota, California, Alaska, Washington, Colorado, Missouri, Utah, Virginia, Montana, Connecticut, Georgia.

Just under one year until the 2020 presidential election…how does it look for Democrats?

On November 3, 2020, one year from this past Sunday, the United States will hold its next presidential election; technically, the election will conclude that day, given early voting and vote-by-mail opportunities in many states. Once a month since April 2019, I have updated analyses of polling data on hypothetical match-ups between potential candidates for the 2020 Democratic presidential nomination and President Donald J. Trump; for this post, I assume he will be impeached by the United States House of Representatives but not removed by the Senate. I make this assumption not because of any particular insight into the outcome of the Senate trial, but simply because polling data for other potential 2020 Republican presidential nominees, such as Vice President Mike Pence or former Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley, is sparse.

With the presidential election now one year away, here is a deeper dive into these polling data.

I Voted sticker

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First, however, here are the final polling averages for the two gubernatorial elections to be held on Tuesday, November 5, 2019.  In Kentucky, incumbent Republican Governor Matt Bevin trails Democrat Andy Beshear by 6.1 percentage points (“points”), though this is based upon only five polls, and only two conducted in October, with an average pollster rating of B-/B and an average Democratic “bias” of roughly 0.8 points; pollster quality is a letter grade assigned by FiveThirtyEight.com, and bias is a pollster’s average tendency to err towards Democrats or Republicans[1]. Plus, this state leans 28.7 points more Republican than the nation, according to my 3W-RDM, meaning the “fundamentals” (-28.7 3W-RDM + 5.7 Democratic edge in the generic ballot question – 8.5 Republican incumbency edge) suggest Bevin should win by nearly 32 points. Beshear should still be considered a slight favorite, but it would not be remotely surprising if Bevin won; with an astonishing gap of 38 points between polling and fundamentals, anything from a Bevin landslide to a narrow Beshear victory is possible.

In Mississippi’s open gubernatorial race, meanwhile, Republican Tate Reeves leads Democrat Jim Hood by 2.7 points, based upon 11 polls with an average C pollster rating and Democratic bias of 1.2 points. The fundamentals suggest Reeves wins by about 13 points, which more closely matches the polls. Reeves will likely win by a margin in the mid-single digits.

The bottom line, however, is that Democrats should not be competitive in either of these races, yet are within single digits in both.

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We have national-level polling data for hypothetical match-ups between 16 of the 17 currently-declared candidates for the 2020 Democratic presidential nomination and President Donald J. Trump; only former United States House of Representatives member (“Representative”) Joe Sestak has not yet been tested. Table 1 summarizes these match-ups; it includes all polls released publicly since January 1, 2019.

Table 1: Weighted-average national-level polling data for hypothetical match-ups between 2020 Democratic presidential nominees and President Donald J. Trump

Democrat NSW-WAPA # Polls Pollsters

 

Wtd-Ave Margin
# Rating Bias
Biden 26.8 76 22 B 0.0 D+8.4
Warren 17.4 70 20 B/B+ 0.0 D+3.8
Sanders 16.0 67 19 B/B+ 0.0 D+5.4
Buttigieg 7.6 37 13 B/B+ R+0.1 D+0.2
Harris 6.9 56 18 B R+0.2 D+1.8
Booker 2.1 18 9 B-/C+ R+0.6 R+0.6
Yang 1.8 8 HarrisX C+ R+1.5 R+7.1
Klobuchar 1.7 10 3 B R+0.3 R+5.5
Gabbard 1.3 7 HarrisX C+ R+1.5 R+8.7
Steyer 1.2 3 HarrisX C+ R+1.5 R+5.0
Castro 0.6 9 2 C+ R+1.5 R+6.2
Delaney 0.4 7 HarrisX C+ R+1.5 R+7.4
Williamson 0.3 7 HarrisX C+ R+1.5 R+9.1
Bennet 0.3 3 HarrisX C+ R+1.5 R+7.3
Bullock 0.2 3 HarrisX C+ R+1.5 R+6.5
Messam 0.0 5 HarrisX C+ R+1.5 R+12.5
Weighted Average Democratic margin over Trump D+4.0

NSW-WAPA” is a 2020 Democratic nomination polling average that aggregates national- and state-level polling averages adjusted for pollster quality and time-to-election; early states are weighted more than later states, and all state polls more than national polls. Each candidate’s estimated margin versus Trump uses polling margins from which pollster “bias” has been subtracted before weighting by pollster quality and time-to-election[2]. Final estimated margins for each Democratic candidate are weighted by the value NSW-WAPA/.845[3] to produce an “overall” Democratic average margin over Trump; the denominator is the total of 17 individual NSW-WAPA values[4].

Each of the six leading candidates for the 2020 Democratic nomination—former Vice President Joe Biden; United States Senator (“Senator”) from Massachusetts Elizabeth Warren; Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders; South Bend, Indiana Mayor Pete Buttigieg; California Senator Kamala Harris; New Jersey Senator Cory Booker—have at least 18 polls testing a hypothetical election between them and Trump. And for the first five candidates, the average pollster rating is a respectable B or B/B+ for at least 13 distinct polling organizations; the average for Booker is only C+/B- due to a preponderance of polls from Republican-leaning HarrisX (rating=C+, bias=+1.5); I have written previously about problems with HarrisX polls.

Overall, based upon a rough likelihood of each candidate winning the nomination, Trump would lose to the 2020 Democratic presidential nominee nationally by 4.0 points; Removing Biden’s polls lowers the margin to 2.0 points, while removing Biden’s and Sander’s polls lowers the margin to 0.6 points. Nonetheless, each of the six leading candidates either beats Trump nationally (Biden, Warren, Sanders, Buttigieg, Harris) or loses by less than one point (Booker). Unfortunately, the final estimated margins for the remaining 10 candidates in the table, including entrepreneur Andrew Yang, Minnesota Senator Amy Klobuchar, Hawaii Representative Tulsi Gabbard, businessman Tom Steyer and former Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Julián Castro, should be taken with a few pounds of salt due to the preponderance of HarrisX polls of these match-ups; for every candidate except Klobuchar and Castro they are the only publicly-available polls.

There are reasons besides these admittedly-very-early polls to argue the Democratic presidential nominee will win the national popular vote in 2020 by around 3-4 points—where Warren polls right now. In fact, Warren’s 3.8-point margin is very close to the 3.3-point-average Democratic margin in the last six presidential elections, which include three incumbents seeking reelection (Bill Clinton in 1996, George W. Bush in 2004, Barack Obama in 2012) and three open seats (2000, 2008, 2016); Obama beat Republican Mitt Romney in 2012 by 3.9 points. As usual, presidential election data from Dave Leip’s indispensable Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections.

Also, relative support for a Democratic candidate versus Trump is directly related to how well that candidate currently fares in the presidential nomination process, itself a proxy for name recognition; the correlation between the final estimated margin and NSW-WAPA is 0.90, suggesting the better known a Democrat becomes, the better (s)he polls versus Trump; Democrats are that eager to defeat the president.

Finally, some very back-of-the-envelope math suggests the 2020 Democratic presidential nominee is likely to improve over 2016 nominee Hillary Clinton’s 2.1-point margin over Trump. For one thing, while Trump remains nearly as unpopular as he was on election day 2016 (38% favorable then, 41% job performance approval now[5]), he will likely not face a nearly-equally-unpopular Democratic nominee in 2020. Voters who chose Trump as, hypothetically, the lesser of two evils now know what he is like as a president; the Democratic nominee now represents the blank slate, for better or for worse. More to the point, however, it is difficult to envision more than a small handful of the 65,853,625 voters who chose Clinton in 2016 switching to Trump, whereas switching in the other direction strikes me as far more plausible. But even if the vote switches roughly cancel out, there are 8,261,498 third party 2016 votes to consider, an unusually-high 6.0% of the total national popular vote. Let us assume half of those voters switch to one of the two major party candidates in 2020, and that they split roughly 2-1 for the Democrat, based on the idea voters who wanted to vote against Trump in 2016 but could not stomach voting for Clinton voted for Libertarian Gary Johnson, Green Jill Stein or Independent Evan McMullin. Using the six-election average increase in the total national popular vote over the previous election of 4.9%, that works out to about 72 million Democratic votes (50.0%), 67.5 million Republican votes (46.9%) and 4.3 million third party votes (3.1%)—and a Democratic margin of 3.1 points.

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Of course, it is the Electoral College, not the national popular vote, that determines the winner of presidential elections. Using 3W-RDM, if the Democratic nominee won by 4,0 points, (s)he would be expected to win 308 electoral votes (EV), although the race in Florida would be very close, more than the 270 EV necessary to win the presidency. Given an average error of 5.3 points, however, the Democratic EV total could be anywhere from 222 to 347. If the Democratic nominee only won by 0.6 points, though, (s)he would either lose with 259 EV or win with 279 EV, pending a likely recount in Pennsylvania[6]; the range of Democratic EV in this scenario is 191 to 314.

However, it is not necessary to rely solely on “fundamentals” calculations (i.e., national average plus 3W-RDM), as we have at least one hypothetical match-up poll from 26 states, including every relatively competitive state except Georgia. Table 2 summarizes these data, with polling averages in boldface; Democratic “wins” are italicized. Each row containing polling data has two values: the final weighted-adjusted average and, in parentheses, the extrapolated national popular vote margin based upon 3W-RDM. For example, Biden is currently ahead by 10.3 points in Michigan (which Trump won in 2016 by 0.2 points), but because Michigan averages 2.2 points more Democratic than the nation, that implies Biden is winning the national popular vote by 10.3-2.2=8.1 points, very close to his 8.4-point national polling average.

Table 2: Weighted-average state-level polling data for hypothetical match-ups between leading 2020 Democratic presidential candidates and President Donald J. Trump

State EV 3W-RDM Biden Warren Sanders Buttigieg Harris
DC 3 82.0 D+90.4 D+85.8 D+87.4 D+82.2 D+83.5
Hawaii 4 34.3 D+42.7 D+38.1 D+39.7 D+34.5 D+36.1
Vermont 3 27.7 D+36.1 D+31.5 D+33.1 D+27.9 D+29.5
California 55 23.2 D+28.4

(D+5.2)

D+21.9

(D+1.3)

D+26.7

(D+3.4)

D+20.0

(R+3.2)

D+22.4

(R+0.8)

Maryland 10 22.6 D+31.0 D+26.4 D+28.0 D+22.8 D+24.4
Massachusetts 11 22.1 D+37.9

(D+15.8)

D+25.9

(D+3.8)

D+27.9

(D+5.8)

D+22.3 D+23.9
New York 29 21.6 D+30.0 D+25.4 D+27.0 D+21.8 D+23.4
Rhode Island 4 18.0 D+26.4 D+21.8 D+23,4 D+18.2 D+19.8
Illinois 20 14.7 D+23.1 D+18.5 D+20.1 D+14.9 D+16.5
Connecticut 7 12.8 D+19.0

(D+6.2)

D+14.0

(D+1.2)

D+16.0

(D+3.2)

D+12.0

(R+0.8)

D+13.0

(R+0.2)

Delaware 3 12.5 D+20.9 D+16.3 D+17.9 D+12.7 D+14.3
Washington 12 12.1 D+21.8

(D+9.7)

D+20.5

(D+8.3)

D+21.4

(D+9.3)

D+12.9

(D+0.8)

D+13.9

(D+1.8)

New Jersey 14 12.0 D+20.4 D+15.8 D+17.4 D+12.2 D+13.8
Oregon 7 8.7 D+17.1 D+11.5 D+14.1 D+8.9 D+10.5
New Mexico 5 6.5 D+14.9 D+10.3 D+11.9 D+6.7 D+8.3
Maine 4 5.9 D+8.7

(D+2.8)

D+7.7

(D+1.8)

D+8.3

(D+2.4)

D+6.6

(D+0.7)

D+5.0

(R+0.9)

Michigan 16 2.2 D+9.0

(D+6.8)

D+4.5

(D+2.3)

D+7.5

(D+5.3)

D+2.8

(D+0.6)

D+4.1

(D+1.9)

Colorado 9 2.2 D+9.2

(D+7.0)

D+6.9

(D+4.7)

D+9.9

(D+7.7)

D+9.9

(D+7.7)

D+2.9

(D+0.7)

Nevada 6 2.0 D+1.4

(R+0.6)

R+2.8

(R+5.0)

D+0.1

(R+1.9)

R+4.4

(R+6.4)

R+0.8

(R+2.8)

Minnesota 10 1.5 D+12.7
(D+11.2)
D+11.7
(D+10.2)
D+9.7

(D+8.6)

D+1.6 D+3.3
Virginia 13 1.5 D+10.5

(D+9.0)

D+7.0

(D+5.5)

D+4.2

(D+2.7)

D+1.7 D+11.0

(D+9.5)

Wisconsin 10 0.7 D+5.9

(D+5.2)

D+1.1

(D+0.4)

D+4.5

(D+3.8)

R+1.3

(R+2.0)

D+0.1

(R+0.6)

New Hampshire 4 0.1 D+10.2

(D+10.1)

D+0.6

(D+0.5)

D+6.7

(D+6.6)

D+2.3

(D+2.2)

D+6.4

(D+6.3)

Pennsylvania 20 -0.4 D+4.5

(D+4.9)

D+0.04

(D+0.3)

D+2.8

(D+3.2)

R+3.8

(R+3.4)

D+0.3

(D+0.7)

Florida 29 -3.4 D+2.3

(D+5.7)

R+0.2

(D+3.2)

R+0.2

(D+3.2)

R+1.0

(D+2.4)

R+2.9

(D+0.5)

Iowa 6 -4.7 R+0.4

(D+4.3)

R+3.9

(D+0.8)

R+0.9

(D+3.8)

R+3.5

(D+1.2)

R+6.8

(R+2.1)

Ohio 18 -5.8 D+4.9

(D+10.7)

D+1.4

(D+7.2)

D+1.8

(D+7.6)

R+1.8

(D+4.0)

R+1.8

(D+4.0)

North Carolina 15 -6.0 D+1.8

(D+7.8)

R+1.5

(D+5.5)

R+0.2

(D+5.8)

R+3.0

(D+3.0)

R+3.7

(D+2.3)

Georgia 16 -9.6 R+1.0 R+6.1 R+4.3 R+9.5 R+7.8
Arizona 11 -9.7 D+1.8

(D+11.5)

R+0.8

(D+9.1)

R+6.0

(D+3.7)

R+3.6

(D+6.1)

R+6.7

(D+3.0)

Texas 38 -15.3 D+0.4

(D+15.7)

R+3.3

(D+12.0)

R+0.7

(D+14.7)

R+5.3

(D+10.0)

R+5.2

(D+10.1)

South Carolina 9 -15.7 R+11.3

(D+4.4)

R+12.1

(D+3.6)

R+15.7

(D+0.0)

R+15.5 R+17.4

(R+1.7)

Missouri 10 -15.9 R+11.3

(D+4.6)

R+15.1

(D+0.8)

R+16.7

(R+0.8)

R+15.4 R+17.1

(R+1.2)

Indiana 11 -16.3 R+7.9 R+12.5 R+10.9 R+15.8 R+14.5
Mississippi 6 -18.5 R+10.1 R+14.7 R+13.1 R+18.0 R+16.7
Montana 3 -18.6 R+7.0

(D+11.6)

R+9.0

(D+9.6)

R+8.0

(D+10.6)

R+18.4 R+10.0

(D+8.6)

Alaska 3 -19.2 R+4.1

(D+15.1)

R+15.1

(D+4.1)

R+6.1

(D+13.1)

R+13.1

(D+6.1)

R+17.1

(D+2.1)

Louisiana 8 -22.2 R+13.8 R+18.4 R+16.8 R+22.0 R+20.4
Kansas 6 -23.4 R+15.0 R+19.6 R+18.0 R+23.2 R+21.6
Nebraska 5 -25.8 R+17.4 R+22.0 R+20.4 R+25.6 R+24.0
South Dakota 3 -25.8 R+17.4 R+22.0 R+20.4 R+25.6 R+24.0
Tennessee 11 -25.8 R+17.4 R+22.0 R+20.4 R+25.6 R+24.0
Arkansas 6 -28.2 R+19.8 R+24.4 R+22.8 R+28.0 R+26.4
Alabama 9 -28.4 R+20.0 R+24.7 R+23.0 R+28.2 R+26.6
Kentucky 8 -28.7 R+15.5

(D+13.2)

R+32.6

(R+3.9)

R+22.6

(D+6.1)

R+32.6

(R+3.9)

R+26.9
North Dakota 3 -29.4 R+21.0

(D+8.4)

R+25.6 R+24.0 R+29.3 R+27.5
Utah 6 -33.1 R+1.3

(D+31.8)

R+3.3

(D+29.8)

D+5.7

(D+38.8)

R+20.3

(D+12.8)

R+15.3

(D+17.8)

Idaho 4 -34.2 R+25.8 R+30.4 R+28.8 R+34.0 R+32.4
West Virginia 5 -35.5 R+27.1 R+31.7 R+30.1 R+35.3 R+33.5
Oklahoma 7 -38.1 R+29.7 R+34.3 R+32.7 R+37.9 R+36.3
Wyoming 3 -45.7 R+37.3 R+41.7 R+40.3 R+45.5 R+43.9
TOTAL EV 390 271/291 297 243 273

There is a lot to unpack in this table, so here are some highlights:

  1. Biden would resoundingly beat Trump, but other top Democrats could easily defeat Trump as well.

Based upon polling averages and fundamentals calculations, Biden would most likely win 390 EV, even more than Bill Clinton’s 379 EV in 1996 and Obama’s 365 EV in 2008. However, if we allow states where the table margin has an absolute value less than 3.0 points to be “won” be either major party candiates, he could finish with as few as 292 EV—still 22 more than needed—or as high as 412 EV, a number on par with George H. W. Bush’s 426 EV in 1988; the senior Bush was the last president to top 400 EV.

However, I would not put too much stock in the single set of match-up polls from Utah (R+33.1), which imply Democrats winning the national popular vote by anywhere from 13 to 39 points, despite the pollster, Y2 Analytics having a B rating and a slight Democratic skew of 0.3 points; the polls, which also have Booker winning Utah by 12 points, were conducted on just 144 registered voters between July 31, and August 6, 2019. It is nearly impossible to envision ANY Democrat winning Utah’s six EV.

Meanwhile, Warren, Sanders and Harris would be slightly favored based on these polling averages and fundamentals calculations, with Warren literally winning Pennsylvania by something like 3,000 votes. Warren’s range is 239-352 EV, Sanders’s range is 242-379 EV, and Harris’ range is 243-326 EV. Buttigieg, finally, would be a slight underdog, with a range of 200-300.

Taking a much wider view, however, incumbent presidents should not be trailing at all at this point, and especially not to five or possibly six Democrats. In many ways, this race feels like late 1979, when a wide range of Republicans were eager to challenge an unpopular Jimmy Carter—whose own election had been something of a fluke in 1976, based on revulsion with the Watergate scandal. With all that, however, Carter won a narrow victory over a weakened incumbent Gerald Ford, at a time when Republicans had won four of the six previous presidential elections. At this point, the polls were close—though Republican Ronald Reagan, often seen as “too extreme” to beat an incumbent, ultimately won a 9.7-point landslide and the Electoral College 489-49.

  1. Democrats are doing better on Republican turf than Republicans are on Democratic turf.

Extrapolating from individual-state polling averages, the “typical” Democratic presidential nominee would win the national popular vote by either 5.6 (median) or 6.6 points (mean), both substantially higher than the average 4.0-point margin of actual national polls. Given extreme outliers like Utah, the median is likely the more valid measure. Remove Biden’s data, and the extrapolated national margins are 3.8 (median) and 4.9 (mean); remove Biden’s and Sander’s data yields margins of 2.5 and 4.0 points.

Why do state polls paint a rosier picture for Democrats? Consider Ohio, North Carolina, Arizona Texas, Montana, Alaska, Kentucky and, yes, Utah. Trump won each of these states in 2016 by at least 3.5 points, and they have a mean 3W-RDM of R+17.0. And yet, in these states the extrapolated national popular vote margin for each Democratic candidate mostly exceeds her/his calculated average national margin. In fact, the correlation between 3W-RDM and “excess extrapolated Democratic national popular vote margin” is -0.46, implying that the more Republican the state, the more Democratic state polling “overperforms” national polling. This should be extremely encouraging for Democrats.

The flip side, however, is a number of states where Democrats are underperforming, most notably in Nevada, whose six EV look dicey right now, despite it being a D+2.0 state. For all that, every other core Democratic state looks good for Democrats

Democratic support also looks wobbly in the vital swing states of Pennsylvania (R+0.4) and Wisconsin (D+0.7). Still, in Pennsylvania, Warren is no worse than tied, while Buttigieg is “only” 3.8 points behind, and in Wisconsin, Harris is no worse than tied, while Buttigieg is only 1.3 points behind. Plus, Michigan (D+2.2)—the third state, along with Pennsylvania and Wisconsin, that delivered the Electoral College to Trump in 2016 by less than 77,000 total votes—and New Hampshire (D+0.1) look solid for Democrats right now, with Florida (R+3.4) very much in play.

**********

The values discussed here, of course, should be taken with multiple grains of salt. It is impossible to know, for example, how the rapidly-unfolding impeachment process or changes in the economy will affect voters’ decision-making. An unforeseen crisis, domestic or foreign, could fundamentally change perceptions of Trump’s job performance—for better or for worse—as could something like a bipartisan massive infrastructure bill. Undecided and truly “independent” votes could break heavily for either party’s nominee—or they could split right down the middle.

Nonetheless, I would much rather be the Democratic presidential nominee than Trump right now.

Until next time…

[1] All calculations made prior to FiveThirtyEight publishing updated pollster ratings on November 5, 2019.

[2] Final nomination and presidential election values, nationally or at state-level, are the average of two  weighted-adjusted averages: irrespective of pollster and adjusted for pollster.

[3] Sum of NSW-WAPA across 17 candidates

[4] Overall Democratic margin does not substantially change if NSW-WAPA is calculated only using polls released since the first Democratic presidential candidate debates held on June 26-27 2019.

[5] I realize these metrics assess slightly different concepts, but job performance is a) a slightly better predictor of vote choice and b) cannot be measured prior to being in office.

[6] And possibly New Hampshire

October 2019 update: 2020 Democratic nomination and general election polling

With the fourth Democratic presidential nomination debate set for October 15, 2019 in Westerville, Ohio, it is time for an updated assessment of the relative position of the now-19 declared candidates. The more-stringent criteria to qualify for this debate—despite the looming presence of twelve candidates on one stage—led to the announcement by New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio on September 20, 2019 he was ending his presidential campaign. The seven candidates who have thus far abandoned their quest to be the 2020 Democratic presidential nominee each exited with grace, class and dignity, and I commend them for it.

To learn how I calculate the value I assign to each candidate, NSW-WAPA (national-and-state-weighted weighted-adjusted polling average), please see here;[1] for recent modifications, please see here.

And, of course, here is the October 2019 lighthouse photograph in my Down East 2019 Maine Lighthouses wall calendar.

Oct 2019 lighthouse.JPG

**********

Table 1 below aggregates data from all national and state-level polls publicly released since January 1, 2019 (as of 12 am EST October 15, 2019), including:

  • 216 national polls (including 41 weekly Morning Consult tracking polls)
  • 26 Iowa caucuses polls
  • 32 New Hampshire primary polls
  • 8 Nevada caucuses polls
  • 25 South Carolina primary polls
  • 55 Super Tuesday polls[2]
  • 52 polls from 17 other states.[3]

This makes a total of 414 polls, up from 328 last month. One poll of the New Hampshire Primary was conducted by RK Research and Communications, Inc. between October 9 and October 13, 2019. Actually, they conducted two versions of the poll, one including former First Lady Michelle Obama (who edged out the field with 26%) and one excluding her; in the interest of completeness, I used the former poll[4].

Table 1: National-and-state-weighted WAPA for declared 2020 Democratic presidential nomination candidates

Candidate National IA NH NV SC Post-SC NSW-WAPA
Biden 27.4 23.8 23.1 26.3 37.5 27.5 27.2
Warren 14.6 17.1 18.4 17.9 12.2 16.8 16.5
Sanders 15.4 15.5 17.7 19.3 11.7 16.4 16.1
Harris 7.5 8.7 6.8 6.7 7.8 8.6 7.6
Buttigieg 5.1 10.3 8.5 5.3 4.3 6.2 7.1
O’Rourke 2.9 2.5 1.5 1.8 1.4 5.3 2.2
Booker 2.1 2.6 1.8 1.7 2.9 1.6 2.2
Klobuchar 1.2 2.9 1.6 0.8 0.6 1.0 1.5
Yang 1.6 1.1 1.9 2.1 0.9 1.2 1.5
Gabbard 0.8 1.1 1.9 1.1 0.5 0.8 1.1
Steyer 0.3 0.05 0.9 2.7 1.3 0.2 1.0
Castro 1.0 0.7 0.2 0.9 0.2 1.3 0.59
Delaney 0.3 0.8 0.5 0.00 0.2 0.2 0.39
Bennet 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.32
Williamson 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.28
Ryan 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.26
Bullock 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.19
Sestak 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.2 0.00 0.1 0.05
Messam 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.1 0.02
DK/Other 17.3 10.5 12.3 4.7 16.5 11.2 12.9

The race has shifted somewhat following the first three rounds of debates. Former Vice President Joe Biden remains the nominal frontrunner (27.2—down from 28.7), primarily because of his 25.3-point lead in South Carolina primary polls. However, he is less strong in Iowa, New Hampshire and Nevada, where the two candidates battling for second place overall—Massachusetts Senator Elizabeth Warren (16.5—up from 14.5) and Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders (16.1—down from 17.4)—are closer to first place. In fact, Warren has moved from fourth place in April 2019 to second place now. Rounding out a clear top five, both overall and in the four earliest states, are California Senator Kamala Harris (7.6—down from 9.3) and South Bend, Indiana Mayor Pete Buttigieg (7.1—down from 7.5). These five candidates account for three-quarters (74.6%–down from 77.4%) of Democratic voter preferences at this point, and the conventional wisdom is the 2020 Democratic presidential nominee will be one of them.

In the next tier are seven candidates with NSW-WAPA between 1.0 and 2.2 who could yet rise into the top five with a strong debate performance: former Texas Representative Beto O’Rourke and New Jersey Senator Cory Booker, tied for 6th place, followed by Minnesota Senator Amy Klobuchar, entrepreneur Andrew Yang, Hawaii Representative Tulsi Gabbard and billionaire activist Tom Steyer. Fading somewhat, but still over 0.5, is former Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Julián Castro.

These 12 candidates—all of whom will be on the debate stage tonight—total 84.7% of Democratic voter preferences, down from 87.0% last month. Of them, only eight—Biden, Warren, Sanders, Harris, Buttigieg, Booker, Yang and Steyer—have thus far met the criteria for the fifth round of Democratic presidential nomination debates on November 20.

With 12.9% (up from 9.5%)[5] undecided or choosing an unlisted candidate, the remaining seven candidates are divvying up just 2.4% between them; as none of them appears close to making the November 2019 debate(s), I expect them to end their campaigns by the end of 2019.

**********

Speaking of the debates, 11 different pollsters—10 nationally[6] and one in California[7]–conducted polls of the 2020 Democratic presidential nomination both before (but after the August 2019 debate) and shortly after the September 2019 Democratic presidential candidate debate. Simple average differences in polling percentage (California poll results weighted twice national results) show measurable gains for Warren (+2.0 points), Don’t Know/Other (+0.7), Castro and Yang (+0.5 each), as well as declines for Harris (-1.8 points), Sanders (-1.3) and Biden (-1.2). However, once results were adjusted for pollster quality and the number of days between polls (using the midpoint of the field dates), no candidate shifted more that 0.4 points in either direction, with Warren increasing and Harris decreasing by that amount.

Nonetheless, when the relative standing of the candidates since the first Democratic presidential debates (June 26-27) is compared to their standing prior to the start of the debates, it is clear which candidates have benefitted and which have suffered (Table 2).

Table 2: National-and-state-weighted WAPA for declared 2020 Democratic presidential nomination candidates, as of June 25, 2019 and beginning June 28, 2019

Candidate As of

 June 25, 2019

Beginning

 June 27, 2019

Delta
Biden 31.0 26.1 -4.8
Warren 11.3 18.6 +7.3
Sanders 17.6 15.7 -1.9
Harris 7.7 7.9 +0.2
Buttigieg 8.4 6.9 -1.5
Booker 2.9 1.8 -0.9
Yang 0.9 1.7 +0.8
O’Rourke 3.9 1.6 -2.4
Klobuchar 1.8 1.4 -0.4
Gabbard 0.6 1.3 +0.7
Steyer 0.03 1.2 +1.2
Castro 0.59 0.59 -0.01
Delaney 0.45 0.44 -0.01
Bennet 0.07 0.35 +0.28
Williamson 0.13 0.38 +0.25
Ryan 0.23 0.26 +0.03
Bullock 0.08 0.25 +0.17
Sestak 0.00 0.02 +0.02
Messam 0.06 0.01 -0.05
DK/Other 11.3 12.0 +0.7
Total polls[8] 184 223 +39

The clear beneficiary, by far, has been Warren, who jumped from 11.3 to 18.6, a remarkable 7.3-point increase. Curiously, the only other candidate to see her/his support increase by at least 1.0 points is Steyer—who will appear in his first debate tonight. Just behind him are Yang and Gabbard, whose support increased by 0.8 and 0.7 points, respectively. On the flip side, the debate period has been especially unkind to Biden (-4.8 points) and O’Rourke (-2.4), with Sanders (-1.9), Buttigieg (-1.5) and Booker (-0.9) also losing support. Among the top 12 candidates, only Harris and Klobuchar essentially maintained the same level of support they had prior to the start of the debates.

**********

Four Democrats would currently win the national popular vote in a hypothetical head-to-head match-up with President Donald J. Trump: Biden (by 8.2 points), Sanders (5.0), Warren (2.9) and Harris (1.5), while Buttigieg (-0.5 points), Booker (-0.6), and O’Rourke (-1.1) would be very close. The other 11 candidates for whom I have match-up data would lose by between 5.0 and 12.5 points, although these numbers are misleading, as they are primarily based upon data from pollster Harris X, who tend not to push undecided voters to choose, making for unusual polling margins.

Overall, “generic 2020 Democratic nominee” now beats Trump by 3.6 points; I now exclude match-up data for any potential 2020 Democratic presidential nominee not currently a declared candidate. This is higher than the median Democratic presidential margin (+3.0 points) in the previous six presidential elections, which include three elections with an incumbent seeking reelection and three elections with no incumbent. However, once you exclude Biden and Sanders, the margin over Trump decreases to 0.1 points—though see the caveat in the preceding paragraph.

Still, given that state-level results actually determine the winner of a presidential election (via the Electoral College), it is more informative to look to those polls, where they are publicly-available. Using my 3W-RDM, a measure of how much more or less Democratic a state’s voting is relative to the nation as a whole, this polling[9] implies Democrats would win the national popular vote by between 2.7 (excluding Biden and Sanders) and 5.9 (including Biden and Sanders) points, using the median value. Most encouraging to Democrats should be the polls from North Carolina (R+6.0) and Texas (R+15.3), which show a very close race, implying a national Democratic lead of 4-6-and 12-15-points, respectively; these polls confirm strong opportunities for Democrats in the southeast and southwest. By contrast, however, a few polls from Democratic-leaning Maine (D+5.9) and Nevada (D+2.0) imply Democrats would lose nationwide by 1-6 points. Those remain the exceptions, however, to what continues to be encouraging news for Democrats in 2020—about which I will have more to say in a November 2019 post.

Until next time…

[1] Essentially, polls are weighted within areal units (nation, state) by days to the nominating contest and pollster quality to form a unit-specific average, then a weighted average is taken across Iowa (weight=5), New Hampshire (5), Nevada (4), South Carolina (4), the time-weighted average of all subsequent contests (2) and nationwide (1). Within the subsequent contests, I now weight the 10 March 3, 2020 “Super Tuesday” states (Alabama, California, Colorado, Massachusetts, Minnesota, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia) twice as much as the subsequent contests. As of this writing, I have at least one poll from (in chronological order) Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Ohio, Washington, Arizona, Florida, Illinois, Georgia, Wisconsin, Maryland, New York, Pennsylvania, Indiana, Oregon and New Jersey.

[2] Primarily California (21). Texas (16)

[3] Primarily Florida (11), Wisconsin (8), Pennsylvania (6)

[4] Comparing the two sets of results, Sanders drops seven percentage points (“points”), Warren drops five points, Biden and Buttigieg drop four points, Harris drops two points, Gabbard drops one point and Other/DK drops three points.

[5] This does include polls that limit the number of candidates queried.

[6] Morning Consult Tracking, Harris X Tracking (Likely Voters), Survey USA, Fox News, YouGov, Emerson College, Harris Interactive, Quinnipiac University, Reuters/Ipsos, IBD/TIPP

[7] Survey USA

[8] Seven polls were conducted wholly or in part on June 26 and/or June 27, 2019.

[9] From Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, Michigan, North Carolina, Texas, Iowa, Arizona, South Carolina, Minnesota, Nevada, Massachusetts, Florida, New York, Kentucky, Maine, Ohio, North Dakota, California, Alaska, Washington, Colorado, Missouri, Utah, Virginia, Montana, Connecticut.

Four stories and 12 years ago…

I have been deeply immersed in preparing final first drafts (how is that for an oxymoron?) of early chapters of the book I am writing, whose new tentative title is Interrogating Memory: Film Noir Spurs a Deep Dive into My Family’s History…and My Own. We have also been preoccupied with various illnesses, injuries and anniversaries. Not to mention following the twists and turns of the impeachment saga.

With all that, however, I have not forgotten about this site. I have been meticulously compiling polling for the next 2020 Democratic nomination and presidential election updates, as well as this year’s three governor’s races.

And life has thrown a handful of interesting curveballs our way.

***********

Sunday, October 6, 2019 was Nell’s and my 12th wedding anniversary.

Rather than go out to celebrate, we chose to stay home and order food from our favorite local pizza joint. Three of our orders—and both orders of French fries—were perfect; only Nell’s was thoroughly botched, somewhat dampening the otherwise celebratory mood.

But that is beside the point.

As a gift on my first birthday as a married man, my mother-in-law gave me—after strong hinting from Nell—this high-quality Swiss Army knife with my surname engraved on the primary blade. Ever since then, it always goes into my front left pocket when I leave the apartment. This has proven troublesome on a few occasions, as it was nearly confiscated by a TAA worker at Logan Airport as well as on my recent trip to Philadelphia.

Swiss army knife.JPG

Swiss army knife--open.JPG

Along with my wedding band, in other words, it is one of my most-prized possessions.  In a recent post, I told the story of how I lost my wedding band in the spring of 2011, only to have it miraculously recovered a few weeks later. Well, with all due respect to the excellent and criminally-underrated Split Enz, history does sometimes repeat.

On the Thursday night before our recent wedding anniversary, I used the primary blade on my Swiss Army knife to puncture holes in a seemingly-endless set of air bags used for packing boxes from Amazon, so I could flatten them prior to recycling them. I also broke up a handful of cardboard boxes, threw them into the back of Nell’s car—along with our golden retriever Ruby, who was due for a “’venture”—and took them to a nearby giant metal recycling bin; given the tandem nature of our residential parking, it was easier to take her car. After recycling the cardboard, I filled up Nell’s gas tank then took Ruby to a nearby park for a quick play.

I mean, who could resist this?

Ruby on blue sofa.JPG

To be clear, speaking to pet dogs in a form of baby talk stems from my mother, who invented an entire language for our pet Keeshond Luvey (so named because “he loves everybody!”): chicken became “cluckies,” a favorite game was “sockie ballies,” and so forth. Given that history, my calling an adventure a “’venture” is perfectly understandable.

Meanwhile, eureka!

Luvey on Sue Ellen Drive 1974

Look carefully at the photograph of Luvey and me in my parents’ bedroom in the Havertown, PA house in which I lived until I was 10 years old. Well, forget that the big stuffed blue bear I am snuggling belies the story I have long told that my allergies were so bad as a young child I lost all my stuffed animals; I will interrogate that memory some other time.

On the floor just to the left of the white two-drawered bureau is a blue spherical object which looks like an old-fashioned portable hair dryer, like the one that features so prominently in the house fire I first interrogated here.

But that poses a bit of a puzzle (yes, I am in the middle a story about my Swiss Army knife…just bear with me). Luvey was born on December 17, 1972, and we brought her home about two weeks later, when he was nothing but a small black ball of fur with a pink tongue. My house fire almost certainly took place in March or April 1973. If that is indeed THE portable hair dryer, Luvey would be at most four months old in this photograph. Could he really have grown that much that quickly? While it is certainly possible, it is also possible—maybe even more likely—that this photograph was taken shortly after the fire, and what is pictured is a replacement for the portable hair dryer destroyed in the fire—now stored safely upstairs. The Polaroid photograph itself is undated, other than the cardstock on which it was printed having the date “4/72.”

As the fictionalized King of Siam would say, “Is a puzzlement.”

Returning to my beloved Swiss Army knife, I am reminded of an incident that took place on an earlier wedding anniversary. Nell and I were then extremely fond of an upscale Italian restaurant in Newton Centre called Appetito, which closed in March 2014. In fact, we had one of the most important early conversations of our relationship at its bar.

On this particular anniversary, most likely in 2013, given the state of decline then apparent in the restaurant (nearly every customer was using a Groupon), our waitress was particularly flirtatious—and to my regret and shame, I playied along, cracking jokes about knives. At one point, I went to the bathroom. Just outside the door, our waitress stopped me, wanting to hold my Swiss Army knife, in lieu of my earlier “jokes.” I gave it to her, thinking nothing of it…OK, I was flattered by the attention.

I know, I know, it was my wedding anniversary.

While I was in the bathroom, in full view of Nell, our waitress pulled out every gizmo on the Swiss Army knife in a way that could be described as “provocative.” Needless to say, Nell was NOT happy with either of us, though I (deservedly) bore the brunt of her displeasure.

Hmm, I had intended that to be a funny anecdote, not a “husbands behaving poorly” confession. At times, I think these posts write themselves.

Moving right along, we return to last Thursday night, when I distinctly last remembered using my Swiss Army knife. The following night, there were yet more cardboard boxes to recycle, so once again Ruby and I had a ‘venture. We did not stay at the park nearly as long as we had the night before, however, in part because in the darkness I slipped on some small apples that had fallen from a tree near where I parked, whacking my left knee a bit.

Returning home a few minutes later, I removed all of the accessories (wallet, keys, pen, etc.) from my pockets into the wooden tray I keep in my office to hold those items.

Umm, where is my Swiss Army knife?

I checked every pocket of my jacket and jeans to no avail.

The first thing I thought was that it seemed as though when I had put things INTO my pockets, something had been missing. So that became my starting point: somehow it had gotten misplaced between Thursday night and Friday night.

Acting on that thought, I quickly searched all of the surfaces near where I had used my Swiss Army knife, thinking I had closed it up, put it down then forgotten to put it back in my office. That is very unlike me, but I was also wicked tired that night, so anything was possible.

Perhaps Nell had borrowed it during the day and simply forgotten to return it? Or one of our daughters? The answer to both questions, I learned on Saturday, was an emphatic “No!”

Thus commenced an epic search of the apartment, including my going through every single item in the large blue wheeled recycling bin in our backyard, thinking I had somehow tossed it in there with other recycling Thursday night. I even went through the adjacent trash barrel, as well as Nell’s car, on the off chance I had put in on the seat next to me or it had gotten mixed up with the broken-down cardboard boxes.

It was not in any of those places.

That evening, our daughters, a friend of our eldest daughter and I walked down to our favorite local restaurant, Zaftigs, for supper. Our route took us past the large metal recycling bin I had visited the previous two evenings, so I scoured the ground around it; it was not there either.

Finally, just after Nell went to bed, I had all but decided it had somehow gotten thrown into the large metal recycling bin with the cardboard when I remembered slipping on the apples at the park the previous night.

Well, it is worth a shot, I thought. And for the third night in a row, Ruby and I drove to the park. Using the flashlight on my iPhone, I scanned the ground where I had had my pratfall. Within seconds, a red metallic object caught my eye.

I am not ashamed to say I actually kissed my Swiss Army knife after picking it up from the dewy grass.

Nell was asleep when I get home, though the next day, after she heard the full story, she said that for that I could have woken her up.

Good to know.

**********

In this post, I took an early look at four elections, one of which was the 2019 Louisiana gubernatorial election. The “jungle primary” featuring every announced candidate, regardless of political party, will be held on Saturday, October 12. If no candidate wins an outright majority of the vote, a runoff election between the top two contenders will be held on November 16.

With 18 polls released since January 1, 2019 to analyze—11 since September 1, including five from Republican-leaning JMC Analytics (rated C+ by FiveThirtyEight), four from Democratic-leaning Remington Research Group (C) and three from unbiased Market Research Insight (B+), there are two questions to ask.

  1. Will Democratic incumbent John Bel Edwards, who has an average lead of 23.2 percentage points (“points”) over his two primary Republican rivals, secure more than 50% of the vote on Saturday, avoiding a runoff?
  2. If he does not, will he face United States House of Representatives (“Representative”) member Ralph Abraham or businessman Eddie Rispone?

As of early on the morning of October 10, Bel Edwards averages (weighted by pollster quality and time to election) 46.6% of the vote, well ahead of Abraham’s 21.5% and Rispone’s 17.9%; three additional candidates included in some polls total 2.9% of the vote,[1] leaving 11.0% undecided. Bel Edwards is tantalizingly close to 50%; assuming these averages are accurate and every undecided voter actually casts a vote, he would need to win just 31.9% of that vote to win an outright majority on Saturday. This is certainly possible, though I would not bet on it; never mind that I do not ever gamble.

That brings us to the question of whom Bel Edwards would face in a runoff. In early September, the weighted-adjusted averages were Bel Edwards 46.5%, Abraham 24.9% and Rispone 10.3%. While Bel Edwards’ position has not materially changed, Rispone has surged 7.6 points, both at the expense of Abraham, down 3.4 points, and by picking up support from some undecided voters. It is now effectively a toss-up between the two Republicans, although Rispone has finished ahead of Abraham in six of the last eight polls.

Either way, however, I estimate Bel Edwards has roughly a 92% chance of winning the runoff, and by around eight or nine points.

**********

For the last 69 days, ever since a string of mass shootings in late July and early August left 34 people dead, I have written a daily tweet which begins “Day XX mourning/decrying/bemoaning XXX mass shooting deaths in US in 2019.” The tweet always includes a call to repeal Amendment II to the Constitution of the United States, about which I first wrote in October 2017, and the hashtag #Repeal2A. To read those tweets, I invite you to follow me at @drnoir33.

While my tweets have clearly not effected any policy changes, I at least continue to call attention to the unaddressed scourge of gun violence in this country, to the point where a candidate for president of the United States could have this harrowing moment on a late night talk show. I have also had some fascinating, umm, conversations with gun enthusiasts, mostly some radical libertarians, while finding common cause with some extraordinary allies.

But what really made me realize how far this nation has come (not in a good way)—and because on this site EVERYTHING ultimately connects—was a seemingly unrelated event.

As I am naturally predisposed toward being a night owl, and because I do my best work after 11 pm, when the apartment becomes wonderfully dark and quiet, I tend to go to sleep well past 3 am, waking in the early afternoon. Indeed, the running joke now is “Daddy has finished breakfast so it must almost be time for Ruby’s supper!”

To wind down in those wee small hours after I turn off my computer, I like to watch selected YouTube videos on our living room television. I am especially drawn to videos produced by WhatCulture, Polyphonic, CineFix, WatchMojo and anything relating to the utterly brilliant third season of Twin Peaks.

A week or so ago, somewhat at random, a video of performances by stand-up comedian Emo Philips on Late Night with David Letterman appeared. I had quite liked the quirky cerebral Phillips 30 or so years ago but had lost track of him since. Intrigued, I began to watch; eventually I watched this 1987 special in its entirety. Another 1987 special, filmed in Washington DC, saw Phillips open his set by observing Joe Biden had just dropped out of the race for the 1988 Democratic presidential nomination.

What is old is new again?

But the bit that really stuck out was this oft-repeated line: “I go the playground often to watch the little kids jump up and down and scream, because they don’t know I’m using blanks,” delivered in what could be described as a deadpan nasal falsetto.

Dang, I thought, nobody could get way with a joke like that today. And the only reason it was even remotely funny in the mid-1980s is because of how unthinkable such an action was.

Yes, it is time to repeal Amendment II.

**********

My birthday was September 30 and, not unlike Nell’s and my wedding anniversary, the day did not go precisely according to plan. Still, I received a generous Amazon gift card from a close friend; we routinely exchange such cards on our respective birthdays.

With it, I purchased a DVD copy of one of my all-time favorite “guilty pleasure” films, The Shadow, the 1994 film starring Alec Baldwin as the titular character. And I promptly decided that I wanted to be his version of the character—dressed all in black with a red scarf covering most of his face—for Halloween this year.

When I shared this notion with my psychotherapist, I had a mild epiphany. One of the issues we routinely discuss is the sense that nobody really listens to me, no matter how “right” I am. (And, yes, I appreciate the irony of making that statement on a blog, where by definition you are listening to me, a fact for which I am very grateful.)

Huh, I said, so for Halloween I choose to be a person that literally nobody can see, only hear. That is very telling.

Here is the thing, however.

For weeks, I have been telling Nell how there was only one thing I want for my birthday. Really and truly, I only want this one thing. I wanted it because my previous version of it had finally ceased to function, which it made it hard to follow up on those wonderful Polyphonic videos.

To her eternal credit, Nell, my brilliant, beautiful, loving and supportive wife of 12 years, listened to me, because this is what I saw when I came downstairs for the first time on September 30:

New keyboard.JPG

OK, OK, it was actually still in its box, covered in birthday cards and ribbons, along with three bags of mini Three Musketeers bars, which I had been craving the past few days for some reason.

But who wants to see a photograph of a box?

This may finally have supplanted my Swiss Army knife as BEST BIRTHDAY PRESENT EVER!, though it is very close.

Until next time…

[1] I assign them “0” if excluded.

September 2019 update: 2020 Democratic presidential nomination scenarios and general election polling

With the third Democratic presidential nomination debate set for September 12, 2019 in Houston, Texas, it is time for an updated assessment of the relative position of the now-20 declared candidates. The more stringent criteria to qualify for this debate—the first to be held on only one night—presaged the end for three more campaigns. Washington Governor Jay Inslee announced on August 21 he would attempt instead to win a third term as governor. United States House of Representatives (“Representative”) member Seth Moulton of Massachusetts dropped out on August 23 (to seek reelection to his House seat), followed by New York Senator Kirsten Gillibrand on August 28. The six candidates who have thus far abandoned their quest to be the 2020 Democratic presidential nominee all exited the race with grace, class and dignity, and I commend them for it.

To learn how I calculate the value I assign to each candidate, NSW-WAPA (national-and-state-weighted weighted-adjusted polling average), please see here[1]. I recently made two other methodological changes. One, I now treat as distinct polling entities two sets of ABC News/Washington Post national-level polls of the 2020 Democratic nomination contest: 1) Two polls, conducted January 21-24 and April 22-25, of adults only which simply asked respondents to name their first choice (as opposed to being read a list of names and being asked to choose one) and 2) two more recent polls (June 28-July 1, September 2-5) which used a list of names. Two, as of their poll conducted August 24-27, I am now using the “likely voters” version of the Harris X tracking poll; I treat these as coming from a distinct “pollster” than the “registered voters” version.

And, of course, here is the September 2019 lighthouse photograph in my Down East 2019 Maine Lighthouses wall calendar.

Sep 2019 lighthouse.JPG

**********

I begin with a heartfelt methodological apologia.

While conducting the “post-first-debate-polls-only” analysis I discuss below, I noticed a significant glitch in how I weighted polling within distinct polling firms. I was also not incorporating more recent national polls correctly. The combined effect was to lower every candidate’s final NSW-WAPA (thus) at most 1.7 percentage points (“points”), while increasing the “Don’t Know/Other” value 4.6 points. However, the relative ordering of the candidates and the spacing between them was unaffected.

Even so, it is an embarrassing error on my part, and I apologize.

Table 1 below aggregates data from all national and state-level polls publicly released since January 1, 2019 (as of 12 am EST September 12, 2019), including:

  • 178 national polls (including 36 weekly Morning Consult tracking polls)
  • 21 Iowa caucuses polls
  • 25 New Hampshire primary polls
  • 6 Nevada caucuses polls
  • 19 South Carolina primary polls
  • 43 Super Tuesday polls[2]
  • 36 polls from 15 other states.[3]

This makes a total of 328 polls, up from 293 in the last update.

Table 1: National-and-state-weighted WAPA for declared 2020 Democratic presidential nomination candidates

Candidate National IA NH NV SC Post-SC NSW-WAPA
Biden 29.0 24.9 23.8 28.6 40.3 27.8 28.7
Sanders 16.2 16.6 19.5 19.9 14.3 15.8 17.4
Warren 13.0 14.9 15.5 17.5 10.5 14.2 14.5
Harris 8.8 10.1 8.6 8.0 10.8 9.1 9.3
Buttigieg 5.3 9.6 8.9 6.5 5.3 6.3 7.5
O’Rourke 3.3 2.8 2.6 2.6 1.9 6.5 2.7
Booker 2.3 2.6 1.6 1.6 3.7 1.6 2.3
Klobuchar 1.2 2.8 1.0 1.0 0.7 1.0 1.5
Yang 1.4 0.8 1.9 1.5 0.9 0.9 1.2
Gabbard 0.8 0.8 2.0 1.2 0.4 0.7 1.1
Castro 1.0 0.8 0.2 1.2 0.2 1.4 0.70
Steyer 0.2 0.1 0.5 2.1 0.5 0.2 0.65
Delaney 0.3 1.0 0.6 0.00 0.4 0.2 0.49
Bennet 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.28
Williamson 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.28
Ryan 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.23
de Blasio 0.3 0.1 0.00 0.6 0.1 0.1 0.19
Bullock 0.3 0.4 0.00 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.17
Sestak 0.02 0.1 0.00 0.2 0.00 0.1 0.07
Messam 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.1 0.04 0.03
DK/Other 13.9 9.6 11.4 4.7 7.6 12.3 9.5

The race has settled into a kind of stasis following the first two rounds of debates. Former Vice President Joe Biden remains the frontrunner (28.7), primarily because of his 26-point lead in South Carolina primary polls. However, he is less strong in Iowa and New Hampshire, where the candidates battling for second place overall, Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders (17.4) and Massachusetts Senator Elizabeth Warren (14.5), are even closer to first place. Rounding out a clear top five, both overall and in the four earliest states, are California Senator Kamala Harris (9.3) and South Bend, Indiana Mayor Pete Buttigieg (7.5). These five candidates account for over three-quarters (77.4%) of Democratic voter preferences at this point, and the conventional wisdom is the 2020 Democratic presidential nominee will be one of them.

In the next tier are candidates with NSW-WAPA between 1.0 and 3.0 who could yet rise in the polls with strong debate performances: former Texas Representative Beto O’Rourke, New Jersey Senator Cory Booker, Minnesota Senator Amy Klobuchar, entrepreneur Andrew Yang and Hawaii Representative Tulsi Gabbard. Of this group, only Gabbard did not qualify for the September 2019 debate, though may yet meet the criteria for the fourth round of Democratic presidential nomination debates (October 15 and possibly October 16). Just behind Gabbard, essentially tied for 11th place, are former Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Julian Castro and billionaire activist Tom Steyer; Castro is the 10th and final September 2019 debate qualifier, while Steyer has already qualified for the October 2019 debate(s).

These 12 candidates total 87.0% of Democratic voter preferences. With 9.5%[4] undecided or choosing an unlisted candidate, the remaining seven candidates are divvying up just 3.5% between them; as none of them appears close to making the October 2019 debate(s), I expect them to end their campaigns by the end of 2019.

**********

Because I have been playing them out in my head, I will sketch out some likely nomination-winning scenarios at this point; as these are purely thought experiments, they should not be taken as predictions. These scenarios incorporate additional information like endorsements, my own study of the presidential nomination process[5] and the data in Table 2, derived only from polls that began on June 28, 2019 or later (i.e., after the first round of debates; n=137).

Table 2: National-and-state-weighted WAPA for declared 2020 Democratic presidential nomination candidates—starting date of poll June 28, 2019 or later

Candidate National IA NH NV SC Post-SC NSW-WAPA
Biden 27.8 23.8 21.9 26.1 38.5 26.2 27.0
Sanders 15.9 14.5 19.8 21.4 15.0 15.3 17.3
Warren 15.4 18.7 19.0 19.0 12.0 16.7 17.2
Harris 9.2 12.2 10.2 8.2 12.9 10.0 10.8
Buttigieg 5.0 9.3 9.1 5.3 4.7 5.4 7.0
Booker 2.1 2.0 1.6 1.2 3.2 1.3 1.9
O’Rourke 2.4 1.4 1.2 1.8 1.0 6.2 1.9
Yang 1.9 1.0 2.4 1.3 0.9 1.1 1.4
Gabbard 1.0 0.9 2.6 1.3 0.5 0.9 1.3
Klobuchar 1.1 2.5 1.2 0.9 0.7 0.6 1.3
Steyer 0.4 0.02 0.7 3.4 0.9 0.3 1.0
Castro 1.1 0.7 0.3 1.4 0.2 1.4 0.75
Delaney 0.3 0.8 0.6 0.00 0.7 0.2 0.52
Bennet 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.38
Williamson 0.5 0.1 0.6 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.36
de Blasio 0.4 0.3 0.00 0.9 0.1 0.1 0.28
Ryan 0.4 0.00 0.00 0.6 0.5 0.2 0.25
Bullock 0.3 0.5 0.00 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.24
Sestak 0.03 0.1 0.00 0.4 0.00 0.1 0.11
Messam 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.1 0.01
DK/Other 13.7 9.6 7.2 3.8 6.0 12.2 7.8

The top five remains the same (and combine for a slightly higher 79.3%), though Biden and Buttigieg are lower, while Sanders, Harris and, especially, Warren are higher.  The next tier of seven candidates is closely bunched together between 0.7 and 1.9. And a slightly smaller percentage (7.8) are undecided or prefer a different candidate.

But the real differences may be seen in Iowa, where Warren is now a close second to Biden, and New Hampshire, which is essentially a three-way tie between Biden, Sanders and Warren; Nevada is similar, with Biden slightly further ahead—and Steyer has his best showing (3.4) by far. Gabbard (2.6) and Yang (2.4) are similarly rising in New Hampshire.

In these scenarios I assume two things:

  1. Results in the four early states will continue to have an outsized impact on all subsequent contests,
  2. Candidates not finishing in the top five in any of Iowa, New Hampshire or South Carolina will end their campaign before March 3, 2020

Scenario 1: Biden wins easily.

This is the most obvious scenario: the front-runner wins. Biden has consistently led national and most state polls. He leads Harris in endorsement “points,” though relatively few Democratic party officials have endorsed a candidate. He is winning the “Hillary Clinton 2016 coalition”: older, moderate/conservative and black Democrats. And even after two shaky debate performances, Biden is still nearly 10 points ahead of Sanders and Warren overall in the most recent polling—and about five points ahead in the leadoff Iowa caucuses.

In this scenario, Biden wins the Iowa caucuses by closer to 10 points, with Sanders, Warren and Buttigieg splitting the votes of whiter, younger, more liberal Democrats, and Harris a distant fifth; no other candidate is close. Biden, who lately has been downplaying his chances in the early states, looks like the winner he was presumed to be.

Klobuchar, who had pinned everything on Iowa, drops out of the race and endorse Biden (instead of a Senate colleague or the untested Buttigieg). This, along with support from supporters of former candidates, breaks the logjam in New Hampshire. Biden wins there in the high single digits as Sanders, Warren and Buttigieg continue to split the not-Biden vote between them. Nevada becomes an afterthought (allowing Steyer to finish a surprising fourth), as all eyes turn to South Carolina—where Biden wins easily.

After the remaining candidates make their last stands on Super Tuesday (Warren in Massachusetts; Harris, Yang, Steyer and Gabbard in California; O’Rourke and Castro in Texas), Biden wins the majority of delegates awarded that day, after which only Sanders and Warren are serious challengers. Uncommitted officials, sensing a chance to focus on President Donald J. Trump, quickly coalesce behind Biden. He effectively wraps up the nomination on April 28, when he trounces Sanders and Warren in the Pennsylvania primary, the state where he was born, and whose southern neighbor (Delaware) he served in the Senate for 36 years.

Scenario 2: Warren’s early state strength vaults her to the nomination.

This is essentially the inverse of Scenario 1 and, to my mind, about equally as likely. Warren wins the Iowa caucuses because her far-more enthusiastic supporters show up to a caucus site on a Monday night in early February. Biden’s supporters, however, do not caucus in expected numbers, and he finishes a disappointing third, behind Sanders and barely ahead of Buttigieg and Harris. Booker finishes a surprisingly strong sixth, thanks to a core of enthusiastic supporters, though it is still disappointing. Nobody else is even close; Klobuchar again drops out of the race, though this time she endorses Warren. Harris, meanwhile, focuses on doing well in South Carolina and California.

Sensing a winner, supporters of other “liberal” candidates break for Warren, who edges out Sanders to win the New Hampshire primary; Biden actually finishes third behind Buttigieg. Yang and Gabbard finish higher than expected, but not enough to garner any momentum. Warren then makes it three-for-three in Nevada, as even some Sanders voters caucus for her; Biden finishes fourth, behind a surprisingly-strong Steyer.

In a matter of days, the very core of Biden’s appeal—his “electability”—is irreparably damaged. He still wins the South Carolina primary on the strength of moderate/conservative Democrats alarmed by the one-two punch of Warren and Sanders; pragmatic black Democrats split their votes between Biden, Harris and Warren (with a smattering for Booker), who finish in that order.

Just prior to Super Tuesday, though, Booker, Buttigieg, Castro and Yang—all eyeing the vice-presidential nomination—drop out of the race and endorse Warren. As a result, on Super Tuesday, besides her home states of Massachusetts, Warren wins Colorado, Minnesota and, in a narrow upset, Virginia. Biden wins the southern states of Alabama, North Carolina, Oklahoma and Tennessee, but by smaller margins than expected.

Texas is an inconclusive muddle, with Biden, Warren and O’Rourke battling for first place (roughly in that order)—but the game-changer is California. On the strength of white liberals (who have broken decisively from Sanders, especially women) and a slight plurality of LatinX voters, and with Biden and Harris splitting the black vote between them, Warren wins the California primary.

Harris, O’Rourke and Steyer see the writing on the wall and drop out, endorsing Warren. Gabbard also drops out, but chooses to endorse Sanders instead.

It is now effectively a two-person race between Biden and Warren, the clear front-runner. Sanders soldiers on, despite not having won a single contest, though his percentages languish around 10-15%, just enough to win some delegates here and there.

Biden continues to win primaries in the south (including the Florida primary on March 17) with Harris and Booker out of the race, but his only win outside the south is Ohio on March 10. Making his last stand in Pennsylvania, his high-single-digit win is deemed a disappointment. Warren then wins the Indiana primary on May 3, effectively wrapping up the nomination.

Scenarios 1a and 2a: Biden and Warren split the early states

It is highly plausible that Biden wins Iowa and South Carolina, while Warren wins New Hampshire and Nevada. Sanders, Harris and Buttigieg survive to battle on Super Tuesday, but Warren ends up winning California (as just enough Harris supporters instead vote for Warren), while Biden wins Texas (with O’Rourke a distant third). Sanders soldiers on, but it would once again be a Biden-Warren race. Given his base of support, Biden would probably be the slight favorite in this scenario.

In fact, nearly every scenario I game out ends up with either Biden or Warren as the nominee. There are, however, some entertaining (if less likely) exceptions:

Scenario 3: Sanders wins Iowa and New Hampshire

This is essentially 2016 all over again (Sanders barely lost Iowa before a landslide win in New Hampshire), except with three or four other viable candidates instead of one.

In this scenario, Biden and Warren begin to attack each other directly in the September and October debates, ultimately depressing turnout for both as voting begins in February 2020. The beneficiary is Sanders, who suddenly appears to be the sage elder statesman (and whose head-to-head polling numbers against Trump cause a second look at his candidacy): his loyal supporters push him over the top in Iowa—ahead of a surprisingly-strong Buttigieg, who picked up many disgruntled Biden and Warren voters. Harris also benefits, essentially tying the latter two for third place.

New Hampshire now becomes a battle between Sanders and Buttigieg, with Harris focusing on South Carolina and California. Once again, New Hampshire supports the familiar neighbor, though Buttigieg again makes it surprisingly close.

And national Democrats get very nervous, despite those head-to-head polls.

Ignoring Nevada (which Sanders wins easily), and taking solace in the prospect of a solid, historic ticket to go against Trump and Vice President Mike Pence[6], they rapidly and tactically endorse Harris and Buttigieg. Having finished no higher than sixth in any of the first three contests, every other candidate drops out and endorses either Harris or Buttigieg (except Williamson and Gabbard, who back Sanders).

Biden and Warren fight on, but with their candidacies fatally damaged, Harris wins South Carolina, with Buttigieg a solid second, well ahead of Sanders. Harris and Buttigieg then make a strategic decision to make every Super Tuesday contest a one-on-one battle against Sanders, who can no longer win with around 20-25% of the vote.

On March 3, Harris wins California and the southern states (Alabama, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia) while Buttigieg wins Colorado, Massachusetts and Minnesota. Sanders finishes second or third in every state, collecting some delegates, while Biden and Warren see their campaigns end with a whimper.

Opening a commanding one-two lead in delegates, Harris and Buttigieg follow the same path as Kerry and North Carolina Senator John Edwards in 2004: a relatively calm trek through the remaining primaries and caucuses, with Harris steadily closing in on the nomination. Once she does, she surprises nobody by selecting Buttigieg as her running mate, just as Kerry chose Edwards in 2004.

Scenario 4: Someone other than Biden, Sanders or Warren wins Iowa and/or New Hampshire

This is the true wild card scenario, which is nearly impossible to game out at this point.

Still, let us suppose Booker continues to have very strong debate performances, and with them now on a single night (for the sake of argument, the October debate is one night), this finally resonates with voters, who take a long second look at him.

As a result, he surprises everyone by winning the Iowa caucuses. Rather than campaign in New Hampshire or Nevada, which he concedes to Sanders and Warren, he focuses exclusively on South Carolina. Sensing weakness in Biden, and excited by his Iowa win, black voters overwhelmingly support Booker, who just edges Biden, effectively ending that latter’s campaign.

Booker and Warren (who won New Hampshire and Nevada) then battle it out on Super Tuesday. With Harris making a last stand in California, and O’Rourke doing the same in Texas, Warren wins the former, Booker the latter. Warren and Booker now effectively replay the 2008 campaign between then-Senators Barack Obama and Clinton, with the most likely outcome either a Warren-Booker or a Booker-Warren ticket.

An alternative scenario sees Buttigieg finishing in the top two or three in Iowa (behind Biden and Warren in some order), then winning the New Hampshire primary. Nevada is again an afterthought, and Biden wins South Carolina. This feels somewhat like the 1988 Republican nomination battle, when then-Senator Bob Dole of Kansas won Iowa, but ultimately lost to the front runner, then-Vice-President George H. W. Bush; Biden thus eventually prevails.

What these scenarios suggests is that, based upon what we know now, Biden and Warren are far and away the most likely nominees, but there are universes in which Harris or Booker win the nomination. By contrast, it is very difficult to see Sanders or (probably) Buttigieg doing so…or any other candidate, for that matter.

**********

Because Democrats other than Biden and Sanders, who would beat Trump nationally by 9.0 and 5.7 points, respectively, are also winning (or barely losing) hypothetical head-to-head match-ups, “2020 Democratic nominee” (averages vs. Trump weighted by likelihood of being the nominee) now beats Trump by 4.1 points. This is higher than the median Democratic presidential margin (+3.0 points) in the previous six presidential elections, which include three elections with an incumbent seeking reelection and three elections with no incumbent. However, once you exclude Biden and Sanders, the margin over Trump decreases to 1.0 points; Warren would hypothetically win by 2.5 points and Harris by 1.9 points, while Buttigieg, O’Rourke and Booker would lose by less than one point.

Still, given that state-level results actually determine the winner of a presidential election (via the Electoral College), it is more informative to look to those polls, where they are publicly-available. Using my 3W-RDM, a measure of how much more or less Democratic a state’s voting is relative to the nation as a whole, this polling[7] implies Democrats would win the national popular vote by between 3.2 (excluding Biden and Sanders) and 6.5 (including Biden and Sanders) points on average. Most encouraging to Democrats should be the polls from North Carolina (R+6.0) and Texas (R+15.3), which show a very close race, implying a national Democratic lead of 5-7-and 12-15-points, respectively; these polls confirm strong opportunities for Democrats in the southeast and southwest. By contrast, however, a few polls from Democratic-leaning Maine (D+5.9) and Nevada (D+2.0) imply Democrats would lose nationwide by 1-6 points. Those remain the exceptions, however, to what continues to be encouraging news for Democrats in 2020.

Until next time…

[1] Essentially, polls are weighted within areal units (nation, state) by days to the nominating contest and pollster quality to form a unit-specific average, then a weighted average is taken across Iowa (weight=5), New Hampshire (5), Nevada (4), South Carolina (4), the time-weighted average of all subsequent contests (2) and nationwide (1). Within the subsequent contests, I now weight the 10 March 3, 2020 “Super Tuesday” states (Alabama, California, Colorado, Massachusetts, Minnesota, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia) twice as much as the subsequent contests. As of this writing, I have at least one poll from (in chronological order) Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Ohio, Washington, Arizona, Florida, Illinois, Georgia, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, Indiana, Oregon and New Jersey.

[2] Primarily Texas (15), California (14)

[3] Primarily Florida (9), Pennsylvania (5), Wisconsin (5)

[4] This does include polls that limit the number of candidates queried.

[5] As a doctoral student in government at Harvard in the early 1990s, I was a teaching assistant for an undergraduate course on this very topic.

[6] As of this writing, anyway.

[7] From Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, Michigan, North Carolina, Texas, Iowa, Arizona, South Carolina, Minnesota, Nevada, Massachusetts, Florida, New York, Kentucky, Maine, Ohio, North Dakota, California, Alaska, Washington, Colorado, Missouri, Utah.

A post-Labor-Day look at 2019 elections for U.S. House and governor

In May, I took a “wicked early” look at, among other elections, the three gubernatorial elections to be held on November 5, 2019 in Kentucky, Louisiana and Mississippi. I also updated my estimated effects of incumbency for Democratic and Republican United States Senators (“Senators”) and governors.

Having passed Labor Day, the traditional start of the fall campaign season, I want to take a closer look at those three 2019 gubernatorial elections, as well as a “do-over” election for the United States House of Representatives (“House”) to be held in North Carolina’s 9th Congressional District (“CD”) on September 10, 2019[1].

Specifically, I want to add available public polling to the fundamentals of each election: a baseline estimate of the outcome of an election. I calculate an election’s fundamentals by summing three values:

  1. State partisan lean, measured by my 3W-RDM[2],
  2. Incumbency advantage, which I estimate to be 5.7 percentage points (“points”) for incumbent Democratic governors and 8.5 points for incumbent Republican incumbent governors, and
  3. National partisan lean, measured by the “generic ballot” question for the House[3]. As of the evening of September 5, 2019, FiveThirtyEight gave Democrats a 6.5-point edge on this measure.

Before I discuss the individual races, however, just bear with me while I discuss my new approach to converting fundamentals and polling averages into probabilities, as well as the weights I now use to combine those two values into a single “projection” and probability of victory.

Probability. When I calculated updated advantages for Senators and governor, I used the simple arithmetic difference between the “expected” result (fundamentals-only) and the actual results. This means I have an “error” distribution for 106 gubernatorial elections going back to 2011. These errors are roughly normally distributed, with a mean of 0.6 points and a very high standard deviation of 17.5 points, suggesting inordinate uncertainty in my fundamentals estimates.

Still, using the properties of the normal distribution, I can estimate the probability a given estimate of fundamentals equates to a Democratic win (i.e., Democratic margin > 0).

Similarly, I can generate the probability a WAPA equates to a Democratic win using the formula

Standard deviation = square root of ((D average*R average)/total number polled),

using the simple polling averages for the Democratic and Republican candidates. Technically, this is calculating the margin of error (without multiplying by a “z-score” to get, say, a 95% confidence level), but with an assumed normal distribution it is the functional equivalent of a standard deviation.

Time weighting. This close to election day, polling averages should be given more weight than fundamentals, and that weight should increase daily. Since my polling data for these races begins on January 1, 2019, I used the number of days between that day and November 5, 2019[4]—308—as the denominator for my weight. The numerator is the number of days between January 1, 2019 and the closing field date of the most recent poll of that election. That ratio is the weight given to WAPA, with one minus that weight applied to the fundamentals.

For example, the most recent poll of the Kentucky gubernatorial election was in the field from August 19 to August 22, 2019. It is 233 days from January 1 to August 22 this year; dividing 233 by 308 yields 0.754. Thus, as of now, I weight WAPA in Kentucky 0.754 and fundamentals 0.246. The other two gubernatorial elections have similar 3-1 ratios of polling to fundamentals, which seems right.

**********

Let us begin the election in North Carolina’s 9th House CD. In the 2018 midterm election, Republican Mark Harris, a conservative pastor, appeared to defeat Democrat Dan McCready, an entrepreneur and former Marine Corps captain, by just 905 votes (0.4%). However, once substantial evidence emerged of ballot tampering by a Republican operative named Leslie McCrae Dowless, the state election board refused to certify the election results. Instead, they called for a new election—including new primaries to select each party’s nominees. While McCready ran unopposed, Republicans chose State Senator Dan Bishop in a July 9 runoff election.

According to the Cook Political Report, this CD leans 8.0 points more Republican than the nation. With no incumbent running, the fundamentals suggest a generic Republican would beat a generic Democrat by 1.5 points.

However, examination of available public polling[5]–adjusted for mean partisan bias and pollster quality, as well as time to election (what I call “WAPA”: weighted-adjusted polling average)—suggests McCready is ahead by 0.5 points. That lead increases to nearly two points in the two most recent polls, both taken in late August. Take this WAPA with multiple grains of salt, however, as the average pollster rating is just C+.

Still, the time-weighed polling and fundamentals by time, gives you an aggregate of D+0.3, making this race a true toss-up, and likely within recount territory. But any outcome between D+2 and R+2 is extremely plausible…and that includes R+0.4; it would be a beautiful bit of irony if Bishop wins by the same 0.4 points Harris led by on election day 2018.

**********

That Democrats are reasonably competitive in all three gubernatorial elections this fall is extraordinary given they average 23.1 points more Republican than the nation (Table 1). A word of caution, however: the available public polling in these races ranges from an average of C+ (Mississippi) to B/B- (Kentucky).

Table 1. 2019 Gubernatorial elections

Incumbent Party State 3W-RDM Fund WAPA Comb Prob D win
John Bel Edwards D LA R+22.2 R+10.0 D+9.1 D+3.8 79.5%
Open seat R MS R+18.5 R+12.0 R+4.0 R+6.1 6.9%
Matt Bevin R KY R+28.7 R+30.7 D+4.7 R+4.0 76.5%

The likeliest Democratic win is in Louisiana, where Democratic incumbent John Bel Edwards remains fairly popular (favorable 47%, unfavorable 33% in the most recent Morning Consult polling). This is remarkable in a heavily Republican state; even as an incumbent in a strongly-Democratic year, he would still be expected to lose by about 10 points to a generic Republican (though that would still give him about a 30% chance based on recent electoral history).

John_Bel_Edwards

Photograph of John Bel Edwards from here

Louisiana will actually hold a “jungle primary” on October 12 in which every declared candidate will run regardless of party affiliation. If no candidate captures more than 50% of the vote, the top two vote-getters will face off in a runoff election on November 16. The available polling[6] shows Bel Edwards far ahead of his two primary Republican challengers, House Member Ralph Abraham and businessman Eddie Rispone. WAPA values across the available public polls shows Bel Edwards at 46.5%, Abraham at 24.9% and Rispone at 10.3%, with the remaining 18.3% scattered among a handful of other candidates and undecided. Bel Edwards could well fall shy of a majority on October 12.

His likeliest opponent appears to be Abraham, though he recently stirred up some self-inflicted controversy. Head-to-head matchups suggest Bel Edwards would defeat him by about 7 points. Similar polls suggest Bel Edwards would defeat Rispone by about 16 points. If we assume Abraham would be roughly a 5:2 favorite to be Bel Edwards’ runoff opponent, the weighted average is a Bel Edwards win by about nine points. Overall, Bel Edwards is about a 4:1 favorite to win reelection.

At the other end of the popularity spectrum, meanwhile, is Republican governor Matt Bevin of Kentucky, the least popular governor in the country (if you subtract his unfavorable rating of 56% from his favorable rating of 32%). In fact, the incumbent Bevin only defeated State House member Robert Goforth in the May 21 primary 52-39%. Still, even with a -24-point differential in favorability and a divided party, Kentucky is such a Republican-leaning state that the fundamentals have Bevin beating a generic Democrat by a whopping 30.7 points. That generic Democrat would have only about a 4% chance of winning, based on recent electoral history.

However, in a closely-fought primary, Kentucky Democrats nominated state Attorney General Andy Beshear, whose father Steve was governor of Kentucky (as a Democrat) from 2008-2016. And Beshear’s name may be just enough to defeat Bevin, even in the 7th most Republican state in the country. The Democrat leads by 4.7 points in the WAPA, which would make him essentially a shoo-in to win; this value is derived from only three publicly-available (two with a strong Democratic lean) polls, though[7].

BeshearAndy_320

Photograph of Andy Beshear from here.

The time-weighted average of fundamentals and WAPA is Bevin+4.0, reflecting the enormous disparity between the two. Still, with WAPA weighted 3-1 over fundamentals, Beshear would seem to be about a 3:1 favorite.

I remain skeptical, though, and consider this race essentially a toss-up (maybe even a slight advantage for Bevin) until I see more and higher-quality polling.

As for the open seat in Mississippi, where Republican Governor Phil Bryant is not seeking reelection, the fundamentals have a generic Republican defeating a generic Democrat by 12.0 points, giving that Democrat about a 1-in-4 chance of winning based on recent electoral history.

On August 6, Democrats nominated state Attorney General Jim Hood, who easily defeated seven other candidates, while Republicans nominated Lieutenant Governor Tate Reeves, who edged state Supreme Court Chief Justice William Waller in a controversial August 27 runoff election. In fact, following filmed instances of electronic voting machines switching Waller votes to Reeves, Waller refuses to endorse his party’s gubernatorial nominee.

Unlike in Kentucky and Louisiana, though, the few publicly-available Mississippi polls[8] are broadly in line with the fundamentals; the WAPA is Reeves+4.0, making him a near-certain victor. In fact, if you remove two Democratic-leaning Hickman Analytics polls, Reeves’ lead over Hood jumps to about 10 points. The time-weighted average has Reeves up about six points, with a roughly 93% chance of victory.

In sum, then, the good news for Democrats in these three races—in heavily Republican southern states—is that they are unlikely to lose any ground in governor’s mansions overall (they now trail Republicans 23-27), and could even net one new seat in Kentucky, of all places.

Until next time…

[1] There will also be a special election in North Carolina’s 3rd CD that day, to fill the seat vacated when GOP House Member Walter Jones died on February 13, but Republican Greg Murphy is heavily favored to win that seat over Democrat Allen Thomas.

[2] Essentially, how much more or less Democratic a state’s presidential voting has been relative to the nation as a whole over the last three presidential elections.

[3] If the election for were held today, would you vote for the Democratic candidate, the Republican candidate, or some other candidate?”

[4] November 16 for Louisiana

[5] RRH Elections, 8/26-8/28/2019, 500 LV: Harper Polling/Clarity Campaign Labs, 8/26-8/28/2019, 551 RV; Anzalone Liszt Grove Research, 7/15-7/18/2019, 450 RV; Atlantic Media and Research, 5/20-5/30/2019, 358 RV; JMC Enterprises, 5/21-5/24/2019, 350 RV

[6] Market Research Insight 8/13-8/16/2019, 4/9-4/11/2019, 600 LV; Multi-Quest International, 7/19-7/21/2019, 601 RV; Remington Research Group, 6/1-6/2/2019 (1,471 LV), 3/13-3/14/2019 (1,484 LV); JMC Enterprises, 4/25-4/29/2019, 650 LV; LJR Custom Strategies, 1/14-1/17/2019, 600 LV

[7] Garin-Hart-Yang Research Group, 8/19-8/22/2019, 501 LV; Clarity Campaign Labs, 8/12-8/13/2019, 792 LV; Gravis Marketing, 6/11-6/12/2019, 741 LV

[8] Hickman Analytics, 8/11-8/15/2019 (600 LV), 5/5-5/9/2019 (604 LV); Survey Monkey, 7/2-7/16/2019, 1.042 RV; Impact Management Group, 6/10-6/14/2019, 610 LV; Mason-Dixon Polling & Research, Inc., 1/30-2/1/2019, 625 RV; OnMessage Inc., 1/28-1/30/2019, 600 LV

Looking in the mirror, 2020 Democratic nomination polls edition

Monthly since April 2019, I have updated my weighted-adjusted polling averages for the 2020 Democratic presidential nomination. You may read about my aggregation methods here, but a key difference between my algorithm and those used by some other polling aggregators (e.g. RealClearPolitics) is that I use every publicly-available poll (as listed on FiveThirtyEight.com) released since January 1, 2019.

I Voted sticker

This means I do not:

  1. Exclude polls based on “quality,”
  2. Drop polls from the algorithm after a certain period of time, or
  3. Distinguish between polls of adults, registered voters and likely voters.

I do, however, give much more weight to polls from higher-quality pollsters (as measured by FiveThirtyEight) and those released more recently. I weight “quality” by converting grades to numeric equivalents (A+=4.3, A=4.0) then dividing by 4.3. And I weight more recent polls by dividing the number of days between the poll’s field dates midpoint and January 1, 2019 by the number of days between January 1, 2019 and the election being assessed. Finally, I have not seen any appreciable difference in candidate standing based upon what set of respondents is sampled.

Simply put, I would rather collect more information, even of lower “quality” or “outdated,” than less. I would prefer to avoid defending exclusion/inclusion criteria.

My aggregation process also does something no other polling average or selection process does. It yields a single score (national-and-state-weighted weighted-adjusted polling average, or NSW-WAPA) for each 2020 Democratic nomination candidate based upon the fact nominations are won through the accumulation of delegates committed to voting for them at the 2020 Democratic National Convention. These delegates are accrued at the state level, usually based upon the results of that state’s presidential primary or caucuses. NSW-WAPA combines state and national polling averages (WAPA), weighting WAPA from the early state contests of Iowa, New Hampshire, Nevada and South Carolina higher than those from later states (with Super Tuesday states weighted twice as high) and national WAPA lowest of all.

As a brief aside, while I try to keep my personal feelings as far from this site as I can, there are two things even the best political journalists do that annoy me to no end:

  1. They call caucuses simply “caucus.” (Multiple such events, requiring time and effort, each called a “caucus,” will be held on the same day in such states as Iowa and Nevada)
  2. They refer to a complex, multi-stage, months-long nomination process as a “primary.” (“Primary” implies a single, national, one-day event in which every interested party member casts a ballot for the person they want to be their party’s presidential nominee. There is no such event.)

It is, frankly, lazy writing and reporting from people I otherwise respect and who should know better. I understand that “caucuses+ is an awkward word to pronounce, and that “nomination process” is a mouthful, but that is no excuse for inaccuracy and imprecision.

OK, I have put my soapbox back in the closet. Thank you for listening.

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Having chastised political journalists, I now look in the mirror myself.

I believe my algorithm approach (modeled to a large extent on the FiveThirtyEight approach) is the appropriate one, because it is both more comprehensive (individual higher quality polls may be outliers while certain lower quality polls may better reflect current preferences) and less prone to fluctuate wildly based on any single fluky poll or set of polls.

Nonetheless, it is important to ask if my algorithmic choices are biasing my NSW-WAPA in some way. By “bias,” I mean the mathematical difference between a calculated value and some platonic ideal “true” value.

There are three ways to think about this question:

  1. What would happen to NSW-WAPA if I excluded “lower quality” polls entirely?
  2. Does my current weighting scheme give outdated polls too much influence on what is essentially a snapshot of current voter preferences?
  3. Am I correct that the type of voters sampled (e., registered vs. likely voters) does not make an appreciable difference in NSW-WAPA?

I altered my algorithm to reflect these three questions then compared the resulting NSW-WAPA to what I typically calculate. The results are summarized in the following sections.

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Pollster Quality. As noted, FiveThirtyEight assigns a letter grade to dozens of polling organizations based on how they conduct polls (e.g., do they call cellphones as well as landlines; do they use live callers or recordings, sometimes called “robo-polls;” do they randomly select subjects or are they Internet- or panel-based). They also assign a C+ to pollsters who did appear in their May 2018 update.

I include A+-level pollsters like Monmouth University and Seltzer & Co. (gold standard of Iowa polling, extremely difficult in multi-candidate caucuses), C- (and lower)-level pollsters like Zogby Interactive/JZ Analytics (C), McLaughlin & Associates (C-) and Survey Monkey (D-), as well as all pollsters in between.

On balance, the polling is OK, averaging between B and B-, depending on the location; B is a good midpoint.

But what if I only included pollsters with at least a B rating from FiveThirtyEight (while still weighting as before)?

First, the set of polls drops essentially in half, from:

  • 157 national polls to 62 (34 to 17[1] pollsters)
  • 20 Iowa polls to 10, (10 to six pollsters)
  • 22 New Hampshire polls to 11 (10 pollsters to six pollsters)
  • Five Nevada polls to two (four to two pollsters)
  • 18 South Carolina polls to six (eight to five pollsters)
  • 36 Super Tuesday polls (10 states) to 16 polls, with 0 polls from Alabama, Minnesota, Oklahoma, Tennessee or Virginia
  • 32 polls from 14 other states to 10 polls from six other states (Michigan, Ohio, Florida, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, Oregon).

The number of polls overall drops from 293 (national, 28 states) to 117 (national, 15 states). However, the overall quality rises from B/B- to A-/B+ (precisely the student I was at Yale).

Table 1 compares NSW-WAPA with and without “lower quality” pollsters for the 21 announced Democratic candidates:

Table 1: NSW-WAPA for declared 2020 Democratic presidential nomination candidates with and without pollsters rated B- or lower by FiveThirtyEight

Candidate All Polls Pollster Rating≥B Difference
Biden 27.5 29.8 2.27
Sanders 16.0 15.8 -0.20
Warren 13.2 12.5 -0.73
Harris 9.2 8.8 -0.40
Buttigieg 7.5 6.5 -1.05
O’Rourke 2.6 2.7 0.13
Booker 2.2 2.2 -0.01
Klobuchar 1.5 1.5 -0.02
Yang 1.1 1.0 -0.10
Gabbard 0.9 0.7 -0.17
Steyer 0.6 0.2 -0.41
Castro 0.6 0.6 -0.02
Gillibrand 0.5 0.5 -0.05
Delaney 0.4 0.4 0.02
Bennet 0.3 0.3 -0.03
Williamson 0.3 0.3 0.04
Ryan 0.2 0.2 -0.04
Bullock 0.2 0.1 -0.07
de Blasio 0.1 0.0 -0.11
Messam 0.0 0.1 0.02
Sestak 0.0 0.0 0.01
DK/Other 14.1 15.0 1.16

On average, there is no appreciable difference (-0.04) based on the two criteria. Regardless of direction, the average candidate shift is just 0.28.

Most of that comes from former Vice President Joe Biden, who has a 2.27 higher NSW-WAPA (29.8) in the higher-quality polls than among all polls. While I did not examine the data this way, this would imply a NSW-WPA of “just” 25.0 using only the lower-quality polls, though he would still clearly be in first place, about nine points ahead of Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders (~16.2). No other candidate does appreciably better in the higher-quality polls, with the possible exception of former Texas United States House of Representatives (“House”) member Beto O’Rourke (2.75 vs. 2.62).

In fact, a number of candidates fared worse in the higher-quality polls relative to all polls, most notably South Bend, Indiana Mayor Pete Buttigieg (-1.05), Massachusetts Senator Elizabeth Warren (-0.73) and billionaire activist Tom Steyer (-0.41). However, the only one of the three whose relative positioning would change is Steyer; using only the highest-quality polls, he drops from 11th place to 17th place.

Curiously, the number of respondents selecting “don’t know/not sure” or an unlisted candidate rises 1.16 to 15.1 when only higher-quality polls are analyzed.

Overall, however, while my aggregation method may slightly underrate Biden’s position (and percentage not choosing a listed candidate) and slightly overrate the positions of Buttigieg, Warren and Steyer, these differences are fairly minor.

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Poll recency. One simple way to down-weight older polls faster is to square the weight. For example, in my current algorithm, a poll whose field midpoint is August 22 (weight=0.417) is weighted four times as much as a poll whose field midpoint is February 28 (weight=0.104). Squaring each value, however, gives the more recent poll 16 times more weight (0.174 to 0.011).

Table 2 compares NSW-WAPA using more gradual down-weighting to more rapid down-weighting for the 21 announced Democratic candidates:

Table 2: NSW-WAPA for declared 2020 Democratic presidential nomination candidates, simple time weighting vs. squared time weighting

Candidate Simple time weight Squared time weight Difference
Biden 27.5 26.3 -1.22
Sanders 16.0 15.2 -0.75
Warren 13.2 13.7 0.48
Harris 9.2 9.1 -0.07
Buttigieg 7.5 7.5 -0.05
O’Rourke 2.6 2.2 -0.40
Booker 2.2 2.0 -0.23
Klobuchar 1.5 1.4 -0.15
Yang 1.1 1.1 0.00
Gabbard 0.9 0.9 0.01
Steyer 0.6 0.7 0.10
Castro 0.6 0.6 -0.01
Gillibrand 0.5 0.5 0.00
Delaney 0.4 0.4 -0.01
Bennet 0.3 0.3 0.03
Williamson 0.3 0.3 0.02
Ryan 0.2 0.2 -0.01
Bullock 0.2 0.2 0.02
de Blasio 0.1 0.1 0.01
Messam 0.0 0.0 0.00
Sestak 0.0 0.0 0.00
DK/Other 14.1 16.2 2.25

If anything, the differences are even smaller here: although the mean “actual” difference is -0.11, the mean shift, regardless of direction, was only 0.17.

Table 2 does suggest Warren is rising faster (13.7 vs. 13.2) than my more-conservative algorithm shows, while Biden (-1.22), Sanders (-0.75) and O’Rourke (-0.40) are dropping faster; New Jersey Senator Cory Booker and Minnesota Senator Amy Klobuchar also appear to be losing ground recently[2]. Meanwhile, the proportion not choosing any listed candidate seems to be increasing, suggesting greater volatility in the race than my algorithm suggests.

Again, however, these differences are minor.

**********

Likely vs. registered voters. If I were only analyzing national polls, this might make a meaningful difference; of the 157 national polls, just 88 limited their sample to likely voters. And while most eliminated polls are from lower-quality pollsters, it also eliminates polls from Monmouth (A+), CNN/SSRS (A), IBD/TIPP (A-), Quinnipiac University (A-) and Reuters/Ipsos (B+).

However, just two polls (both by Gravis Marketing) in total from Iowa, New Hampshire, Nevada and South Carolina are of registered voters. Moreover, just 18 polls from every other state combined (mostly from Pennsylvania and Texas) were not of registered voters, meaning the number of polls analyzed only drops from 293 to 204, primarily from the lowest-weighted polls (national).

Not surprisingly, there is barely any difference between NSW-WAPA using all polls and only those of likely voters. The mild exception is Steyer dropping from 11th to 15th place (0.62 to 0.39), while the percentage not choosing a listed candidate drops from 14.1 to 13.4.

All combined. Just for fun, I limited the polls being analyzed only to those which were from pollsters with at least a B rating AND sampled likely voters, AND I used the squared time weight. This left 32 national polls, 10 Iowa polls, 11 New Hampshire polls, two Nevada polls, six South Carolina polls, 12 Super Tuesday polls and six polls from all other states (Ohio was dispatched), for a total of just 79 polls.

Table 3: NSW-WAPA for declared 2020 Democratic presidential nomination candidates, comparing original algorithm to most restrictive

Candidate All Polls Pollster Rating≥B Difference
Biden 27.5 29.8 2.29
Sanders 16.0 15.4 -0.61
Warren 13.2 13.4 0.12
Harris 9.2 8.7 -0.50
Buttigieg 7.5 6.8 -0.80
O’Rourke 2.6 2.2 -0.36
Booker 2.2 2.1 -0.14
Klobuchar 1.5 1.4 -0.16
Yang 1.1 1.0 -0.04
Gabbard 0.9 0.8 -0.12
Steyer 0.6 0.2 -0.38
Castro 0.6 0.5 -0.05
Gillibrand 0.5 0.5 -0.05
Delaney 0.4 0.5 0.06
Bennet 0.3 0.3 -0.01
Williamson 0.3 0.4 0.09
Ryan 0.2 0.1 -0.05
Bullock 0.2 0.1 -0.06
de Blasio 0.1 0.0 -0.12
Messam 0.0 0.1 0.02
Sestak 0.0 0.0 0.01
DK/Other 14.1 15.2 1.26

As with limiting polls to those from pollsters with a B rating or better, the average “actual” difference is -0.04, while the average shift, regardless of direction, is 0.29. Other than Biden (+2.29) and “unlisted/unsure” (+1.26), no candidate did measurably better when limiting the analysis to these 79 national and state polls. Buttigieg (-0.80), Sanders (-0.61), Harris (-0.50) and Steyer (-0.38) all did somewhat worse, but—again—only Steyer’s rank changed (11th to 17th).

Conclusion. While my algorithm may somewhat understate Biden’s strength—and overestimate Steyer’s—while not fully capturing the rate at which Warren is gaining support, the overall differences are so minor I see no reason to alter it.

Until next time…

Postscript. For those who are curious, here is a comparison, as of August 28, 2019, between NSW-WAPA and the RealClearPolitics (RCP) averages, combining national and state polls, using my weighting scheme. I exclude New York Senator Kirsten Gillibrand—who dropped out on August 28—and Miramar, FL Mayor Wayne Messam, who is not included in the RCP averages; if a candidate’s average was not listed by RCP (i.e., it was less than 0.5%), I assigned her/him a value of 0.25%.

Table 4: Comparing NSW-WAPA to RealClearPolitics averages for declared 2020 Democratic presidential nomination candidates

Candidate All Polls RealClearPolitics Difference
Biden 27.5 27.8 0.3
Sanders 16.0 15.9 -0.1
Warren 13.2 15.3 2.1
Harris 9.2 10.7 1.5
Buttigieg 7.5 6.4 -1.1
O’Rourke 2.6 1.8 -0.8
Booker 2.2 2.0 -0.2
Klobuchar 1.5 1.8 0.3
Yang 1.1 1.5 0.4
Gabbard 0.9 1.4 0.5
Steyer 0.6 2.0 1.4
Castro 0.6 1.0 0.4
Delaney 0.4 0.5 0.1
Bennet 0.3 0.3 0.0
Williamson 0.3 0.3 0.0
Ryan 0.2 0.4 0.2
Bullock 0.2 0.3 0.1
de Blasio 0.1 0.4 0.3
Sestak 0.0 0.2 0.2
DK/Other 14.1 10.1 -4.0

Other than underestimating the polling strength of Warren, California Senator Kamala Harris and Steyer—and overestimating the strength of O’Rourke—these differences are minimal; the much lower percentage not choosing a listed candidate in the RCP average could easily result from assigning 0.25% (likely too high) to unlisted candidates. The average actual difference is just 0.1, and the average difference, regardless of direction, is 0.7.

The next comprehensive update will come just before the September 12, 2019 debate.

[1] Emerson College, Monmouth, GBAO, CNN/SSRS, ABC News/Washington Post, Quinnipiac, YouGov, Suffolk University, WPA Intelligence, YouGov Blue, NBC News/Wall Street Journal, Perry Undem-YouGov, SurveyUSA, Public Policy Polling (PPP), IBD/TIPP, Reuters/Ipsos, Fox News

[2] This may be illusory for Booker. Taking a simple average of national polls, Booker was at 1.7% between the first and second Democratic debates, but he has risen to 2.7% since then.